

# Climate Change Multilateral Negotiations

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# ¿How to understand climate change negotiations within UNFCCC process?



# Table of Contents

- UNFCCC BACKGROUND
- PROCESS
- INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
- ACTORS
- ROLES
- DOCUMENTATION
- TERMINOLOGY
- ART OF NEGOTIATION
- PROGRESS IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

# UNFCCC BACKGROUND



**United Nations**  
Framework Convention on  
Climate Change

# UNFCCC history

- 1988 IPCC established
- 1992 UNFCCC adopted (entry into force 1994)
- 1998 Kyoto Protocol adopted (entry into force 2005)
- Shift towards global responsibility for GHG emissions, adaptation and loss and damage
- 2009 Copenhagen Accord
- 2011 ADP (Durban Platform for enhanced Action)
- 2012 Doha amendments to the Kyoto Protocol
- 2015 Paris Agreement (2016), APA
- 2018 Paris Agreement Rulebook

# UNFCCC

- Ultimate Objective: To stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
- Guiding Principles:
  - Equity
  - Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC)
  - Specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties
  - Precautionary Principle
  - Sustainable Development
  - Principle of Cooperation

- Key commitments (based on the CBDR and Respective Capabilities)
  - All Parties:
    - Publish national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions
  - Developed Country Parties:
    - Adopt national mitigation policies
    - Provide new and additional financial resources for developing countries
    - Assist developing country Parties particularly vulnerable to climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation
    - Take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance the transfer of technology
    - Take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the LDCs



# PROCESS



**United Nations**  
Framework Convention on  
Climate Change



# Getting prepared for negotiations

- National coordination
- Comprehensive understanding of national interests and priorities
- Good sense of interest other delegations
- Preparatory workshop/session
- Stakeholder consultation
- Mobilizing the negotiation team
- Clear division of labour
- Briefing papers
- Introductory statements
- Basic material to take with



# Procedures (UNFCCC)

- Rules of Procedures: never adopted, they are applied
- Consensus vs Voting
- COP can adopt “decisions necessary to promote effective implementation” of UNFCCC (non formally binding)
- COP can adopt protocols (ratification is necessary)
- COP can adopt emendaments to UNFCCC with 3/4 majority

# Conduct of Business: Agenda

- **Adoption of the agenda:**

- Rule 9 of the draft rules of procedure: preparation of the provisional agenda of each session of **COP/CMP** by the secretariat in agreement with the President

Preparation of the provisional agenda of each session of the **subsidiary bodies** by **the** Secretariat in agreement with the chairs of those bodies

- Rule 11: distribution of the agenda in the six official languages of the UN at least six weeks prior to the session

- If opposition by a Party to the inclusion of one topic: topic “held in abeyance” until further consultation

# Conduct of Business: Quorum

- **Quorum:**

- quorum for opening a meeting: at least one third of the Parties to the Convention or the Protocol

In practice: President verifies that the representatives of all the negotiating groups are present before opening the session

- quorum for decision-making: two thirds of the Parties to the Convention or the Protocol

# INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE



**United Nations**  
Framework Convention on  
Climate Change

# Stages

## Stages In The Treaty-Making Process

Prenegotiation

- Framing of an issue

Iniation of negotiations

- Formulation of national positions
- Choice of negotiating forum
- Adoption of negotiating mandate

Negotiations


- Structural issues: committees, coalitions
- Procedures: decision-making rules, transparency, access
- Formulation of initial draft

Adoptions and entry into force

- Adoption
- National consent: signature and ratification, or accession

Entry into force

# Structure of a UNFCCC Negotiation Session



# Sample day

7:00-10:00	Country delegation meetings Country group coordination meetings
10:00-13:00	Official UN meeting time, for example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plenaries</li> <li>• Working group meetings</li> <li>• Contact group meetings</li> </ul>
13:00-15:00	Country group coordination meetings Informal consultations with other Parties Lunch Side events organized by secretariat, Parties or observers Press conferences by the secretariat, Parties or observers
15:00-18:00	Official UN meeting time
18:00-20:00	Country group coordination meetings
18:00 onwards	Extended formal meeting time Side events Press conferences

# Week overview

- Saturday and Sunday: preparatory country group meetings
- Monday: opening plenary
- Tuesday: contact groups, working groups, informal groups
- Wednesday: in the corridors
- Thursday: Friends of the Chair group
- Friday: closing plenary



# The institutional structure (I)

- The **COP/CMP/CMA** (supreme governing bodies):
- COP (Conference of the Parties): highest decision-making organ
  - responsible for reviewing the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments
  - power to make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention
- CMP (Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol): supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol
  - responsible for overseeing implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (Article 13 of the Kyoto Protocol)
- CMA (Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Agreement): Paris Agreement

# The institutional structure (II)

- **Subsidiary bodies:** two main working bodies within the UNFCCC:
  - SBSTA: provides the COP, CMP and other subsidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
  - SBI: assists the COP and the CMP in the assessment and review of the implementation of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
  - Divers working groups and committees: e.g.; Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), Ad Hoc Working Group on Advancing the Durban Platform (ADP), Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)

# The institutional structure (III)

- **The Bureau:**
  - Composed of the President, seven Vice-Presidents, the Chairs of the SBSTA and the SBI, and the Rapporteur
  - Guides the work of the subsidiary bodies
  - Examines the credentials of representatives and submit its report to the COP
  - Addressees organizational and procedural issues arising during the sessions
  - Provides advice and guidance to the President and chairs of subsidiary bodies on the conduct of business during the sessions

# The institutional structure (IV)

- The **Secretariat**:
  - Services the COP, CMP, subsidiary bodies, the Bureau and other bodies established under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol
  - Makes practical arrangements for sessions and meetings of Convention and Kyoto Protocol bodies;
  - Assists Parties in implementing the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and PA;
  - Performs any other functions that may be determined by the COP and CMP;
  - Prepares official documents for sessions and meetings of the COP, CMP, subsidiary bodies and other bodies established under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
  - Coordinates reviews of Annex I Parties national communications;
  - Compiles GHG inventory data;
  - Organizes meetings and workshops

# Negotiating Forums (I)

- **Plenary** of the COP, CMP and the subsidiary bodies :

- Formal forums for decision-making by Parties;
- Open to participation by all Parties, observer States and organizations, the media and other participants registered for the sessions;
- Rarely place for negotiations on key issues but rather procedural decisions (agenda) and substantive decisions (adoption of policies, procedures related to the implementation of the Convention or Protocol)
- COP or CMP decide of the agendas of subsidiary bodies, contact groups, etc



Source: Worldat1c.org

# Negotiating Forums (II)

- **Contact groups:**

- Established through COP/CMP/SB decision to conduct negotiations on specific agenda items
- Creation based on a proposal by the President, Chair of the subsidiary body or a Party
- Aim: achieving an agreed outcome
- Open to participation by all Parties, including representatives of observer organizations unless one third of the parties object
- Date, time and venue for the contact group meetings advertised in advance



# Negotiating Forums (III)

- **Informal Consultations:**

- Convened by the President or Chair of a subsidiary body or contact group, with the approval of the body

- Invitation of a delegate by the presiding officer to undertake consultations on a particular issue

- Generally open-ended



# Negotiating Forums (IV)

- Other smaller group settings:

- Informal informals:** (“drafting groups” or “spin off groups”)

- focus on a specific problematic issue or advance negotiations on contentious issues, e.g. to draft a specific section of text or resolve a specific problem.
    - established with the agreement of the group or under presiding officers own responsibility.
    - open ended or limited to only those delegates invited to participate

- Friends of the Chair:**

- convened by presiding officers to advance negotiations on particularly difficult and politically sensitive issues
    - limited number of Parties can participate
    - closed meetings usually chaired by the presiding officer.
    - no formal rules are applied, conduct of business is entirely at the discretion of the chair






# Type of meetings




# Types of meetings

The tip of the iceberg:  
Plenary, election of officers,  
adoption of agenda, adoption  
of text, etc



*Figure 3. The formal and informal processes  
(Boyer 2000, adapted from Jean Freymond)*



# ACTORS



**United Nations**  
Framework Convention on  
Climate Change

# Type of actors

- Groups of states
- Observers
- Conference officers and facilitators
- Secretariats

# NEGOTIATING GROUPS AND COALITIONS

# Negotiating Groups and Coalitions

- **5 UN Groups:** African States, Asian States, Eastern European States, Latin American and the Caribbean States, and the Western European and Other States

- **G77 + China**

- African group
- Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 43
- OPEC countries
- Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 50
- ALBA, AILAC, CfrN, LMDCs, BASIC, etc

- **EU:** 27 Member States


- **Umbrella Group:** Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine, USA

- **Environmental Integrity Group:** Mexico, South Korea, Switzerland, Monaco

- **Turkey**

**Critical points:**  
different interests in  
large coalitions (G77 or  
EU)

# Negotiating Groups





# Regional and interest group negotiating blocks

- Together is better
- Membership in one group does not preclude membership in other groups
- Ad-hoc coalitions
- Inclusiveness and transparency
- Pre-session preparation and workshop
- Mailing list and communication
- Regional vs Coalitions within Multilateral Environmental Agreements

# G77 and China



- Today 134 members, all non Annex I Parties
- Current chair: Guinea
- Creation in 1964 by 77 developing countries “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” at first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva
- Formal negotiating group at UN level (UNFCCC, GA, ECOSOC)
- Rotation of presidency every year on the basis of geographical representation
- Very large composition and variety of countries => other negotiating groups within the G77+China

Palestine, for the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China), said Article 6 negotiations should, *inter alia*, reflect the diversity of NDCs, and focus on avoiding double counting, and providing predictable funds for adaptation. She cautioned against a mitigation-centric COP. She also called for making the WIM an effective mechanism, including through financial support and technology transfer.

# African Group of Negotiators (AGN)


- Coalition of 54 States from the African continent
- Extremely diversified group
  - LDCs,
  - OPEC (fossil energy producers,...)
  - South Africa
  - Arab countries

Egypt, for the African Group, stressed that the COP and the CMA should balance mitigation and adaptation, rather than become “consumed with reporting.” On finance, he stressed the importance of grant-based resources to avoid increasing the developing countries’ debt burden.

- Priorities: poverty, lack resources, vulnerability to extreme events

# Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

- 48 countries: 34 in Africa, 13 in Asia and 1 in the Caribbean



Bhutan, for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), outlined the group's priorities, including: a COP decision announcing 2020 as a year of "strong ambition"; a meaningful review of the WIM; and that Article 6 should provide resources for adaptation through a share of proceeds.

# LDCs (II)

- Considered as the least developed countries in the world by the United-Nations
- Criteria: low income, weak human resources and economic vulnerability
- Population cannot exceed 75 million people
- Extremely vulnerable, sensitive to the topic of adaptation, loss and damage and finance

# Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

- Group of 51 small island and low-lying coastal states
- Common environmental situation of vulnerability to the sea-level rise
- Similar development challenges: small populations, lack of resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters
- 5% of the world population
- From all regions of the world
- Front line against the effects of climate change

# Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

- Under auspices of SIDS
- Ad-hoc lobbying and negotiating group for SIDS members
- Established in 1990 for dealing on climate change issues
- No budget, nor secretariat

Belize, for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), expressed disappointment regarding inadequate action and urged COP 25 to “trigger a decade of ambition.” She called for Article 6 to go beyond offsetting and for reforming the climate finance landscape, including to address loss and damage.

# European Union

- 27 Members States to the European Union
- Common position during international negotiations
- Presidency of the Country holding the EU presidency (rotation every 6 months)
- Party to the UNFCCC but no separate vote from its members
- Unique and single voice
- Lack of political unity and representation



Finland, for the European Union (EU), outlined priorities, including: “robust and comprehensive” accounting rules for Article 6 to avoid double-counting; the second review of the WIM; and the review of the Lima Work Programme on Gender.



# Umbrella Group

- Informal group of countries not member of the European Union and not developing countries
- Generally 9 members: Japan, US, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, Canada, Ukraine
- Generally skeptical about the Kyoto Protocol and multilateral process

Australia, for the Umbrella Group, stressed the need for Article 6 rules to facilitate markets and enhance ambition. He also highlighted the WIM, capacity building, and the Adaptation Fund as key issues.

# Like-Minded Developing Countries

- Established right before Paris
- Coalition of 25 States: Arabia, Latin-American and Caribbean, African and Asian
- Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Sudan, Venezuela, Vietnam
- Creation in 2012 in Bonn
- Represents half of the world population
- Goal: create uniformity within the
- G77 and China

Malaysia, for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), stressed, among others: strengthening transparency for developed countries regarding implementation; engaging with all parties on cooperative approaches by operationalizing multiple metrics; and “depoliticizing” the flow of international financial resources.

# The BASIC

- Group of 4 emerging economies and regional economical power: Brazil, South-Africa, India and China
- Large producers of GHG emissions
- Creation in 2009 in preparation of the Copenhagen Accord



China, for Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC), called upon developed countries to honor existing financial commitments, scale up financial support, and increase predictability of support.

# The ALBA



- Originally economic, political and social organization to promote cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean
- Official Alliance in negotiation since 2010
- 11 members: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Ecuador, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Grenada
- No presidency
- Instauration of a Court of Justice to prosecute States, companies, and individuals who contribute to the degradation of the environment

Venezuela, for the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), called for creating a financial mechanism under the WIM and emphasized the need for balanced support, noting that its priority is adaptation and that financial support is essential for raising ambition.

# The AILAC

- The Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean
- Group formed in December 2012
- 8 members: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru
- Objective: coordinated, ambitious positions during multilateral negotiations on climate change; coherent vision for sustainable development responsible both for the environment and the future generations
- Close to G77 and China

Guatemala, for the Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), emphasized the need to ensure environmental integrity and avoid double counting, and for developed countries to increase funding channeled through the GCF and the GEF.

# The Arab Group

- Countries economically heavily relying on fossil energy (oil)
- 22 members: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
- Consideration for the negative effects of the combat against climate change on their economy
- No official presidency or leader, key role of Saudi Arabia
- Generally associated with the position of the G77 and China and

Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, urged consideration of the needs of developing countries in discussions regarding, *inter alia*, response measures and Article 6.

# Environmental Integrity Group

- Coalition of 5 OECD states: Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland
- Not part to the EU, not aligned with the Umbrella Group
- No official residency
- Vocal and accomodating

Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), highlighted Article 6 as an “unprecedented opportunity” to increase NDC ambition, noting that EIG would not support transitioning Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits into the post-2020 mechanism.

# Coalition for Rainforest Nations

- 52 rainforest nations with tropical forests (Belize, Dominican Republic, Congo, Ghana, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Fiji, ec...)
- REDD+ created in 2005
- Mobilizing financial and technological support to reduce deforestation and forest degradation

Papua New Guinea, for the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, urged scaling up implementation of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+). He called for Article 6 rules to protect environmental integrity and called for an Article 6 “adaptation credit.”



# ABU

Brazil, for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (ABU), outlined expectations on climate finance, calling on developed countries to scale up ambition with regard to the GCF and the Adaptation Fund. He also stressed, among others, the need to engage all stakeholders on Article 6 and to raise the profile of adaptation.

# Groups/Parties positions

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Saudi Arabia, needs of developing countries, response measures

transitioning to a low-carbon economy by 2030, and the Paris Agreement 2020 mechanism.

Guatemala, for the Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), emphasized the need to ensure environmental integrity and avoid double counting, and for developed countries to increase funding channeled through the GCF and the GEF.

highlighted the WIM, capacity building, and the Adaptation Fund

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American Group, stressed that the COP and the WIM should focus on mitigation and adaptation, rather than reporting.” On finance, he stressed the need for resources to avoid increasing the

China, for Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC), called upon developed countries to honor existing financial commitments, scale up financial support, and increase predictability of support.

Bhutan, for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), outlined the group’s priorities, including: a COP decision announcing 2020 as a year of “strong ambition”; a meaningful review of the WIM; and that Article 6 should provide resources for adaptation through a share of proceeds.

Belize, for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), expressed disappointment regarding inadequate action and urged COP 25 to “trigger a decade of ambition.” She called for Article 6 to go beyond offsetting and for reforming the climate finance landscape, including to address loss and damage.

# Different Delegations:



## **Critical points:**

- Strength of the delegation (number, mandat)
- Language issues

# Paris Agreement

# CONTENTS

- Background
- The Paris Agreement
- Way forward



# THE AMBITION GAP

- Past, current and future mitigation efforts are not sufficient to reduce GHG emissions and stop global warming
- From legally binding targets to INDCs (Warsaw – COP19) and finally NDCs (Paris – COP21)
- INDCs put us on track for a world that is 2.7-3.7 degrees C warmer (median chance), depending on modeling assumptions




# Decision 1/CP.21

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17. Notes with concern that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions **do not fall within least-cost 2 °C** scenarios but rather lead to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030, and also notes that **much greater emission reduction efforts will be required** than those associated with the intended nationally determined contributions **in order to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 °C** above pre-industrial levels by reducing emissions to 40 gigatonnes **or to 1.5 °C** above pre-industrial levels by reducing to a level to be identified in the special report referred to in paragraph 21 below;

# POST-2012





- COP13: Bali Action Plan
- Shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal for emission reductions
- Mitigation
- Adaptation
- Finance
- Technology and capacity-building



# ROAD TO PARIS

- COP11, Montreal (2005) – COP13 Bali (2007)
- COP15, Copenhagen Accord (2009)
- COP16, Cancun Agreements (2010)
- COP17, Durban Platform (2011)
- COP18, Doha Climate Gateway (2012)
- COP19, Warsaw (2013)
- COP20, Lima Call for Climate Action (2014)
- COP21, Paris (2015)
- COP22, Marrakech
- ... forever!



# Decision 1/CP.17 (2011 – Durban Platform ADP)

2. *Also decides* to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, through a subsidiary body under the Convention hereby established and to be known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action;

3. *Further decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall start its work as a matter of urgency in the first half of 2012 and shall report to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work;

4. *Decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020;

# PARIS AGREEMENT: OBJECTIVE, ART. 2

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- ... aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:
  - (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to **well below 2 °C** above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to **1.5 °C** above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
  - (b) Increasing the **ability to adapt** to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;
  - (c) Making **finance flows consistent** with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

# PARIS AGREEMENT: ART. 3

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- As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles **4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13** with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.

- Compromise in Warsaw COP19 (2013)
- Lima COP20
- Submission well in advance of COP21
- Secretariat synthesis report on the aggregated effects of INDCs
- Information in the INDCs: **quantifiable information on the reference point (or base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions and, as appropriate, removals, and how the Party considers that INDC is fair and ambitious, in light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention (decision 1/CP.20,para 14);**
- LDCs and SIDS may communicate information on strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emission development reflecting their special circumstances in the context of INDCs (decision 1/CP.20,para 11);

# PARIS AGREEMENT: MITIGATION, ART. 4

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- Aim to reach **global peaking** of GHG emissions as soon as possible
- Achieve a **balance** between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of this century
- Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive **nationally determined contributions** that it intends to achieve
- Each Party's successive NDC **progression** beyond Party's current NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances
- Developed country Parties **should** continue **taking the lead**
- **Support** shall be provided to developing country Parties
- NDC: information (4.8), every five years (4.9), common time frames (4.10, adjustment (4.11), public registry (4.12)
- Accounting NDCs (4.13): guidance by CMA1 (Regular info to track progress 13.7b)
- Long-term low GHG emission development strategies

# PARIS AGREEMENT: REDD+, ART. 5

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- Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, including forests
- Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for REDD+

# PARIS AGREEMENT: VARIOUS APPROACHES, ART. 6

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- **Voluntary cooperation** in the implementation of NDCs
- On a voluntary, **cooperative approaches** that involve the use of **internationally transferred mitigation outcomes** towards NDCs
- Guidance by CMA
- A **mechanism** to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established
- Body designated by the CMA
- CMA1 to adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism
- A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is hereby defined to promote the non-market approaches



# PARIS AGREEMENT: ADAPTATION, ART. 7

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- Parties establish the **global goal** on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change
- Adaptation as global challenge
- Adaptation efforts to be recognized as agreed by CMA1
- Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation
- Each Party shall engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions
- Each Party should submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions (public registry)

# PARIS AGREEMENT: LOSS AND DAMAGE, ART. 8

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- Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change
- The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage may be enhanced and strengthened as determined by the CMA
- Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change

# PARIS AGREEMENT: FINANCE, ART. 9

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- Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties on mitigation and adaptation
- Other Parties encouraged to provide support voluntarily
- Developed country Parties **should** continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance
- Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information and provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties
- CMA1 modalities, procedures and guidelines (transparency of support)

# DECISION 1/CP.21: FINANCE

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- 54. “developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”

# PARIS AGREEMENT: TECHNOLOGY, ART. 10 and CAPACITY BUILDING, ART. 11

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- Technology framework established: guidance to the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development
- Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation
- Support including strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at different stages
- Enhance the capacity and ability of developing country Parties
- Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity
- All Parties regularly communicate on those actions
- CMA1 to adopt a decision on capacity-building institutional arrangements

# PARIS AGREEMENT: TRANSPARENCY, ART. 13

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- Enhanced transparency framework for action and support established
- Build on and enhance the transparency arrangements under the Convention
- Purpose transparency of action: provide a clear understanding of climate change action, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties' INDCs
- Purpose transparency of support: provide clarity on support provided and received and full overview of aggregate financial support provided
- Each Party shall provide info: National Inventory Report + Information necessary to track progress in implementing and achieving its NDC
- Technical expert review
- CMA1 building on experience from the transparency arrangements under the Convention, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines

# PARIS AGREEMENT: GLOBAL STOCKTAKE, ART. 14

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- CMA periodically take stock of the implementation of the PA
- To assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the “global stocktake”)
- Comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science
- CMA first global stocktake in 2023 and every 5 years thereafter
- Outcome: inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support

# PARIS AGREEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE, ART. 15

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- A mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement is hereby established.
- The mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive



# PARIS AGREEMENT: INSTITUTIONS

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- CMA, Art. 16
- Secretariat, Art. 17
- SBs, Art. 18
- Other subsidiary bodies, Art. 19

# PARIS AGREEMENT: FINAL CLAUSES

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- Ratification, Art. 20
- Entry into force, Art. 21
- Voting, Art. 25
- Reservations, Art. 27
- Withdrawal, Art. 28

# DECISION 1/CP.21

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- 1 year signature period
- Provisional application
- Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) to prepare entry into force
- APA to complete its work by CMA1
- Updated INDC synthesis report by 2 May 2016
- 2018 facilitative dialogue to take stock of the collective efforts
- IPCC to provide special report on impacts global warming of 1.5C by 2018

# WAY FORWARD

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- 22 APRIL 2016: high-level signature ceremony Paris Agreement, New York
- Next steps post adoption
- APA1: Bonn May 2016, Marrakech COP22, ...
- CMA1: ?

# PARIS AGREEMENT: FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

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- Compromise text often cumbersome
- Use of different type of language
- Treaty first, rules afterwards: same mistake of Kyoto
- Weakness of individual efforts
- No obligation to implement NDCs
- Norms are often not sufficiently precise
- Lack of enforcement mechanism

# VALUE OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

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- How to reach the 2C/1,5C objective
- Will be determined in the years to come on the basis of:
  - Legal character
  - Effectiveness
  - Political commitment

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THANK YOU!


leonardo.massai@gmail.com

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# BACKGROUND SLIDES



## Estimates for Global Temperature Rise with INDCs




Note: "Likelihood" refers to the probability of limiting global warming to a specified temperature by 2100. For instance, >66% likelihood provides a "likely" chance that warming will not exceed the given temperature.

Source: WRI  
blog, 2015

<http://bit.ly/indc-temp>

# Comparison of global emission levels resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions in 2025 and 2030 with other trajectories


UNFCCC  
secretariat  
synthesis  
report



# IPCC 5<sup>th</sup> Assessment Report – WG III

Without more mitigation, global mean surface temperature might increase by 3.7° to 4.8°C over the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### GHG Emission Pathways 2000-2100: All AR5 Scenarios







# UNEP Sixth Emissions Gap report (2015)

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Full implementation of unconditional INDC results in emission level estimates in 2030 that are **most consistent with scenarios that limit global average temperature increase to below 3.5°C until 2100** with a greater than 66 per cent chance. INDC estimates do, however, come with uncertainty ranges. When taking this into account the 3.5°C value could decrease to 3°C or increase towards 4°C for the low and high unconditional INDC estimates, respectively. When including the full implementation of conditional INDCs, the emissions level estimates **become most consistent with long-term scenarios that limit global average temperature increase to <3-3.5°C by the end of the century with a greater than 66 per cent chance.**

# UNEP Sixth Emissions Gap report (2015), p. 19





Source: IPCC,  
WGII, 5AR,  
2014

# IPCC 5<sup>th</sup> Assessment Report – WG II

- Five integrative reasons for concern (RFCs) provide a framework for summarizing key risks across sectors and regions
  - RFCs illustrate the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies, and ecosystems. They provide one starting point for evaluating dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system
- i) Risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods in low-lying coastal zones and small island developing states and other small islands, due to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea level rise. [RFC 1-5]
  - ii) Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods for large urban populations due to inland flooding in some regions [RFC 2 and 3]
  - iii) Systemic risks due to extreme weather events leading to breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services such as electricity, water supply, and health and emergency services. [RFC 2-4]
  - iv) Risk of mortality and morbidity during periods of extreme heat, particularly for vulnerable urban populations and those working outdoors in urban or rural areas. [RFC 2 and 3]
  - v) Risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems linked to warming, drought, flooding, and precipitation variability and extremes, particularly for poorer populations in urban and rural settings. [RFC 2-4]
  - vi) Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to insufficient access to drinking and irrigation water and reduced agricultural productivity, particularly for farmers and pastoralists with minimal capital in semi-arid regions. [RFC 2 and 3]
  - vii) Risk of loss of marine and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for coastal livelihoods, especially for fishing communities in the tropics and the Arctic. [RFC 1, 2, and 4]
  - viii) Risk of loss of terrestrial and inland water ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for livelihoods. [RFC 1, 3, and 4]