Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-First Century

The First Decade

WORLD BANK GROUP

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Social, Urban, Rural & Resilience Global Practice

Latin America and the Caribbean Region

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Foreword

The first decade of the millennium brought impressive gains to Latin America and the Caribbean in general, raising approximately 70 million people out of poverty and expanding the middle class to over one-third of the population. Indigenous peoples shared in these gains alongside non-indigenous populations in many respects: important advances in poverty reduction were accompanied by improved access to basic services and expanded access to primary education. Legal frameworks to address indigenous needs and rights were approved across the region, and indigenous peoples achieved greater inclusion in decision making and development planning. Through involvement in electoral processes, indigenous leaders occupied official government posts at every level.

Nonetheless, indigenous peoples did not benefit proportionately during the "golden decade," and despite many positive developments, they still face sizable challenges. In urban environments, for example, indigenous households tend to live in conditions that are less secure, less sanitary, and more disaster prone than those of non-indigenous urban residents. Overall, they are 2.7 times more likely to live in extreme poverty when compared with the non-indigenous population.

Based on a survey of census and household data across the region, this report finds that there are structural conditions that might anchor indigenous peoples to poverty and preclude their full potential for economic opportunity. These conditions are an important focus of the World Bank's agenda for the region and beyond.

Over the past decade the World Bank has redoubled its efforts to contribute to the social and economic inclusion of indigenous peoples. A two-year dialogue with indigenous organizations from around the world has informed our approach to setting high standards for participatory and inclusive development projects that integrate indigenous peoples' views. This process has also helped identify key areas of focus for a coordinated and joint development approach.

There are prolific examples of engagements, in partnership with governments from across the region, to enhance social and economic inclusion for indigenous peoples. Today, World Bank-financed projects in Latin America include special provisions to address indigenous peoples' needs, and are designed and implemented in partnership with national governments and through an iterative and consultative process with local and indigenous communities.

Evidence continues to show that while all these efforts are necessary, they might not be sufficient. As we look to the post-2015 development agenda, we remain cognizant of the fact that, despite recent gains, indigenous peoples face structural and cultural barriers that inhibit full social and economic inclusion. Eliminating barriers will require the combined efforts of all actors that influence sustainable economic and social development, including governments, civil society, development agencies, academia, and the private sector, all the while working in tandem with indigenous communities.

Change is unlikely to happen overnight, and although there have been a number of positive developments in recent years, a number of critical barriers still remain. This report provides evidence that with the concerted effort of relevant stakeholders, change is possible. Within the requisite enabling and participatory frameworks, indigenous peoples will be central to eradicating extreme poverty in Latin America and ensuring inclusive growth through increased shared prosperity across the region.

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Executive Summary

The first decade of the millennium will probably be remembered in Latin America for economic growth and unprecedented reduction of inequality.[1] Over 70 million people escaped poverty in 10 years, because of a combination of tailwinds in the economy and the implementation of important redistributive policies. Already dubbed by some the "golden decade," this period of growth and prosperity left indigenous Latin Americans with a somewhat different story, with mixed and often contrasting results.

The decade coincided with the end of the United Nations' First International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (1995–2004) and the better part of the second (2005–2014), when indigenous peoples strengthened their position as relevant actors in the political and social life of the region. Fifteen of the 22 countries that have ratified the International Labour Organization's Convention No. 169 are in Latin America, and owing to the tenacity of their social movements, many countries have passed laws and regulations to protect and promote indigenous peoples' rights. Though in practice many of these regulatory frameworks remain at a trial-and-error stage, the signs are certainly encouraging.

The development of international treaties and declarations reaffirming indigenous peoples' aspiration to self-determination has been accompanied by their increasing involvement in the political life of the region. Indigenous peoples' political participation today takes place at the level of local or national parliaments, in municipalities, and even in the highest levels of state power, with active involvement of leaders who partake in national political parties or have created indigenous political parties. Today, indigenous parties exist with large influence in Bolivia and Ecuador, and in smaller proportions in countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, and Nicaragua. Electoral systems offer an opportunity for political engagement, enabling indigenous representatives to bring their agendas to mainstream debates, thereby increasing their voices within the state. In a similar vein, these waves of reform have strengthened the implementation of tools that enable local participation and decision making, such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Today, the question in the region no longer is whether indigenous peoples should be involved in deciding matters that directly or indirectly affect their lives and well-being, but how and when.

There have also been socioeconomic gains. The region has made progress in terms of poverty reduction, which benefited indigenous people. The percentage of indigenous households living in poverty declined in Peru and Bolivia, while the proportion living in extreme poverty was reduced in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. The wage gap was reduced in urban Bolivia and Peru, though big differences remain in rural areas and within indigenous households if considered by gender. Primary education has reached most indigenous latitudes, probably representing one of the greatest and clearest achievements of recent decades; in some countries—Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua—the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous children was in fact closed. Likewise, access to electricity, piped water, and sanitation improved across the region to various degrees. It is therefore evident that the favorable economic context, combined with the right policies, has yielded economic gains and positive changes.

These gains, however, have not been uniformly distributed across the region, nor within the countries. Overall, indigenous peoples have benefited less than non-indigenous people on most accounts, which

1 World Bank, Office of the Regional Chief Economist, *Latin America and the Caribbean as Tailwinds Recede: In Search of Higher Growth* (2013).

has contributed to the persistence—and in some cases growth—of important gaps. The number of indigenous persons living in poverty has fallen, but the gap separating them from other Latin Americans has either remained stagnant or widened. Poverty, in fact, afflicts 43 percent of the indigenous population in the region—more than twice the proportion of non-indigenous people—while 24 percent of all indigenous people live in extreme poverty, 2.7 times more than the proportion of non-indigenous people.

Furthermore, being born to indigenous parents substantially increases the probability of being raised in a poor household, contributing to a poverty trap that hampers the full development of indigenous children. In Ecuador, the probability of a household to be poor increases by 13 percent if the household head belongs to an indigenous group, regardless of his or her level of education, gender, urban or rural location, and number of dependents. In Bolivia and Mexico, the probability is 11 percent and 9 percent higher, respectively. Similarly, despite a general expansion of basic services, indigenous peoples' access to sanitation and electricity is 18 percent and 15 percent lower than that of other Latin Americans.[2]

The problem with these remaining gaps is not only that they reflect exclusionary patterns in the distribution of wealth in times of growth, but that they also increase the vulnerability of indigenous peoples as the region moves forward to a new and less favorable economic and social scenario. This calls for a thorough reflection on the need to build a post-2015 agenda that breaks away from the structural barriers and glass ceilings that impede closing the gaps between indigenous peoples and the majority society, regardless of the context, while maintaining and reinforcing their social and political achievements of the past two decades.

This report presents a critical review of the data available and the main challenges facing indigenous Latin Americans with the aim of contributing to these discussions. The report is based on microdata extracted from censuses in 16 countries and household surveys in 9 countries, as well as on a review of secondary data, regulatory frameworks, and regional experiences. Though there are limitations in the available regional data on indigenous people, which are intrinsic to both cultural and methodological discrepancies between indigenous milieus and the majority society, the data presented here have been reviewed for accuracy and consistency.

Census and household data are differently treated throughout the report. Census data are used to highlight observable patterns in the distribution of services, demographic characteristics, increases in coverage, and the like, without delving into explanations of causality. Overall, these data show persistent gaps in access to many services across the region. Household data, for their part, are mainly used in an econometric analysis intended to respond to the fundamental question of whether those observable gaps are reinforced by conditions affecting indigenous peoples, in particular, or the poor in general. The poverty section provides unambiguous evidence that indigenous peoples fare worse on most accounts, independently from other factors such as level of education, age, urban or rural location, type of work, and characteristics of the household.

The persistence of many gaps, amid an exceptionally favorable wave of inclusive policies and economic growth, suggests that some of the policies intended to address indigenous peoples' situations need to be revised, as well as the lens

2 The regional weighted averages for electricity access are 82 percent for indigenous persons and 97 percent for non-indigenous persons, while the weighted averages for access to sewerage are 57 percent and 75 percent (authors' calculations based on regional census data).

under which development is being implemented in indigenous milieus. Although development tends to be associated with the attainment of specific political, economic, and social goals, this report acknowledges that indigenous peoples usually have a more nuanced understanding of what development is and why it matters. If indigenous peoples are to assume their role as key actors in the post-2015 agenda, these alternative voices and ideas need to be considered. This entails reviewing not only the procedures under which development is implemented, but also how development goals are set and the mechanisms used for assessing progress toward them.

The definition of who is and who is not indigenous has become increasingly relevant and controversial in the region, because in the wake of a new set of legal frameworks, covenants, and international agreements safeguarding indigenous peoples' rights, indigenous peoples often rely on their official recognition to be protected from or included in aspects of decision making that could affect their lives, assets, and cultures. While we focus on the gaps separating indigenous and non-indigenous actors, this report underscores the complexity of identifying indigenous people across the region and argues that the conditions of indigeneity vary over time and are, in some cases, context- and country-specific.

Based on the latest censuses available in the region, in 2010 there were about 42 million indigenous people in Latin America, representing nearly 8 percent of the total population. Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia had the largest populations in both absolute and proportional terms, accounting for more than 80 percent (34 million) of the regional total. It is difficult to estimate increases in the indigenous population across the region because of disparities in how census data have been collected between censuses and across countries. However, the only country that reported a decrease in its indigenous population in the past decade is Bolivia, for reasons that probably have more to do with discrepancies in how the data were collected between the last two censuses than with a real trend to negative growth.

Although traditional territories have been one of the main referents of historical continuity, identity, and self-determination for indigenous peoples, the report finds that 49 percent of the indigenous population in Latin America currently lives in urban areas. Migration from rural to urban areas is motivated by an array of factors and generates mixed outcomes and expectations. Urban spaces can broaden the quantity and quality of services, expand access to health care and education, and provide more economic opportunities. Regionally, indigenous people living in urban settings have 1.5 times better access to electricity and 1.7 times better access to piped water than their rural counterparts. Primary education completion is also 1.6 times higher for urban indigenous people than for their rural counterparts, secondary education 3.6 times higher, and tertiary education 7.7 times higher. Moreover, the urban space can be a vehicle for reducing gender-based discrimination and enabling new forms of political participation and cultural expression for indigenous peoples. Though rural-urban migrations do not affect indigenous people alone, what is distinctive of indigenous peoples is how hard rural-urban disparities hit them. In Peru, for instance, an indigenous household is 37 percent less likely to be poor and 26 percent less likely to be extremely poor if it lives in an urban area, regardless of other factors such as gender and education level of the household head or the number of dependents.

However, urban environments are also characterized by large disparities between indigenous and non-indigenous dwellers in terms of access to public

services and economic opportunities. Urban indigenous populations remain highly vulnerable compared with non-indigenous urban dwellers, and are exposed to new dimensions of exclusion. The percentage of indigenous people living in slums almost doubles the proportion of non-indigenous urban dwellers. Thirty-six percent of all indigenous urban dwellers inhabit insecure, unsanitary, and polluted environments. In Mexico, indigenous urban dwellers have less than half the access to electricity and piped water than other city dwellers have, one-fifth the access to sanitation, and live nearly three times more often in houses with dirt floors. Urban migrations also disrupt social safety nets and traditional land tenure systems, potentially exposing indigenous people to further marginalization. In Bolivia, while in rural areas 90 percent of the indigenous population own their homes, in cities only 61 percent do.

More generally, the growing economic inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous Latin Americans is associated with disadvantaged conditions of market inclusion. In cities, indigenous people work mostly in low-skill/low-paying jobs. In countries with large urban indigenous populations, such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico, the percentage of indigenous persons occupying high-skill and stable jobs is two to three times smaller than the percentage of non-indigenous people. Moreover, in many countries the probability of working in the informal sector has increased or remained stagnant throughout the "golden decade" for indigenous workers. In Ecuador and Guatemala, the probability of working in the informal sector increases by 12 percent and 8 percent, respectively, if a person belongs to an indigenous group, regardless of his or her level of education, gender, number of dependents, or place of residence. Indigenous workers are therefore less likely to receive benefits such as social security, health insurance, retirement funds, and other legal compensations than non-indigenous workers.

Even if an indigenous person completes tertiary education, his or her earnings are often significantly lower than those of a non-indigenous person with the same qualification. Household data show that, regardless of educational background, gender, age, number of dependents, and place of residence, an indigenous person likely earns 12 percent less than a non-indigenous person in urban Mexico, and about 14 percent less in rural areas. In Bolivia, an indigenous person likely earns 9 percent less in urban settings, and 13 percent less in rural areas; and in Peru and Guatemala, he or she makes about 6 percent less. In Peru and Bolivia, however, the wage gap for indigenous people living in urban areas was reduced during the decade; in Peru, by nearly a third since the beginning of the decade. For indigenous women, however, the wage gap is much wider than for indigenous men. Bolivian indigenous women earn about 60 percent less than non-indigenous women for the same type of jobs. At the same time, the gap in education between indigenous men and women grew in both countries, suggesting that investments in education could considerably help improve market inclusion for indigenous peoples.

The expansion of various public services to indigenous households has improved in absolute terms, yet it has not always been accompanied by a qualitative change that can truly help indigenous peoples achieve their chosen paths of development and overcome their persistent exclusion. For example, the expansion of education, especially primary education, has been one of the most significant gains of the last decade, closing or minimizing a gap that for decades had excluded indigenous children. The expansion of the school system, however, has not been accompanied by

a significant improvement or adaptation in the quality of education that would allow indigenous children to develop their full potential, neither as members of the state nor as members of their people. Despite widespread laws and regulations protecting indigenous languages and cultures, along with recognition of the importance of providing intercultural bilingual education (IBE) to indigenous children, education attainment is still strongly associated with the loss of indigenous languages and cultures. There is abundant evidence that IBE can help reverse this tendency, but it needs to be implemented well, which is most often not the case.

Indigenous people also have not benefited equally from the exponential growth and democratization of new technologies. While Latin America has become the world's second-fastest-growing market for mobile phones, indigenous people own a cell phone half as often as non-indigenous Latin Americans. They also lag behind in Internet access and computer ownership. The digital divide reinforces prior forms of exclusion insofar as access to technologies is becoming a key aspect of social capital in increasingly globalized Latin American societies.

As a result of this persistent pattern of social exclusion, indigenous people today represent about 14 percent of the poor and 17 percent of the extremely poor in Latin America, despite accounting for less than 8 percent of the population. Undoubtedly, the reduction of key gaps and the unrelenting expansion of legal frameworks in the last decade improved the lives and rights of indigenous peoples, yet more needs to be done. The exclusion of indigenous peoples not only prevents them from receiving the potential benefits of the region's economic growth, but it is also costly and detrimental for Latin American economies.

In sum, the first decade of the millennium left indigenous peoples with two contrasting stories: one of important gains, such as the unprecedented expansion in their capacity to voice and decide what kind of future they collectively want, and another of persistent exclusion, which still limits their ability to contribute to and profit from the benefits of the state without renouncing their cultures and identities. By now, the region has accumulated significant knowledge and experience to face many of the challenges raised by this contradiction. Driving the inclusion of indigenous peoples forward is not only important in itself, as a way of constructing a more equitable, just, and prosperous society, but it is also a collective necessity, as Latin America is unlikely to end poverty and achieve sustainable development without the participation of indigenous societies. This report aims to deepen the understanding of the many facets of development with identity, and to offer suggestions to advance these goals.

Introduction

In 2013 the World Bank set itself two ambitious goals: to end extreme poverty within a generation and to boost the prosperity of the bottom 40 percent of the population worldwide. In Latin America, regarded as the most unequal region in the world,[3] the significance of both goals cannot be overstated. Despite progress over the past two decades, when poverty was nearly halved, the richest 5 percent of the population today absorbs more than 25 percent of the income, while the poorest 25 percent absorbs less than 5 percent.[4] Yet, poverty and other forms of social exclusion do not affect all Latin Americans in the same way. Indigenous people account for about 8 percent of the population, but represent 14 percent of the poor and over 17 percent of all Latin Americans living on less than US$2.50 a day.[5] Together with Afro-descendants, who remain by and large statistically and socially invisible, indigenous people give a predominantly ethnic face to Latin America's exclusion. The extent to which the Bank's twin goals can be achieved will therefore depend to a large degree on whether ethnic minorities participate in and benefit from the region's prosperity.

While several studies have reported little or no progress regarding the economic inclusion of indigenous people,[6] the last two decades have been marked by their increasing visibility and political participation. Their involvement in national and international political discussions has had a significant impact in every country, leading to legal and constitutional reforms that have acknowledged the multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual makeup of the region. At the international level, to mention two examples, the International Labour Organization's Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) established a new scenario in which the relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous people had to be redefined. The recognition of collective indigenous rights, for instance, broke away from the individualistic perspective that dominates the understanding and implementation of human and property rights worldwide.[7]

In many respects, these national and international realignments reflect the growing acceptance that, as culturally distinct societies, indigenous peoples have the right to play a part in the national and regional order without renouncing their languages, cultures, and aspirations. They also reflect the realization that, although development tends to be associated with the attainment of specific political, economic, and social goals—such as eradicating monetary poverty or stimulating growth—indigenous peoples usually have a more nuanced understanding of what development is and why it matters. If indigenous peoples are to become key actors in the post-2015 agenda, these alternative voices and ideas need to be taken into serious consideration.

3 World Bank, *Do Our Children Have a Chance? The 2010 Human Opportunity Report for Latin America and the Caribbean*, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPPOVANA/Resources/840442-1285865149017/overview_english.pdf.

4 CEDLAC/World Bank.

5 The basic World Bank indicator for extreme poverty globally is the percentage of people living on less than US$1.25 a day. However, this report uses US$2.50 per day for extreme poverty (an average of national extreme poverty lines in the region) and US$4 a day for moderate poverty, which are more appropriate in light of prevailing costs of living in the region. This estimate combines poverty rates calculated from household surveys and population trends calculated from censuses of the late 2000s, in countries with available data (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru).

6 See Gillette Hall and Harry Anthony Patrinos, eds., *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development in Latin America 1994–2004* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Hall and Patrinos, eds., *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, and Development* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Harry Anthony Patrinos and Emmanuel Skoufias, *Economic Opportunities for Indigenous Peoples in Latin America* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007); Emmanuel Skoufias, Trine Lunde, and Harry Anthony Patrinos, "Social Networks among Indigenous Peoples in Mexico" (policy research working paper 4949, World Bank, 2009).

7 S. James Anaya, "Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to International Human Rights Law" *Washington University Journal of Law & Policy* 22 (2006): 107–20.

> “Indigenous peoples’ priorities for development are predicated on the full, equal and effective recognition of our rights to lands, territories, resources, air, ice, oceans and waters, and mountains and forests and the connection between customs, belief systems, values, languages, cultures and traditional knowledge. We therefore recommend that rights, culture and spiritual values be integrated into strategies that relate to development including sustainable development goals and the post 2015 UN Development Agenda.”[8]

Indigenous peoples’ ideas of development envision culture not as a means to achieve conventional development goals, based solely on growth or market integration, but rather as a central aspect in defining what type of development is collectively wanted and how it should be implemented. To that end, indigenous organizations have long promoted ideas such as *development with identity, ethno-development, alter-development, and culturally pertinent development*, which define development as a process that originates in and is led by communities. These models have different—and at times contrasting—views about the ways of addressing the balance between cultural continuity and integration. Yet, what is certain is that these alternative notions of development aspire to allow indigenous societies to pursue their own chosen paths of self-improvement, while strengthening their autonomy, reducing their vulnerabilities, and fostering the sustainable management of their environments, resources, and knowledge.

A focus on development with identity therefore demands not only a careful revision of the procedures under which development is implemented—for example, more or less participation; more or less government involvement—but also a reexamination of how development goals are set, as well as the mechanisms used to assess progress toward them. Though the World Bank has chosen two general indicators for measuring progress toward its twin goals—the proportion of people living on less than US$1.25 a day (purchasing power parity, 2005) and the growth of real capital income among the bottom 40 percent of the population—this report acknowledges that these indicators offer only a partial view of the obstacles preventing many indigenous peoples from achieving their chosen paths of development. These leave aside, for example, the political and cultural components that underpin past and current forms of material deprivation. For that reason, and echoing the call of indigenous leaders throughout the region,[9] this report focuses not only on issues of poverty, but also on other aspects that might limit indigenous peoples’ ability to protect themselves from economic and sociocultural shocks, and that might reduce their autonomy and their capacity to benefit from the region’s prosperity.

Social exclusion is a complex, multilayered problem, as a recent World Bank report points out.[10] Analyses focused on poverty indicators or quantitative data alone might therefore fail to identify its root causes. Race and ethnicity, as well as gender, religion, sexual orientation, and many other criteria, have been found to contribute to social exclusion. Social inclusion strategies are hence unlikely to work if focused on or aimed at solving a single factor. Indigenous women, for example, are often discriminated against because they are both indigenous and women. The report notes that in Bolivia, Quechua women are 28 percent less likely to complete secondary school than a non-indigenous Bolivian woman, while Quechua men are 14 percent less likely to complete secondary

8 Global Indigenous Preparatory Conference for the United Nations High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly to be known as the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, 10–12 June 2013, Alta, http://wcip2014.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Adopted-Alta-outcome-document-with-logo-ENG.pdf.

9 Parallel to this report, the World Bank carried out a series of dialogues, both in Latin America and worldwide, which included a workshop held November 25–27, 2013, in Washington, DC, where eight members of Abya Yala (AY), a regional network representing some 40 indigenous organizations from North and South America, recommended identifying indicators that better reflect their own views and needs of development. A second meeting took place in late January 2014, in Kuna Yala, Panama, and a draft of this report was presented and discussed at the United Nations World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, celebrated September 22–23, 2014. This final version incorporates, to the best of the authors’ abilities, the views and recommendations of the indigenous delegates present at these events.

10 World Bank, *Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013).

school than non-indigenous men.[11] Change toward social inclusion therefore needs to start with the right diagnosis—it needs to "ask why"—and not just account for poverty trends. Paramount to this approach is the critical review of the data available and the recognition of knowledge gaps, which should be accompanied by work toward defining indicators and goals that reflect indigenous peoples' own understanding and aspirations of development.

This report seeks to contribute to these discussions by offering a brief, preliminary glance at the state of indigenous peoples in Latin America at the end of the first decade of the millennium. From the outset, this report was not envisioned to propose guidelines for policy action or development operations, but rather to provide the World Bank and the larger audience of development planners and indigenous organizations with a succinct, updated view of the status of indigenous peoples in Latin America in light of the latest data available. The authors believe that this is the first, necessary step to start working on a concerted and evidence-based agenda for subsequent work in critical areas of development such as education, health, and land rights. Nevertheless, in the concluding section of the report, we offer a series of guiding principles that should inform the construction and implementation of policies and programs for indigenous peoples. As the report demonstrates, the results of the first decade of the twenty-first century—considered by many the golden decade of economic growth for Latin America—have been mixed for indigenous Latin Americans. While important steps have been taken to raise awareness on the special needs and rights of indigenous peoples, most countries and development agencies still lack institutionalized and efficient mechanisms to implement indigenous peoples' rights. The region has also shown a limited capacity to learn from best practices and cumulative knowledge.

The report is based on microdata extracted from censuses in 16 countries and household surveys in 9 countries,[12] unless otherwise indicated. Harmonized data sets were collected from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) of the Universidad Nacional de La Plata and the World Bank, for household surveys, and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the University of Minnesota,[13] for all censuses except for Argentina (Indigenous Census 2004–05), Bolivia (2012), Costa Rica (2011), Guatemala (2002), Honduras (2001), Paraguay (2012), and Venezuela (2011), which were manually collected from each country's National Statistical Institute websites and subsequently harmonized.

Despite important progress, several technical and sociocultural problems persist in the collection and presentation of regional data on indigenous people. The report makes a critical analysis of the many inconsistencies present in much of the data, which in many cases are intrinsic to the difficulties of approaching indigenous issues with tools and data sets not originally intended to account for or include indigenous peoples' voices and special needs. However, several corrections have been applied to the data for consistency. While household data are not uniformly gathered across countries, for example, the SEDLAC database maximizes comparability between countries and over time by harmonizing the surveys. This is done by using similar definitions of variables in each country and year, and by applying consistent data-processing methods. Censuses gather information on the whole population, and all estimates calculated for this report were revised for consistency. The table in Appendix A summarizes the countries, years, and variables available for identifying indigenous people in both statistical tools. In all cases, self-identification was prioritized for identifying indigenous people for reasons discussed in the first section of the report. Whenever possible, years were selected with the objective of covering the beginning and end of the first decade of the twenty-first century (early 2000s to late 2000s). Microdata were combined and critically reviewed with qualitative assessments of the situation of indigenous people in terms of poverty, vulnerability, participation, and access to public and social services.

11 Ibid.

12 Although indigenous variables are found in 9 household surveys in the region, this report includes data only from the eight countries where the indigenous population and/or the sample households included were sufficiently large to be statistically representative of the larger indigenous population; namely Bolivia (2002, 2011), Brazil (2001, 2012), Chile (2003, 2011), Ecuador (2004, 2012), Guatemala (2000, 2011), Mexico (2010, 2012), Peru (2004, 2012), and Uruguay (2006, 2012).

13 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International version 6.3 (machine-readable database), Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota, 2014.

Census and household data are treated differently throughout the report. Census data are used to highlight observable patterns in the distribution of services, demographic characteristics, increases in coverage, and the like, without delving into explanations of causality. Overall, these data show persistent gaps in access to many services across the region. Household data, for their part, are mainly used in an econometric analysis intended to respond to the fundamental question of whether those observable gaps are reinforced by conditions affecting indigenous peoples, in particular, or the poor in general. The poverty section provides unambiguous evidence that indigenous peoples fare worse on most accounts, independently from other factors such as level of education, age, urban or rural location, type of work, and characteristics of the household. When possible, the analysis evolves from the areas where the decade left positive outcomes to the areas showing challenges, so as to highlight the policy implications of what has worked well.

The report is divided into six sections. The first part—"How Many and Where They Are"—provides a demographic overview of indigenous people in the region, including population, geographic distribution, number of ethnic groups, and indigenous languages. While the region has made considerable progress in collecting statistical data on the indigenous population, there remain many gaps and areas that require improvement. Demographic invisibility, exclusionary definitions of indigeneity, and the use of disparate statistical criteria are some of the factors that keep indigenous people from overcoming their vulnerabilities.

The second section—"Mobility, Migration, and Urbanization"—describes a growing tendency among indigenous people to migrate to Latin American cities, which are becoming critical, though largely ignored, areas for political participation and market articulation. In addition to describing the magnitude of rural-urban migrations, the section looks at the socioeconomic consequences that these migratory trends have on the lives of a growing number of indigenous people.

In the third section—"Development with Identity"—we briefly discuss the concept of poverty and reflect on how the use of predominantly Western indicators of well-being might condition the understanding of indigenous peoples' situations and needs. In light of this, we argue that other, noneconomic aspects—such as the violation of indigenous people's rights or exclusion from political discussion—can reinforce their vulnerability and deter development efforts.

The fourth and fifth sections broaden this argument by focusing on two particular instances of exclusion—the market and education. Despite the growing endorsement of progressive legal instruments, these changes have not been followed by a significant reduction in inequality, structural violence, and vulnerability among indigenous people, which has led to a gap between legal frameworks and economic inclusion. The Millennium Development Goals have failed ethnic minorities by most indicators,[14] and the gaps separating indigenous people from the majority population have remained the same or increased for much of the past decade. Similarly, efforts to deliver educational services to indigenous people have resulted in expanded coverage and a universal agreement on the need to provide indigenous children with an education that reinforces their right to remain culturally and linguistically distinct. However, these efforts have proved insufficient, inasmuch as the gap between the progressive policies of intercultural bilingual education and the quality and types of education indigenous children receive seems to be widening. Schooling today in indigenous territories is strongly associated with the loss of indigenous languages and knowledge.

Finally, though this report aims simply to update our understanding of the regional trends in development aspects related to indigenous peoples—as seen from the lens of the statistical tools and indicators available today—and to review the policy frameworks, the final section reflects on the challenges ahead and advances some considerations for the construction of a post-2015 agenda of development with identity.

14 George Psacharopoulos and Harry Anthony Patrinos, eds., *Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994); Hall and Patrinos, *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development*.

How Many and Where They Are

The Politics of Recognition

To determine the exact number and distribution of indigenous people in Latin America and the Caribbean is not easy for several reasons, ranging from the lack of accurate and accessible information to the very nature of indigenous identities. Though there has been tremendous progress on this front over recent decades,[15] many limitations and room for improvement remain. Thirteen Caribbean countries have no statistical information concerning indigenous people,[16] and only 10 have included ethnic variables in their household surveys, which offer a more detailed and updated view of the status of indigenous households. Likewise, only a handful of countries have included ethnic variables in other key statistical tools, such as their national epidemiological records, judicial records, and electoral statistics.

Moreover, there are dissimilarities in the criteria used to account for the indigenous population, and many countries do not consider indigenous groups that have recently migrated to their countries. In Argentina, for example, a recent report suggests that current estimates of its indigenous population do not include a substantial number of individuals who entered through the Bolivian and Paraguayan borders in recent years who self-identify as Guaraní, Quechua, or Aymara.[17] Multinational censuses are rare and difficult to operationalize, so many countries find it problematic to account for individuals who lead transnational lives.[18]

In most cases, however, the main challenge to determine the precise number and distribution of indigenous people is political, related to the legal or implicit definitions of *indigeneity* that prevail in the region. The definition of who is and who is not indigenous has become increasingly relevant and controversial in recent decades, not only because of the reemergence of groups thought to be extinct,[19] but also because in the wake of a new set of legal frameworks, covenants, and international agreements safeguarding indigenous rights, indigenous peoples often rely on their official recognition to be protected from or included in aspects of decision making that could affect their lives, assets, and cultures.[20] As a result, the resurgence of indigenous forms of belonging and indigenous peoples' increasing visibility in the regional arena have brought about old and new debates on the definition of *indigeneity*, and thus on the rights that derive from their recognition as indigenous.

The impact that political decisions have on the number and visibility of indigenous identities can be clearly appreciated at times of progressive legal reforms. In Venezuela, for example, the 1999 constitution included a set of articles protecting indigenous peoples' rights, which conferred these groups, for the first time, the full status of adult citizens, with special provisions for the protection of their cultures, languages, territories, natural resources, customary forms of social order, and health (including their traditional healing systems), among others (Chapter VIII, Articles 119–226). Chapter VIII of the constitution, which was passed because of the tenacity of the indigenous movement during this period of constitutional reform, overrode a 1915 law—known as the Missions' Law (Law 12,562)—that delegated the responsibility to oversee most indigenous persons' basic civil rights to the Catholic Church. As a result of these changes and the new opportunities

15 Seventeen Latin American countries included ethnic variables in their last round of censuses, compared with only a handful that had done so in the 1980s. In addition, the prevailing criterion today is "self-identification," with Peru being the only country in the region that still uses "language" as a defining criterion.

16 Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. *Source:* UNICEF and FUNPROEIB Andes, *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina* (Cochabamba, Bolivia: UNICEF and FUNPROEIB Andes, 2009).

17 Luis E. López, "Pueblos, Culturas y Lenguas Indígenas en América Latina," in *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina*, 71.

18 In 1992, for example, Venezuela and Colombia conducted the first (and last) binational census of the Wayuu population. The Wayuu live on both sides of the border and have taken advantage of this citizenship status and identity for generations. The international census allowed both countries to have a more accurate and realistic view of this transnational population, but the logistical and political complexities involved in this census have discouraged follow-up exercises (Roberto Lizarralde, personal communication, 2006).

19 See Karen Stocker, "Locating Identity: The Role of Place in Costa Rican Chorotega Identity," in *Who Is an Indian? Race, Place, and the Politics of Indigeneity in the Americas,* ed. Maximilian Forte (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013); M. Forte, "Carib Identity, Racial Politics, and the Problem of Indigenous Recognition in Trinidad and Tobago," in *Who Is an Indian?*; Circe Sturm, *Becoming Indian: The Struggle over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 2011); Terence Turner, "Representing, Resisting, Rethinking: Historical Transformations of Kayapo Culture and Anthropological Consciousness," in *Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge,* ed. George W. Stocking Jr. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).

20 Jerome M. Levi and Bjorn Maybury-Lewis, "Becoming Indigenous: Identity and Heterogeneity in a Global Movement," in *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, and Development*, 75.

created within the state, the indigenous population rose by 164 percent in the following census (2001) and an additional 43 percent in the most recent census (2011). This proportional expansion was accompanied by an equivalent increase in the number of ethnic groups, which went from 22 to 50, and the reappearance of peoples that were thought to be extinct or about to be extinct for decades.[21] Posterior specialized studies have found many of these claims to be historiographically and ethnographically sound.[22]

These processes of ethno-genesis have become common in the region, and go hand in hand with the recognition and greater visibility of indigenous peoples' rights and voices. Though the reappearance or resurgence of new forms of indigeneity is often seen as opportunistic and economically motivated, the reality is much more complex, as even in those cases ethnicity usually overlaps and coexists with multiple factors that might lead to a rise of inequities and disadvantages.[23] As a matter of fact, new and traditional forms of indigeneity are consistently associated with higher than average poverty rates and other forms of exclusion. In Uruguay, where the indigenous population was either assimilated into the settler society or tragically decimated during the first half of the nineteenth century, the current population identifying itself as of "indigenous descent" (the only country to include this modality in its household survey) shows a pattern of exclusion common to other urban indigenous populations in the region. Poverty among urban Uruguayans who recognize themselves as having indigenous ancestry is 1.7 times higher than among other Uruguayans, and extreme poverty is 1.4 times higher. Moreover, on average they complete one fewer year of schooling by age 18, are more often hired in the informal sector (37 percent vs. 30 percent), and have less access to sanitation (57 percent vs. 65 percent). Ethnically based exclusion has pervasive social and economic consequences that outlive the existence of ethnic groups.

The fact is that indigenous societies are not fixed and homogenous, but rather diverse and adaptable social groups, as more than 500 years of resistance and continuity can attest. Also, there is a difficult balance in the push for improving the terms of recognition and benefit sharing with the larger national society and the struggle for preserving cultural distinctiveness and traditions. These opposing forces lead to constant reconfigurations, realignments, and, often, difficult political decisions. However, many of these tensions are intrinsic to indigenous identities. This is why Latin American demographic institutes have increasingly recognized the complexities of defining *indigeneity* according to fixed and external categories. Rather, they have adopted "self-identification" as the main criterion for statistical recording (see table 1).

The use of native languages as a criterion in collecting demographic data on indigenous groups is in decline, inasmuch as it can create fixed and unreal divides between who is and who is not indigenous. Peru is the only country still providing mother tongue as the only proxy variable for identifying indigenous people in its census. The 2007 census set the number of indigenous-language speakers at 4.4 million (16 percent of the total), but the rapid trend of linguistic replacement among indigenous youngsters makes this figure unrealistic. As shown in figure 1, the main indigenous languages in the country are being rapidly replaced by Spanish, especially among younger generations. For this report, we have therefore considered all members of a household where the household head speaks a native language as indigenous, which elevates the number of indigenous Peruvians to about 7.6 million (26 percent of the total). This figure probably falls short of accounting for the full amount of indigenous Peruvians but is much closer to other projections, based on self-identification, such as Peru's household surveys (2012), which estimate the indigenous population at about 9.7 million people (31 percent of the total)—more than twice the number of speakers of a native language.[24]

21 Miguel A. Perera, ed., *Los aborígenes de Venezuela*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Caracas: Fundación La Salle de Ciencias Naturales, Instituto Caribe de Antropología y Sociología, Ediciones IVIC, Monte Ávila Editores, 2008 [1988]).

22 Cecilia Ayala Lafée-Wilbert and Werner Wilbert, *Memoria histórica de los resguardos guaiquerí: propiedad y territorialidad tradicional* (Caracas: IVIC, 2011).

23 World Bank, *Inclusion Matters*; World Bank, *Voice and Agency: Empowering Women and Girls for Shared Prosperity* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014).

24 The reasons behind the persistent use of mother tongue as a defining criterion in Peruvian official records date to the 1970s, when the Agrarian Reform divided the indigenous population in two by adopting the term *peasant* for the sedentary indigenous farmers of the Andes and *native* for the Amazonian indigenous peoples. As a result, a majority of the Quechua- and Aymara-speaking populations favored the use of "peasant communities" (*comunidades campesinas*) and rejected the more internationally accepted label "indigenous communities." This semantic distinction has had not only demographic consequences, but also negative effects at the time of recognizing indigenous peoples' rights, such as the right to free, prior and informed consent, protected under Peruvian law. In fact, FPIC has not been implemented in highland indigenous settings because of disagreements over their indigenous authenticity.

Table 1 Variables Available for Identifying Indigenous Peoples in Censuses and Household Surveys

	Self-identification	Language
Household surveys	Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay	Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru
Censuses	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela

Figure 1 Mother Tongue by Age Cohort (Peru 2007)



Source: national censuses.

Although the existence of indigenous peoples without native languages is in part the result of recent processes of indigenization and ethnogenesis,[25] the loss of an indigenous language is generally associated with poverty, social exclusion, and lack of political participation. While the extinction of languages is not a novel process, several reports suggest that this trend is accelerating in the midst of rapid globalization, especially among economically vulnerable communities.[26] It is noteworthy that out of

25 Inge Sichra, "Introducción," in *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina,* 13.

26 UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, "Language Vitality and Endangerment" (adopted by the International Expert Meeting on UNESCO Programme Safeguarding of Endangered Languages, Paris, 2003), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001836/183699E.pdf.

the 10 factors contributing to the loss of indigenous languages in Latin America identified by the *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en America Latina,*[27] only three pertain to linguistic processes—intergenerational transmission, role of oral traditions, and sociolinguistic context. The remaining seven are related to the socioeconomic conditions that native speakers face in their daily lives, including political conflict, dependence on external entities, political asymmetries, economic exclusion, and the lack of legal and effective recognition of indigenous rights.[28]

Moreover, because the loss of a native language generally takes place in societies with greater exposure to poverty and social exclusion, elevating language as a defining criterion of indigeneity might paradoxically reinforce and deepen the level of economic and social vulnerability that led to the loss of the language in the first place (see box 1). In Mexico, for example, urban indigenous Spanish speakers have a 33 percent higher employability rate than those who speak only a native language (see figure 2).

Figure 2 Urban Indigenous Population of Working Age by Language and Employment Status



Source: national censuses.

27 UNICEF and FUNPROEIB Andes, *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina.*

28 Another important factor associated with language replacement—and culture change in general—is formal education. This is not to say that formal education or Spanish proficiency necessarily erodes indigenous cultures, but the way formal education is being implemented in indigenous milieus in much of the region is not contributing to their development with identity. This need not be, as abundant evidence on intercultural bilingual education shows. IBE can offer indigenous peoples the alternative of taking part in and benefiting from the prosperity of the state without having to renounce their languages and cultures (see "Education" section for more information).

Box 1 | Language as a Category of Exclusion

In the settlement of El Mayor, in northern Mexico, the Cucapa people (also known as Awiłł Kwñchawaay) are facing restrictions over their fishing rights, in part because this group has failed to satisfy the official criteria used to recognize indigenous peoples. One of the key arguments used to delegitimize the Cucapa's demands for land titles and fishing rights is their adoption of Spanish as their primary language. While native speakers of the Yuman-family language have been reduced to a handful of elders, the younger generations have adopted Spanish in their daily lives. Although this did not previously pose a problem, many of their members are now "finding that a lack of fluency in their indigenous language and traditions is increasingly delegitimizing their current legal claims."[29]

The Cucapa case illustrates the extent to which language proficiency can not only undermine the right of attaining food security and preserving customary forms of production, but also—and more remarkably—reinforce existing forms of discrimination. If in previous decades the Cucapa were excluded for not being properly integrated into national society (that is, for not speaking Spanish), they now face the risk of being discriminated against on the basis of not being properly "indigenous" (that is, for not speaking a native language). The role that languages can play in the recognition of indigenous rights has become so critical that other groups, such as the Pataxó of northeastern Brazil, have made strenuous efforts to adopt a foreign indigenous language (Maxakalí) to fulfill the demands of authenticity enforced by Brazilian government agencies.[30]

Establishing rigid criteria of language proficiency can also hamper development programs that might help indigenous people overcome poverty. Among the Cucapa, several projects based on ecotourism have been halted because sponsors require "a certain level of 'cultural knowledge' and reflexivity… [and] language competency is often used as the indicator for such qualities."[31]

Screening out indigenous populations on the basis of noncompliance with externally defined features of indigeneity can therefore have serious social consequences, as well as negative outcomes in terms of promoting development—such as the impossibility of reclaiming fishing rights or collective land titles.

In sum, self-identification not only reasserts indigenous peoples' agency to decide their forms of adscription, but it also allows accounting for the changing and historically specific character of indigeneity, as well as the distinctive ways indigenous peoples cope with national society, market forces, state politics, and development agencies. Establishing rigid criteria for the identification of indigenous people can therefore trigger negative consequences for those who do not meet all the "relevant" benchmarks—giving rise not only to stereotypical and discriminatory notions of "generic," "new," or "fake" indigenous peoples, but also to concrete forms of social exclusion, displacement, and violation of rights.

Indigenous People in Numbers

According to the last round of censuses available, in 2010 there were about 42 million indigenous people in Latin America, representing nearly 7.8 percent of the total population. Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia had the largest indigenous populations both in absolute and proportional terms, comprising more than 80 percent of the total (34.4 million). El Salvador, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Venezuela had the smallest proportions of indigenous population, with El Salvador and Costa Rica having the smallest indigenous populations in absolute terms (14,865 and 104,143 people, respectively) (see map 1).

29 Shaylih Muehlmann, "'Spread Your Ass Cheeks': And Other Things that Should Not Be Said in Indigenous Languages," *American Ethnologist* 35, no. 1 (2008): 36; see also Muehlmann, *Where the River Ends: Contested Indigeneity in the Mexican Colorado Delta* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).

30 See Alcida Rita Ramos, *Sanumá Memories: Yanomami Ethnography in Times of Crisis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 268.

31 Muehlmann, "'Spread Your Ass Cheeks,'" 40.

Map 1 | Distribution of the Indigenous Population in LAC

Source: national censuses.

However, comparing census data across countries can be problematic for several reasons. El Salvador, for example, has the lowest percentage of indigenous people (0.2 percent), but about 86 percent of its population identifies as "mestizo," an option not present in many other country surveys. Had this option not been available it is difficult to know how many "mestizos" would have identified as "indigenous." Also, official data on indigenous people are not conclusive, as many technical and sociological difficulties persist in census data collection. Other sources based on estimates and unofficial data refer to 50 million indigenous inhabitants in Latin America (about 10 percent of the total population).[32] For this report, however, we will refer to the official—albeit imperfect—numbers provided by the national censuses (see table 2).

It is difficult to estimate increases in indigenous population across the region because of disparities in how the census data were collected, between censuses and across countries, and the fact that some countries are still using data from the previous round of censuses (for example, Honduras, Chile, and Guatemala). Nevertheless, the most significant increases occurred in Venezuela, where the indigenous population went from 1.5 percent to 2.8 percent of the total population between censuses (an increase of 218,251); Panama, where it went from about 10 percent to 12.2 percent of the total population (an increase of 105,855); Costa Rica, from 1.7 percent to 2.4 percent of the total population (an increase of 40,267); and Ecuador, from 6.8 percent to 7 percent of the total population—a small percentage increase but one that reflects an increase of 187,758. Brazil had a modest increase, with its indigenous population going from 0.4 percent to 0.5 percent of the total population (an increase of 83,836 people).

The only country that showed a decrease in its indigenous population is Bolivia, for reasons that have probably more to do with the way the data were collected during the last census than with a real trend to negative growth. The decrease in the proportion of indigenous people in Bolivia (from 62 percent to 41 percent of the population) has in fact been widely discussed, as it has puzzled both the international community and the national authorities. Some preliminary explanations point to the effect of changes in the census questionnaire, as in 2001 Bolivians were asked if they "identified" with an indigenous people, and in 2012 the question was whether they "belonged" to one.[33]

As for the number and distribution of ethnic groups, the issue is even more problematic and the regional censuses might not be the best source, because ethnic frontiers rarely match national borders and no country keeps track of cross-border populations. Also, different ethnic groups sometimes receive homonymous names. *Maku*, for instance, is an Arawakan term used to refer to various peoples of Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil without connection; *Nhengatu, Geral*, and *Yeral* are names given to several unconnected peoples throughout the Amazon who speak varieties of a lingua franca spread by Jesuit missionaries during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, based on an extinct language of the Tupi-Guarani family. On the other hand, a single group or linguistic family might receive different names in different countries—such as the several groups of Maya peoples inhabiting a large area of southern Mexico and Central America.

According to the *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina,* the Amazon is the region with the largest diversity of indigenous peoples (316 groups), followed by Mesoamerica, the Orinoco basin, the Andes, and the Chaco region. The areas with the smallest diversity are the Pacific coast and Patagonia. However, the total number of indigenous peoples is not conclusive or fixed; rather, it needs to be understood as a variable figure that is continually changing as a result of new forms of indigenization, ethno-genesis, and legal recognition. The Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y del Caribe, for instance, has estimated the number of indigenous peoples at 626,[34] and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the

32 López, "Pueblos, Culturas y Lenguas Indígenas en América Latina."

33 http://eju.tv/2013/08/censo-menos-indgenas-es-un-mensaje-poltico/; http://red.pucp.edu.pe/ridei/politica/bolivia-censo-2012-algunas-claves-para-entender-la-variable-indigena/.

34 The countries that provide information on specific indigenous peoples in the census are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela; for these countries approximately 300 indigenous peoples are listed.

Table 2 Indigenous Population in Latin America in 2010

Country	Last available census	Estimated indigenous population at the end of the decade[a] (in millions)	Proportion of the total population[b]
Mexico	2010	16.83	15.0%
Peru	2007	7.60	26.0%
Guatemala	2002	5.88	41.0%
Bolivia[c]	2012	4.12	41.0%
Colombia	2005	1.53	3.3%
Ecuador	2010	1.02	7.0%
Argentina[d]	2010	0.95	2.4%
Brazil	2010	0.82	0.5%
Venezuela	2011	0.72	2.8%
Chile	2002	0.79	4.6%
Honduras	2001	0.55	7.2%
Panama	2010	0.42	12.2%
Nicaragua[e]	2005	0.35	6.0%
Paraguay	2012	0.11	1.7%
Costa Rica	2011	0.10	2.4%
El Salvador	2007	0.01	0.2%
Latin America[f]	--	41.81	7.8%

Source: national censuses.

a For countries without census data available for the end of the decade, the indigenous population was estimated by applying the percentage of the last census to the 2010 projection of the national population.

b The indigenous population was estimated using "self-identification" in all the censuses, except for Peru, which provides only "mother tongue" as a means of identification. In this case, the indigenous population was estimated by identifying as "indigenous" all the members of a household where the head of the household speaks an indigenous language.

c In Bolivia, only respondents 15 years of age or older were asked if they self-identified as indigenous, so the estimate in the table extrapolates the percentage of indigenous population in the segment "15 years of age or older" to the segment "14 years of age or younger."

d Includes people who self-identify as belonging to an indigenous group and people of indigenous descent.

e In Nicaragua, self-identification includes indigenous peoples, Creoles, and mestizos. The latter two categories were not included in this estimate for consistency with the rest of the report, though they are usually listed as indigenous population in the official data of the country.

f The regional estimate was constructed as a weighted average, using country population as weights.

Table 3 Indigenous Peoples and languages in Latin America

Country	Indigenous peoples	Indigenous languages	Legal status of indigenous languages[a]
Argentina	30	15	Languages of education
Belize	4	4	No recognition
Bolivia	114	33[b]	Co-official with Spanish
Brazil	241	186	Languages of education
Chile	9	6	Languages of education
Colombia	83	65	Co-official with Spanish
Costa Rica	8	7	Languages to be preserved
Ecuador	32	13	Of official regional use
El Salvador	3	1	No recognition
French Guiana	6	6	Languages of education
Guatemala	24	24	National languages
Guyana	9	9	Languages of education
Honduras	7	6	Languages of education
Mexico	67	67	Co-official with Spanish
Nicaragua	9	6	Of official regional use
Panama[c]	7	7	Languages of education
Paraguay	20	20	Guarani as co-official
Peru	52	47	Of official regional use
Suriname	5	5	No recognition
Uruguay	0	0	No recognition
Venezuela	50	37	Co-official with Spanish
Latin America	780	560	

Compiled for this report by Luis Enrique Lopez-Hurtado.

a The legal status of indigenous languages is based on the definitions found in the constitution, as well as in existing education and language laws. Sources: national censuses of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela, and I. Sichra, coord., *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina.*

b According to the 2009 constitution.

c According to the Plan de Desarrollo Integral de Los Pueblos Indigenas (2013).

Caribbean (ECLAC) recently listed 826 indigenous peoples.[35] Table 3 is therefore intended to serve as a mere reference of the ethno-linguistic diversity—rather than as a definitive list—and of the legal status and protection this valuable knowledge enjoys at present in the region, at least on paper.

It is estimated that half of the existing languages in the world will become extinct during this century.[36] In Latin America, about one-fifth of indigenous peoples have already lost their native languages in recent decades (44 of them now speak Spanish, while 55 speak Portuguese). Based on an analysis of 313 indigenous languages, a recent report concludes that 76 percent (239) of them are spoken by fewer than 10,000 people.[37] Although population size and language replacement are not necessarily related, a study by the Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas in Mexico found that of 62 languages analyzed, 22 were in rapid process of replacement (including large linguistic groups such as the Maya and Otomí), and an additional 19 were in slow process of replacement, including the most common indigenous languages in the country: Nahuatl and Zapotec.[38] Figure 3 shows the discrepancies between the percentage of people who identify as indigenous and the percentage who speak an indigenous language in the three censuses of the region that offered both alternatives (Bolivia, Mexico, and Ecuador).

Figure 3 Indigenous Language and Self-Identification



Source: national censuses.

Note: In Bolivia the language is identified by the question "first language learned as a child."

35 ECLAC, *Guaranteeing Indigenous People's Rights in Latin America* (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 2014).

36 Michael Krauss, "The World's Languages in Crisis," *Language* 68, no. 1 (1992): 1–42; Luisa Maffi, "Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34 (2005): 599–617; UNESCO, *Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2010).

37 López, "Pueblos, Culturas y Lenguas Indígenas en América Latina," 85.

38 Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, *Indice de reemplazo etnolingüístico*, Mexico (2005).

Mobility, Migration, and Urbanization

Although traditional territories have been one of the most overarching referents of historical continuity, identity, and self-determination for indigenous peoples, 49 percent of the indigenous population in Latin America currently lives in urban areas. This transition has been triggered by numerous factors, including dispossession of land, ecological depletion, displacement due to conflict and violence, and natural disasters. Migration from rural to urban areas, however, is also driven by new and improved access to basic services, such as health care and education, as well as improved market opportunities.

For women, migrating to cities can also be an opportunity to break away from gendered roles and enjoy greater independence, even while facing more disadvantages in cities than men.[39] A recent UN-Habitat report found that urban women enjoy greater social, economic, and political opportunities and liberties than their rural counterparts.[40] However, it is also important to note that women are a heterogeneous group, in which younger women face a range of risks that might be exacerbated in the urban setting, such as personal safety and security concerns, as well as the possibility of contracting HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. Often, women face unequal access to formal work, as their economic opportunities are concentrated mostly in low-skill/low-paying jobs and the informal sector, such as domestic workers. As a regional trend, nevertheless, women outnumber men in cities, particularly older women, and the share of female-headed households is growing faster than that of male-headed households.[41]

Census data show that while over 60 percent of the indigenous population in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Panama still lives in rural areas, over 40 percent of the indigenous population in El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru already resides in urban settings. Most notably, in Chile and Venezuela the indigenous population living in cities surpasses 60 percent of the total. In the case of Peru, though the 2007 census reported a 53 percent urban indigenous population, more recent household survey data elevate this number to 60 percent. The urbanization of indigenous societies calls for at least two obvious questions: Why this is happening, and what are the implications of this trend for poverty reduction strategies?

Fast urbanization is clearly not unique to indigenous people. Latin America has become one of the most urbanized regions in the world, with about 76 percent of the overall population currently living in urban settings,[42] as a result of massive and fast rural out-migration over recent decades. It is safe to assume that the driving forces behind ethnic and non-ethnic migrations are quite similar, as countries with a high proportion of indigenous people living in urban settings, such as Chile and Venezuela, are also among the most urbanized countries in the region (with 87 and 88 percent urbanization, respectively). Throughout the region, unequal access to health care contributes to important gaps in life indicators between rural and urban sectors. In Lima, to cite one example, there are 15 medical doctors for every 10,000 people on average, while in Huanuco (rural Peru) there are only 4. [43]

What is distinctive about indigenous peoples is the strength with which rural-urban disparities hit them. The life expectancy of indigenous people is 30 years shorter in the Peruvian highlands than in Lima.[44] Nearly half of all indigenous Amazonians in Peru are under 15 years of age; only 2 percent are above 64.[45] While this imbalance might be due to several reasons, poor access to health services and other

39 For more on gender and migration, see Sylvia Chant, "Cities through a 'Gender Lens': A Golden 'Urban Age' for Women in the Global South?" *Environment and Urbanization* 25, no. 1 (2013): 9–29; UN-Habitat, *State of Women in Cities Report 2012/13* (Nairobi: UN-Habitat, 2013); Cecilia Tacoli, *Urbanization, Gender and Urban Poverty: Paid Work and Unpaid Carework in the City* (New York: IIED and UNFPA, 2012).

40 UN-Habitat, *State of Women in Cities*.

41 Chant, "Cities through a 'Gender Lens.'"

42 Authors' calculation using national census data for the countries considered in this report.

43 Ministerio de Salud, Departamento de Información Estadística, 2012. http://www.minsa.gob.pe/index.asp?op=2.

44 Chris Hufstader, "The Injustice of Racism," Oxfam America, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/articles/the-injustice-of-racism.

45 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información, *Censos Nacionales 2007: II Censo de Comunidades Indígenas* (INEI, Lima, 2009).

Figure 4 Percentage of Indigenous People Living in Urban and Rural Settings



Source: national censuses.

Note: LAC average weighted by total population for the countries and years included in the figure (last year available). Rural/urban variables were obtained directly from censuses.

forms of exclusion from state benefits are critical factors. The highest percentage of people without access to health care in Peru have an indigenous language as their mother tongue; about 61 percent of all Quechua speakers and 80 percent of Aymara speakers have no regular access to health care services.[46] Similarly, only 41 percent of indigenous Amazonian communities have a community health center,[47] many of them inoperable, and about 90 percent of childbirths in these communities occur without any institutional assistance.[48]

In cities throughout Latin America, indigenous people also have better access to basic services and market opportunities. Indigenous people living in cities have 1.5 times more access to electricity and 1.7

46 Fernando Lavandez, Julie Ruel-Bergeron, and Alejandra Leytón, "Hacia un Perú más saludable: desafíos y oportunidades del sistema de salud," in *Perú en el umbral de una nueva era*, vol. 2, eds. Susan G. Goldmark, C. Felipe Jaramillo, and Carlos Silva-Jáuregui (Lima: World Bank, 2012), 434–65.

47 Instituto Nacional de Estadística.

48 Lavandez, Ruel-Bergeron, and Leytón, "Hacia un Perú más saludable."

times more access to piped water than their rural counterparts. In Panama, Bolivia, and Peru, urban indigenous people have 3.9, 3.6, and 2.6 times better access to electricity, while in Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile, the gap is somewhat narrower (see figure 5). Differences in access to piped water and sewerage are even more pronounced than the gap in electricity. In Chile and Costa Rica, where piped water coverage is virtually universal for the urban population, including indigenous residents, only 61 percent and 68 percent of indigenous rural dwellers have access to this service in their homes. In Peru and Bolivia, indigenous urban dwellers have three times and twice, respectively, the access to piped water that their rural counterparts have. Indigenous urban dwellers also have nearly 15 times better access to sewerage than their rural peers in Bolivia, and 8.5 times in Peru.

Figure 5 Percentage of Indigenous People with Access to Electricity, Piped Water, and Sewerage







Source: national censuses.

While differences in access to basic services are consistent with prevailing disparities in access among urban and rural non-indigenous people, these gaps are generally wider for indigenous peoples (see figure 6). For example, rural-urban gaps in access to electricity are two to five times wider for indigenous people than for non-indigenous people in Ecuador, Panama, and Brazil. Rural-urban gaps in access to piped water are 3.4 times larger for indigenous people in Panama and 1.6 in Brazil. In Peru, while the gap between rural and urban settings is above 50 percent for the entire population, ethnicity does not seem to play a major role. However, it is important to note that because mother tongue is the only available variable for identifying indigenous people in Peru, part of the disparity between non-indigenous urban and rural dwellers might include the peasant/indigenous population of the highlands who declare to speak Spanish. In fact, the probability in Peru of an indigenous household to be poor decreases by 37 percent if it lives in an urban setting (regardless of other conditions contributing to poverty, such as gender, education level of the household's head, and number of children under 15 years of age in the household; see section "Poverty and Vulnerability").

Just as important, completion of primary education throughout Latin America is 1.6 times higher for urban indigenous people than for their rural counterparts, 3.6 times higher for secondary education, and 7.7 times higher for tertiary education. In Bolivia the difference between rural and urban areas in primary education completion is 34 percent, while in Peru the gap is 26 percent. Mexico and Ecuador have 17 and 16 percent gaps, respectively. The pattern for secondary education is more pronounced, with indigenous urban residents having three, four, or more times better chance of completing high school. Urban indigenous dwellers complete secondary education more than four times as often as their rural counterparts in Bolivia, and more than three times as often in Mexico and Peru. Tertiary education, meanwhile, is markedly the urban privilege of a few.

Figure 6 Rural-Urban Gaps in Access to Electricity, Piped Water, and Sewerage: Indigenous People (IP) vs. Non-Indigenous People (Non-IP)



Source: national censuses.

Figure 7 Indigenous People's Educational Attainment: Rural vs. Urban





Source: national censuses.

Finally, though the rural-urban gap in education affects the non-indigenous population as well, the primary education gap is higher for indigenous people in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama, and lower in Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. Secondary and tertiary education show in general a wider gap for the non-indigenous population, probably because of indigenous people's overall lower attainment of secondary- and tertiary-level degrees, irrespective of their location (see figure 8).[49]

49 For more comparisons on the marginal probability of completing primary and secondary education, controlled against other variables and based on household data, see section "Poverty and Vulnerability."

Figure 8 Rural-Urban Gap in Educational Attainment: Indigenous People (IP) vs. Non-Indigenous People (Non-IP)







Source: national censuses.

Another important factor associated with rural-urban migration is the great deal of pressure indigenous territories have been subjected to over the past decades. Although the causes behind indigenous mobility vary greatly from one case to the next, the Amazon, a multinational area cutting across nine countries, is a good example of some of the forces pushing indigenous peoples out of their traditional territories.

With the highest ethnic diversity and the largest proportion of languages in the region,[50] the Amazon basin currently faces important pressures from internal and external actors.[51] Although about 45 percent of the region is protected under different legal jurisdictions, 21.5 percent of which is considered "indigenous territory,"[52] there are few de facto guarantees for indigenous people, even within these protected areas.[53]

Currently, there are 81 active oil blocks in the Amazon, and at least 327 potential blocks are being explored and negotiated (spread over 15 percent of the Amazon basin); 78 percent of all blocks are controlled by nine state-owned and/or transnational oil companies.[54] Potential oil blocks overlap with indigenous territories to different degrees,[55] but the majority (80 percent, 263 oil blocks) are located in the region contiguous to the Andes and their piedmont, an area in which more than half of Amazonian indigenous groups are located, some of which live in "voluntary isolation" or in some degree of initial contact. Today, there are active oil blocks on 13 percent of the indigenous land in the Amazon, but the blocks that are being targeted and negotiated cover about 50 percent of the indigenous land (see map 2).[56]

50 The Amazon comprises 7.8 million square kilometers, with 12 basins and 158 sub-basins, cutting across Bolivia (6.2 percent), Brazil (64.3 percent), Colombia (6.2 percent), Ecuador (1.5 percent), Guyana (2.8 percent), Peru (10.1 percent), Suriname (2.1 percent), Venezuela (5.8 percent), and French Guiana (1.1 percent). This area is occupied by 33 million people and 385 indigenous peoples, many of which are in a situation of "voluntary isolation" or initial contact.

51 RAISG, *Amazonía bajo presión* (2012), http://raisg.socioambiental.org/amazonia-bajo-presion-2012.

52 Ibid., 11.

53 Ibid., 12.

54 Ibid., 24.

55 In Peru, 66.3 percent of all oil blocks overlap indigenous territories, but none do so in Brazil. RAISG, *Amazonía bajo presión*, 24.

56 Ibid., 29.

Map 2 | Areas of Oil and Mineral Extraction in the Amazon



Source: RAISG.

Legal and illegal mining also constitute a major threat to indigenous lands, and are important drivers for migration and conflict.[57] One-fifth of the Amazon basin (1.6 million square kilometers [km^2]) has been identified as having potential for mineral extraction; about 20 percent is indigenous land. *Garimpagem* (illegal gold mining) has also spread throughout the region, causing deforestation, river pollution, and violence.[58] A recent study by the Carnegie Amazon Mercury Ecosystem Project (CAMEP) found that Peruvian indigenous communities registered five times more toxic mercury than what the World Health Organization considers safe, doubling the amount found among urban dwellers.[59] The high level of mercury is the result of the recent gold rush in the Madre de Dios region of Peru.[60] Illegal gold mining has also been prevalent in Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, Brazil, and Venezuela. Currently, 19 percent of indigenous territories are located in areas being used for legal and illegal mining; 94 percent of this area (381,857 km^2) is within indigenous territories with official recognition and 6 percent (25,437 km^2) in indigenous lands with no legal recognition.[61] In other words, land titles alone seem to provide indigenous people with little protection against these practices if not accompanied by other government action.

However, the extractive industries can also be a pull factor for indigenous peoples, with diverse outcomes, and, despite many negative experiences, there are many cases that prove that the interests of extractive industries and those of indigenous peoples do not have to be at odds with each other.[62] The case of the Charagua Norte and Isoso gas exploration project, in Bolivia, represents positive recognition of indigenous institutions in the development of extractive projects. There, after the government-led consent process got off to a rocky start, the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy agreed to relaunch it and to follow the Guaraní communities' proposed methodological guidelines for redirecting the consent process in accordance with their traditional organization and processes. After a phased consent process within the indigenous communities, according to their rules, the communities gave their written consent to the project. As reported by the local non-governmental organization (NGO) providing training to the Guaraní:

"[The government] acted in a receptive, open, and proactive manner with indigenous leaders so that the consultation process could arrive at a positive conclusion. The case of Charagua Norte reinforces the need for government agencies to maintain an attitude of openness and respect towards indigenous peoples' demands for prior consultation and consent."[63]

Finally, another critical driver of displacement in indigenous territories is crime and violence, which are sometimes related to illicit economies. About 17 percent of the land within indigenous *resguardos* in Colombia is estimated to be used for illegal crops,[64] and of the 6.4 million victims of the Colombian conflict officially registered from 1958 to 2012,[65] 30 percent belonged to Afro-Colombian or indigenous communities. Approximately 89 percent of the victims[66] were internally displaced;[67] and out of 720,000 forcefully displaced people in Colombia today, over 125,000 belonged to an indigenous community. Thus, despite representing 3.3 percent of the total population, indigenous people account for over 17 percent of the internally displaced people.

57 In Peru, for example, there were about 1,073 active conflicts related to mining in 2012 alone, accounting for about 55 percent of all active conflicts registered by the Ombudsman Office.

58 "Ungreen Gold," the *Economist*, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17525904.

59 Cecilia Jamasmie, "Peru's Illegal Gold Mining Poisoning Children, Natives—Report," Mining.com, Sept. 9, 2013, http://www.mining.com/perus-illegal-gold-mining-poisoning-children-natives-report-41973/.

60 CAMEP, Carnegie Institution for Science, Department of Global Ecology, http://dge.stanford.edu/research/CAMEP/Findings.html.

61 RAISG, *Amazonía bajo presión*, 35–36.

62 James Anaya, United Nations, "Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," July 1, 2013.

63 Iván Bascopé Sanjines, CEJIS, "Case Study: Bolivian Government Consultation with the Guaraní Indigenous Peoples of Charagua Norte and Isoso, Proposed Hydrocarbons Exploration Project in San Isidro Block, Santa Cruz, Bolivia," Nov. 15, 2010, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/oxfam-bolivia-consultation-process-nov-2010-final.pdf.

64 Marcelo M. Giugale, Olivier Lafourcarde, and Connie Luff, eds., *Colombia: The Economic Foundation of Peace* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), 797.

65 Red Nacional de Información, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Victimas, April 2014.

66 According to a local NGO, CODHES (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento), 5.4 million Colombians were displaced from 2005 to 2011.

67 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Global Overview 2012: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence* (Geneva: IDMC, Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2013).

Table 4 Lack of Access to Piped Water, Electricity, Sewerage, and Building Materials (Dirt Floor) in Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Urban Households

Country	Year	Dirt floor	No electricity	No piped water	No sewerage	Slum
Indigenous						
Bolivia	2001	15%	9%	12%	41%	47%
Brazil	2010	–	2%	7%	39%	40%
Chile	2002	1%	2%	1%	4%	5%
Colombia	2005	22%	7%	18%	–	32%
Costa Rica	2000	6%	0%	1%	14%	16%
Ecuador	2010	6%	3%	9%	10%	21%
El Salvador	2007	24%	12%	20%	37%	40%
Latin America		17%	6%	13%	23%	36%
Mexico	2010	8%	2%	8%	14%	23%
Nicaragua	2005	21%	16%	37%	74%	80%
Panama	2010	9%	7%	5%	40%	47%
Peru	2007	45%	15%	22%	32%	57%
Venezuela	2001	22%	6%	35%	54%	65%
Non-Indigenous						
Bolivia	2001	11%	8%	8%	34%	39%
Brazil	2010	–	0%	2%	26%	27%
Chile	2002	0%	1%	0%	3%	4%
Colombia	2005	7%	2%	8%	–	9%
Costa Rica	2000	1%	0%	0%	4%	5%
Ecuador	2010	4%	2%	9%	9%	17%
El Salvador	2007	13%	5%	11%	37%	40%
Latin America		3%	1%	4%	16%	20%
Mexico	2010	3%	1%	4%	3%	8%
Nicaragua	2005	28%	5%	10%	55%	60%
Panama	2010	3%	2%	2%	31%	31%
Peru	2007	25%	8%	16%	20%	37%
Venezuela	2001	3%	1%	9%	9%	17%

Source: national censuses.

Better, but Not Well...

The urbanization of indigenous spaces raises numerous questions, not only regarding aspects of cultural continuity, but also in terms of protecting their collective rights, including the right to remain culturally distinct, and to be able to engage in targeted programs and policies for improving their social inclusion. Also, even if generally better off than their rural peers—in material terms at least—36 percent of indigenous urban dwellers are relegated to slums, or to the so-called "informal city," where they often face extreme poverty, inhabiting insecure, unsanitary, and polluted areas. As such, while indigenous urban populations have better chances of accessing public services than their rural peers, they lag behind non-indigenous urban dwellers and are exposed to new dimensions of exclusion.

Based on a simplified definition of slum, determined by the absence of at least one basic public service (water, electricity, or sewerage) or the presence of dirt floors as a proxy for poor construction materials, regional censuses show that in most countries the percentage of indigenous people living in slums is considerably higher than that of non-indigenous people; often twice as high or more. Regionally, 36 percent of the indigenous population, about 15 million people, lives in the precarious conditions generally known as slums, compared with 20 percent of the non-indigenous population. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, slum dwellers account for over 60 percent of the urban indigenous population, while in Peru and Bolivia, they account for 57 percent and 47 percent, respectively. The most common problems in almost every country are lack of sanitation and piped water, though in Peru the most common problem is inhabiting unfinished or poorly built houses (with dirt floors).

Additionally, slums usually have no land tenure system, are exposed to natural disasters and crime, and have limited market opportunities. In Bolivia, while in rural areas 90 percent of the indigenous population own their homes, in cities only 61 percent of them do.[68] Moreover, the rate of home ownership among indigenous people has decreased in the past decade in countries such as Ecuador (down by 5 percentage points), while in countries where it has increased, such as Peru and Mexico, it has done so only marginally.

Figure 9 Home Ownership among Indigenous People



Source: national censuses.

68 Indigenous people across the region are 19.6 percent less likely to own a house in urban settings. This gap is even more substantial in some cases such as Ecuador (64.7 percent less likely) and Panama (29.2 percent).

Urban migration also disrupts traditional land tenure systems, which in the long run limit individuals' capacity to secure affordable housing, forcing them to occupy—or remain within—places with poor infrastructure and services. This can often lead to chronic marginalization and homelessness.[69]

Higher costs of public services also hit indigenous people harder. The average cost of giving birth in Bolivia in 2011 was about 800 Bs,[70] for instance, but women in urban areas paid more than twice as much as women in rural areas (1,110 Bs to 530 Bs). However, over half of all indigenous women (53 percent) in urban areas had no insurance to cover these costs, compared with 39 percent of non-indigenous women.[71]

That said, the cityscape can also be a place of participation and empowerment. One illuminating example of how cities delineate citizenship rights and political participation is El Alto, Bolivia—the poorer, larger neighboring city of La Paz (see box 2).

Box 2 | El Alto, Bolivia

Rural migrations, partly sparked by agrarian reform and the emergence of economic opportunities around the railway system, the airport, and a growing industrial sector, accelerated El Alto's growth during the second half of the twentieth century. Today it hosts over 800,000 people, mostly Aymara. With the transition to El Alto, Aymara-speaking dwellers began to organize themselves in *juntas de vecinos* (neighborhood organizations), and already by 1979 these local associations had gained a certain degree of autonomy, structured around the Federación de Juntas Vecinales. Through collective organization, "El Alto residents saw a larger share of municipal resources being spent in the city center and thus demanded access to and control over their own financial resources."[72]

During the 1980s, with the privatization of tin mines and the implementation of other policies that deteriorated the living conditions of many rural families, there was a massive influx of miners to El Alto, which triggered an 11-fold increase in the informal sector from 1989 to 1995 (at an average rate of 130 percent per year). Today the informal sector is one of the main economic activities in El Alto. The widespread informality in El Alto has transformed *juntas* into the main political voice for indigenous people.

In El Alto, the *juntas* thus became the most important grassroots organizations. Neighborhoods organized the boards to plan, finance, and build basic infrastructure and provide services. The boards were the main instrument used for building the city and were also a tool of mediation, representation, and accountability in both public and private spaces. El Alto has also become a place to express indigenous forms of urbanization and beauty.[73]

69 UN-Habitat, *Securing Land Rights for Indigenous Peoples in Cities* (Nairobi: UN-Habitat, 2011), 2.

70 The figures presented are based on an analysis of Bolivian 2011 household survey data. Bolivianos, or Bs, is the national currency. According to the May 2014 exchange rate, 100 Bs is approximately US$15.

71 World Bank, *Bolivia: Challenges and Constraints to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment* (Washington, DC: World Bank, forthcoming); World Bank, Office of the Regional Chief Economist, *Latin America and the Caribbean as Tailwinds Recede: In Search of Higher Growth* (2013).

72 Carlos Revilla, "Understanding the Mobilizations of Octubre 2003: Dynamic Pressures and Shifting Leadership Practices in El Alto," in *Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*, eds. Nicole Fabricant and Bret Gustafson (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2011), 119.

73 "Vea cómo son las mansiones de los millonarios aymara de Bolivia," video, 2:21, from BBC Mundo, May 29, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/video_fotos/2014/05/140529_video_bolivia_cholets_mansiones_men.shtml.

In the wake of this rapid and complex indigenous urbanization, it is noteworthy that current regulatory frameworks on indigenous rights have little or no reference to indigenous people living in cities.[74] A UN-Habitat report argues that "urban indigenous people are seen as an economic and political liability to local and governmental authorities, a further strain on existing services, facilities and infrastructure, especially in overpopulated cities."[75] Additionally, the templates and strategies used by governments and the development community to attend to indigenous peoples' special needs and priorities are designed and intended for "traditional" rural areas.

In cities, indigenous people therefore run the risk of becoming politically invisible, with remarkable exceptions such as El Alto. This ultimately prevents governments from delivering culturally specific public services and guaranteeing that indigenous rights are protected. Neither the development community nor the academia have clear answers to many basic questions pertaining to the needs and views of indigenous people in urban environments. For instance, should free, prior and informed consent be implemented in urban settings? Or, given their better access to other forms of political inclusion, should indigenous people be encouraged to increase their visibility via political parties and electoral politics? And, if so, how? Urban indigenous people have the fastest rate of language loss, and cultural continuity is clearly more at risk there than in their communities of origin, yet intercultural bilingual education is not usually implemented in urban settings. Thus, should urban spaces be prioritized given the current migratory trends? Many of these questions do not have clear-cut answers, but if we are to end poverty within a generation, while respecting the right of indigenous peoples to develop with identity and dignity, evidence suggests we can no longer postpone asking them.

Finally, even if the urbanization of about half of the indigenous population in Latin America is a striking finding—as it challenges our collective representation of what being indigenous is and what indigenous city dwellers' special needs might be—the fact that the other half still lives in rural areas within the most urbanized and rapidly urbanizing region of the world is just as striking, perhaps even more so. The attachment of such a large proportion of indigenous households to the rural world, in the face of pressing and often growing inequalities between the urban and rural milieus, confirms the strong connection between indigenous peoples and their territories, which are not only essential to their collective rights and assets, but which have been repeatedly proved to be an integral part of their identities and their ideas of well-being.

74 International organizations such as the World Bank, for their part, do not usually execute safeguard policies aimed at indigenous peoples in urban environments, as territoriality and continuity—of traditions, institutions, etc.—are common screening criteria to determine whether indigenous people are in the area of influence of a project.

75 UN-Habitat, *Securing Land Rights for Indigenous Peoples in Cities*, 3.

Development with Identity

Poverty means different things to different people, all of them bad, as sociocultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai puts it. "It is material deprivation and desperation. It is lack of security and dignity. It is exposure to risk and high costs for thin comforts. It is inequality materialized. It diminishes its victims…"[76] A common denominator of poverty is the lack of material or immaterial aspects that limits the enjoyment of a life worth living. Yet, what makes "a life worth living" is where indigenous peoples might disagree with poverty assessments and with the development solutions proposed by non-indigenous actors.

Different tools to assess poverty trends, such as the several criteria used to define poverty lines, including the Gini coefficient, the Human Development Index, and the Physical Quality of Life Index, have increasingly incorporated more nuanced, and therefore more comprehensive, dimensions of poverty, but they can inevitably offer only partial views of what poverty means. It is difficult to account for the social or historical elements that reinforce a group's exclusion in numerical or quantifiable terms. However, these—perhaps unquantifiable—dimensions of poverty are particularly pertinent in the case of indigenous peoples, whose cultural distinctiveness requires approaches that capture historically contingent and socially embedded notions of poverty.

Although there is an undeniable correlation between membership in an indigenous group and socioeconomic deprivation today, it must be stressed that depicting indigenous peoples as invariably poor is influenced by predominantly Western indicators of well-being. These indicators reflect cultural patterns and preferences, forms of social organization, and worldviews that might differ from those held by indigenous peoples, such as the provision of sanitation, health, education, and electricity services, or per capita income from officially recognized economic activities. But these indicators do not necessarily reflect reality in indigenous milieus.

Indigenous peoples hold different conceptions of value and production,[77] as well as contrasting social and cultural characteristics that can make them more or less vulnerable in the midst of economic, environmental, or political shocks. For many indigenous societies of the Amazon region, for instance, it has been argued that wealth was traditionally constructed not around the accumulation of goods or foodstuff, but rather on the reproduction of kin, which was ultimately translated into a workforce capable of increasing the social and economic autonomy of the group.[78] Given the relatively even distribution of natural resources and the simplicity of the material culture, a wealthy person was not one who had a particular amount of material goods or foodstuff, but rather someone who belonged to a large and healthy household.[79]

Since the accumulation of material goods or foodstuff made little sense in this context, surpluses were usually spent on reinforcing social ties that increased the group's productive and reproductive capacity, such as in reciprocal exchanges. From this political-economic point of view, accumulation and social stratification were perceived as threats to the core principles of a good life, and thus rejected. Although the articulation of these groups to the market and the monetization of their local economies have of course

76 Arjun Appadurai, "The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition," in *Culture and Public Action,* eds. Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press and World Bank, 2004), 64.

77 See Appadurai, "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value," in *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, ed. Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); David Graeber, *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Dreams* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Chris Hann and Keith Hart, *Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011); Marshall Sahlins, "The Economics of Develop-Man in the Pacific," *Res: Anthropology and Aesthetics* 21 (spring 1992): 12–25; Turner, "The Beautiful and the Common: Inequalities of Value and Revolving Hierarchy among the Kayapó," *Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America* 1, no. 1 (June 2003): 11–26.

78 Pierre Clastres, *Society against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology* (New York: Zone Books, 1987); Peter Rivière, "Aspects of Carib Political Economy," *Antropológica* 59–62 (1983–84): 349–58; Rivière, "Of Women, Men and Manioc," in *Natives and Neighbors in South America: Anthropological Essays,* eds. Harald O. Skar and Frank Salomon (Gothenburg: Gothenburg Ethnographic Museum, 1987); Michael A. Uzendoski, "Manioc Beer and Meat: Value, Reproduction and Cosmic Substance among the Napo Runa of the Ecuadorian Amazon," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 10, no. 4 (December 2004): 883–902.

79 The health of a household refers here to much more than the absence of diseases, starvation, or death. It extends to a household's relationship with the material and symbolic worlds behind such apparent states from an indigenous point of view. See Germán Freire, ed., *Perspectivas en Salud Indígena: Cosmovisión, Enfermedad y Políticas Públicas* (Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2011).

altered many pre-market dynamics in the region, the economic rationale behind what have come to be loosely known as "gift-economies" remains an important factor behind many indigenous actors' economic and political decisions today.[80] Numerous anthropologists have documented cases in which the circulation of money, consumer goods, and services has not eroded preexisting moral regimes of value and accumulation.[81] Ignoring the rationale behind these economic and political decisions often makes the implementation of preconceived development programs impracticable. For many Amazonian societies, preserving high levels of autonomy is therefore not only logical in terms of food security and resiliency, it is also coherent with their own understanding of wealth and poverty.

Therefore, because indigenous peoples can hold different notions of value, as well as different social and cultural strategies to prevent individuals from experiencing deprivation, it is important to focus not only on poverty in monetary terms, or on the lack of access to services, but also on how these and other expressions of poverty, such as dependency, discrimination, land insecurity, and political exclusion, contribute to perpetuate or increase their vulnerabilities. Under this lens, participation in decision making might be a more significant asset for indigenous peoples than, say, monetary income. This is, in fact, how most indigenous organizations see it today.[82]

Participation and Changes in Legal Frameworks

The last two decades have seen a positive shift in the legal and political frameworks of Latin America regarding indigenous peoples' rights. Law and public policy have moved from a clearly assimilationist paradigm—intended to integrate indigenous peoples into mainstream society—to a multiculturalist agenda, aimed at preserving cultural differences and safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples to reproduce their cultures and languages, manage their lands and natural resources, and govern themselves according to their political systems and customary laws.[83] These changes were instigated by a global trend toward legal realignments, led by indigenous peoples themselves, which began taking international notoriety with the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO No. 169, 1989) and reached its peak with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007).

Both the letter of ILO No. 169 and interpretative ILO materials clearly affirm that consultation and participation are fundamental for operationalizing the rights contained in the convention.[84] UNDRIP, adopted after two decades of discussion, is also very much oriented toward indigenous peoples' right to self-determination; that is, the right of indigenous peoples to determine their own economic, social, and cultural development. Other treaties and covenants, as well as international bodies such as the Inter-American Human Rights System, have increasingly shaped the meaning and content of aspects determinant to indigenous peoples' effective participation in different areas, such as the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), indigenous children's rights, the role of indigenous peoples in the preservation of the environment, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination (see table 5).

80 See, for example, Monica C. DeHart, *Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Identity and Development Politics in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Jessica R. Cattelino, *High Stakes: Florida Seminole Gaming and Sovereignty* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

81 Freire, "Indigenous Shifting Cultivation and the New Amazonia: A Piaroa Example of Economic Articulation," *Human Ecology* 35, no. 6 (December 2007): 681–96; Fernando Santos-Granero, "Hybrid Bodyscapes: A Visual History of Yanesha Patterns of Cultural Change," *Current Anthropology* 50, no. 4 (August 2009): 477–512; Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld, Jason Antrosio, and Eric C. Jones, "Creativity, Place, and Commodities: The Making of Public Economies in Andean Apparel Industries," in *Textile Economies: Power and Value from the Local to the Transnational*, eds. Patricia A. McAnany and Walter E. Little (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2011); Colloredo-Mansfeld, *The Native Leisure Class: Consumption and Cultural Creativity in the Andes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

82 Monetary inequality, however, is not irrelevant for indigenous peoples, as will be shown below. It is, in fact, increasingly relevant as indigenous peoples become more dependent on monetary exchanges to reduce their vulnerabilities, and it remains, to this day, a useful proxy for highlighting other forms of social exclusion.

83 Karen Engle, *The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Mario Blaser, Ravi de Costa, Deborah McGregor, and William D. Coleman, eds., *Indigenous Peoples and Autonomy: Insights for a Global Age* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); Blaser, Harvey A. Feit, and Glenn McRae, "Indigenous Peoples and Development Processes: New Terrains of Struggle," in *The Way of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects, and Globalization*, eds. Blaser, Feit, and McRae (New York: Zed Books, 2004); Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, "Indigenous Movements and the Indian Question in Latin America," in *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America*, eds. Postero and Zamosc (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); Edward F. Fischer, ed., *Indigenous Peoples, Civil Society, and the Neo-Liberal State in Latin America* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).

84 See ILO, 98th Session, "General Observation: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)," in *Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2009).

Table 5 International Treaties and Covenants on Indigenous Rights

Country	ILO 169[1] (ratified)	UNDRIP[2]	ICCPR[3]	ICESCR[4]	ICERD[5]	CRC[6]	CEDAW[7]	Rio 1992[8]	CITES[9]
Argentina	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Belize	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bolivia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Brazil	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Chile	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Colombia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Costa Rica	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dominica	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ecuador	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
El Salvador	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Guatemala	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Guyana	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Honduras	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Mexico	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nicaragua	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Panama	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Paraguay	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Peru	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Suriname	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Uruguay	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Venezuela	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: IWGIA.

[1] ILO's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989
[2] UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
[3] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[4] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[5] International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
[6] Convention on the Rights of the Child
[7] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
[8] Convention on Biological Diversity
[9] Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna

In many respects, these national and international legal frameworks reflect the intention to break away from the tradition of exclusion, racism, and discrimination against ethnic, cultural, and linguistic minorities. They also recognize the existence of other sociocultural patterns, other ways of understanding the relationship between humans and nature, and other ways of thinking and knowing. The existence of these legal frameworks illustrates the extent to which indigenous social movements have succeeded in elevating their concerns on the national and international levels. Indigenous peoples have in fact expanded the scope of the human rights system in at least three aspects, according to the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples: (1) the emphasis on collective rights over individual rights; (2) the inclusion of the term *peoples* when referring to indigenous societies—a category precluded by many states; and (3) the relevance given to non-state actors and the globalization of local struggles, via NGOs, indigenous movements, and international forums, among others.[85]

In countries such as Bolivia and Colombia, human rights treaties—of which indigenous peoples–related instruments are a part—enjoy the same rank as the constitution. Other countries such as Ecuador and Guatemala give those treaties a rank below their constitutions but above ordinary legislation.[86] In some cases, indigenous peoples' rights have been included in national constitutions in very specific terms. For example, Articles 246, 287, and 330 of the Colombian constitution provide that indigenous territories are self-governing, autonomous entities, authorized to devise, implement, and administer internal social, economic, and political policies, which enjoy a jurisdiction in accordance with indigenous (customary) law and are considered to be of equal legal status to districts and departmental regulations within the Colombian state.

But regardless of their hierarchy within any given legal system, wherever ratified, ILO No. 169 provisions are binding, and states are under an immediate duty to respect, fulfill, and protect the indigenous peoples' rights affirmed therein. In most cases, the provisions of ILO No. 169 can be considered self-executing. In other words, they apply regardless of whether the state has complied with its obligation to issue laws and regulations facilitating their implementation. Specifically in relation to FPIC, Chile's Constitutional Court has ruled that Articles 6 and 7 of ILO No. 169 are self-executing.[87] The Constitutional Tribunal in Peru has issued a similar ruling. In Colombia, where laws and regulations concerning FPIC are limited, and despite the mining industry's request for a set of clear rules, FPIC implementation relies on the guidance provided by the prolific activity of the Constitutional Court, which has had numerous occasions to define its content and requirements.[88]

The fact that, where ratified, ILO No. 169 provisions may be self-executing or even turned into national laws and regulations does not mean their implementation is unproblematic. For example, in Guatemala, where FPIC regulation under ILO No. 169 is stuck in a contentious battle between indigenous groups and the executive branch, the Constitutional Tribunal has declared that extractive licenses awarded without consultation are illegal, leaving stakeholders scrambling for a solution.[89] In Peru, the approval of a Prior Consultation Law in 2011 was followed by several problems in its application. Notwithstanding the difficulties in implementing indigenous peoples' rights, the fact that 15 countries in the region have ratified ILO No. 169—out of 22 worldwide—is an encouraging sign

85 Anaya, "Indian Givers."

86 TerraLex, "Application of Convention No. 169 in Latin America," Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.carey.cl/download/noticias/application_of_concention_no._169_in_latin_america.pdf.

87 Edesio Carrasco and José Adolfo Moreno, IAIA, "Indigenous Consultation and Participation under Chilean Environmental Impact Assessment," May 2013, http://www.iaia.org/conferences/iaia13/proceedings/Final%20papers%20review%20process%2013/Indigenous%20Consultation%20and%20Participation%20under%20Chilean%20Environmental%20Impact%20Assessment%20.pdf?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1.

88 Minda Bustamante Soldeviila, "La regulación de la consulta previa en los países andinos," Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.noticiasser.pe/02/04/2014/nacional/la-consulta-previa-del-convenio-169-de-la-oit-entre-la-tecnica-juridica-y-la-rei. See also ILO, *Application of Convention No. 169 by Domestic and International Courts in Latin America* (Geneva: ILO, 2009).

89 Mash-Mash and José Guadalupe Gómez, "Two Views of Consulta Previa in Guatemala: A View from Indigenous Peoples," *Americas Quarterly* (spring 2014), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/two-views-consulta-previa-guatemala-view-indigenous-peoples; Silvel Elías and Geisselle Sánchez, "Country Study: Guatemala," *Americas Quarterly* (spring 2014), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/country-study-guatemala.

about where the region is directed. Indeed, advances in recognizing and implementing indigenous rights to participation and consultation can be seen even in those countries where the convention has not been ratified. The region, however, is still at the trial-and-error stage, and numerous lessons are being learned.

Another common area of disagreement regarding the implementation of pro-indigenous policies and laws, including those on participation and consultation, derives from the lack of a clear and universally accepted legal definition of what constitutes an "indigenous" person. Although most legal documents refer to distinct criteria in various degrees—self-identification, specific cultural practices, own language, and collective attachment to a territory—each nation-state tends to fabricate its own definition of *indigeneity* and criteria for recognition. While this flexibility might generally be considered a positive, the lack of legal precision has driven some states to undertake, willingly or not, discriminatory practices. In Peru, the opposition met by the Prior Consultation Law, from sectors with vested interests in extractive industries, led to questioning the indigenous status of the Quechua population—and therefore the applicability of the law. By reworking the definition of *indigenous peoples*, governments and other development actors might fall into the trap of delegitimizing or failing to address the specific needs and claims of indigenous peoples.

Besides violating indigenous peoples' rights, semantic disputes over who is and who is not protected by specific national and international laws, such as those implementing FPIC, have proved to be costly and detrimental, not only to the communities, but also to governments and private stakeholders.[90] Experience of recent decades shows that, no matter how imperfect, the only way to advance development projects successfully within indigenous territories is through indigenous peoples' involvement in the design, implementation, and monitoring of development programs. By de facto rule or by law, the question in Latin America is no longer whether indigenous peoples should be involved in decision making, but how and when.

Participation and the Right to Self-Determination

Political participation and the implementation of practices based on indigenous rights are tantamount to well-being and development for indigenous peoples. *The Second International Decade for the World's Indigenous Peoples* (2005–14) delineated five general goals, which focused not on economic growth but rather on the need to expand and refine the terms of indigenous participation, improve targeted policies, and advance social inclusion as a means for improving indigenous peoples' lives.[91]

Indigenous peoples have traditional forms of governance and decision-making processes that reassert their right to self-determination and to maintain and promote their institutional structures, which is protected under Articles 3, 4, 20, and 34 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Traditional authorities can be beneficial not only in terms of cultural preservation and historical continuity, but also as a sign of indigenous autonomy. However, often these institutions are not properly recognized by state and non-state actors, or are not properly regulated and articulated by the legal framework of each country. The right to self-determination has also been a controversial aspect of indigenous political participation, largely because countries might perceive it as a potential path for secession or as a disruption of the territorial integrity of the state.[92] Experience of the past decade shows, however, that self-determination reinforces the participation and involvement of indigenous peoples in the processes of the state.

90 Rachel Davis and Daniel Franks, "Costs of Company-Community Conflict in the Extractive Sector," in *Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 66* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2014).

91 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Dec. 22, 2004, http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples/SecondDecade.aspx.

92 Levi and Maybury-Lewis, "Becoming Indigenous," 114. See also Anthony Stocks, "Too Much for Too Few: Problems of Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34 (October 2005): 85–104.

The rise of international treaties and declarations reaffirming indigenous peoples' aspiration to self-determination has been accompanied by their increasing involvement in democratic elections, both as representatives and as voters. This is reflected in the number of indigenous political parties and indigenous representatives that have been elected to public office over the past two decades. Indigenous peoples' political participation today takes place at the level of local or national parliaments, in municipalities, and even at the highest levels of state power (for example, the presidency of Evo Morales in Bolivia), with active involvement of leaders who partake in political parties or have created indigenous political parties. Today, indigenous parties have a major influence in Bolivia and Ecuador, and are also active in smaller proportions in countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.[93]

Discourses on multiculturalism and self-development, and the advance in pro-indigenous political frameworks, have intensified indigenous peoples' engagement in political activities in their countries. Data from Latinobarómetro show that over 60 percent of the indigenous respondents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru believe that the right to political participation is somewhat or completely guaranteed by their states, slightly above non-indigenous respondents. Also, over 41 percent of all indigenous respondents identify with a political party (against 35 percent of non-indigenous peple), and 75 percent of them support or strongly support that party (Latinobarómetro 2011).

Electoral systems offer an opportunity for political engagement, which allows indigenous representatives to bring their political agendas into mainstream debates, thereby increasing indigenous peoples' voice within the state.[94] However, only a few countries have enacted laws that broaden the political participation of indigenous peoples in democratic elections. For instance, according to an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) database,[95] while the entire region has generated rules that ensure some sort of territorial jurisdiction for indigenous peoples, only eight countries have created laws and procedures for indigenous voters, six reserve seats in local and national legislatures for indigenous representatives, and only four have changed the political-administrative division of the country to favor special electoral jurisdictions for indigenous peoples (see table 6).

The advance of the indigenous rights agenda in Latin America has also spurred the creation of high-level government bodies dedicated to overseeing the implementation of indigenous rights. Though their organization and effectiveness varies by country, the fact that they exist is a positive signal, which is already starting to shed valuable lessons. For example, Colombia's Permanent Negotiation Roundtable with Indigenous Peoples (Mesa Permanente de Concertación con los Pueblos Indígenas), created in 1996 as a response to indigenous peoples' protests and at the urging of the Constitutional Court, has already amassed an impressive track record. Its activities cover nationwide decision making and do not replace local communities' FPIC in projects that affect them directly. At least in part, its success can be attributed to two key features devised to level the playing field. On the one hand, it empowers indigenous participants by convening high-level authorities from both government and indigenous organizations. Most important, it enjoys governmental support in terms of funding, including support to obtain expert advice on the part of indigenous peoples and to reach grassroots communities for internal consultations.[96] An example of measures currently under discussion is the transfer of educational functions to indigenous peoples to establish their own indigenous education system.[97]

93 See Donna Lee Van Cott, "De los movimientos a los partidos: retos para los movimientos de los pueblos indígenas," in *Pueblos Indígenas y Política en América Latina: El reconocimiento de sus derechos y el impacto de sus demandas a inicios del siglo XXI*, ed. Salvador Martí i Puig (Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB, 2007); Van Cott, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Kay B. Warren and Jean E. Jackson, "Introduction: Studying Indigenous Activism in Latin America," in *Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America,* eds. Warren and Jackson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002); Ferran Cabrero, "Ejercer derechos, refundar el Estado," in *Ciudadanía Intercultural: Aportes desde la participación política de los pueblos indígenas de Latinoamérica*, coord. Cabrero (Quito: PNUD, 2013).

94 UN Human Rights Council, "Final Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," 2011.

95 Indigenous Legislation DataBank, IDB, http://www.iadb.org/Research/legislacionindigena/leyn/.

96 Vladimir Pinto López, "Implementación del derecho de la consulta previa a los pueblos indígenas en la región andina: avances y desafíos. Lecciones aprendidas y recomendaciones para la cooperación alemana," http://wikindigena.org/images/temp/8/8d/20131115164512!phpyLAP3L.pdf.

97 Sonia Mercedes Rodriguez Reinel, "La Política Educativa (Etnoeducación) Para Pueblos Indígenas en Colombia a Partir de la Constitución de 1991" (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2011), http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/5328/1/soniamercedesrodriguezreinel.2011.parte1.pdf.

Table 6 Legal Frameworks Pertaining to Electoral Participation of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America

Country	Vote	Special constituency	Reform of political-administrative divisions
Argentina	×	×	×
Belize	×	×	×
Bolivia	✓	✓	✓
Brazil	×	×	×
Chile	×	×	×
Colombia	✓	✓	×
Costa Rica	×	×	×
Ecuador	✓	×	×
El Salvador	×	×	×
Guatemala	×	×	×
Guyana	✓	×	×
Honduras	×	×	×
Mexico	✓	×	×
Nicaragua	×	✓	×
Panama	✓	✓	✓
Peru	✓	✓	✓
Suriname	×	×	×
Uruguay	×	×	×
Venezuela	✓	✓	✓

Source: IDB Indigenous Legislation DataBank.

Another critical point has to do with the political participation of women. Empowering indigenous women is an effective route for reducing social exclusion and poverty, as well as for creating innovative ways of self-development. Indigenous women in Latin America struggle within the indigenous movements to keep their unity and to advance gender-specific interests. In Bolivia, for example, indigenous women's participation was strengthened as a result of lobbying to influence the content of the new constitution of 2009. These women were able to develop more autonomous forms of mobilization outside their indigenous movement and create coalitions with the feminist movements gaining a more prominent political role.[98] Indigenous Bolivian women managed to

98 World Bank, *Bolivia: Challenges and Constraints*.

position themselves as a central collective actor through different civil society organizations and played a leading role in feminist movements to promote specific women's rights and positive discrimination.[99] In Bolivia, where indigenous peoples are the majority of the population, 41 of the 130 MPs are indigenous, but only 9 are women.[100] However, it is noteworthy that, despite these gaps, indigenous women are generally better represented in the political sphere than non-indigenous women.

Box 3 | Free, Prior and Informed Consent

Although many questions remain, the region's continued and persistent FPIC practice is starting to shed light onto some of the requirements and best practices for its successful implementation. Despite numerous setbacks, stakeholders across the region increasingly accept that FPIC is essential to sustainable decision making. Their perseverance is starting to bear fruit.

While the issue of consent as an objective or an outcome, as well as the controversy over indigenous peoples' right to veto decisions, continues to prompt heated debates, Colombian constitutional law practice has shed light on the requirements for the cases in which the ultimate decision has to be taken by the government. In those cases, according to the Colombian Constitutional Court, the authority's decision must:

- Be free from bias and authoritarianism;
- Be objective, reasonable, and proportional to the state's constitutional mandate to protect the social, cultural, and economic identity of the indigenous community; and,
- Provide the necessary means to mitigate, correct, or repair the resulting impacts, present and future.

In addition, echoing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Colombia's Constitutional Court has gone further to suggest indigenous peoples may have binding decision-making power in cases of large-scale development projects or measures that might threaten their cultural and material survival.[101]

One of the lessons learned concerning the material dimension of FPIC is the need for quality, unbiased baseline information on the situation of indigenous people. Quality baseline information allows proponents to identify measures that should be consulted on with indigenous people. Here, again, one can refer to the Colombian experience with the law on reparations to the victims of violence.[102] In that case, a diagnosis by the Constitutional Court of the situation of indigenous communities resulting from the decades of violence singled out indigenous people as having been particularly vulnerable to the injustices that the law was meant to address. The court's report triggered a FPIC process that has been hailed as one of the most successful in Colombian history.[103]

Crafting Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law (1998) showed that a strong, principled basis for FPIC negotiation, backed by political will, can deliver solid outcomes. In setting out to legislate under the

CONTINUE

99 Stéphanie Rousseau, "Indigenous and Feminist Movements at the Constituent Assembly in Bolivia: Locating the Representation of Indigenous Women," *Latin American Research Review* 46, no. 2 (2011): 5–28.

100 United Nations, *State of the World's Indigenous Peoples* (New York: United Nations, 2009).

101 César Rodríguez Garavito, Meghan Morris, Natalia Orduz Salinas, and Paula Buriticá, *La consulta previa a pueblos indígenas: Los estándares del derecho internacional* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2010).

102 Ley 1448 de 2011, Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras.

103 Rodríguez Garavito et al., *La consulta*.

Convention on Biological Diversity, Costa Rica defined the parameters of the legislation as based on the following principles: 1) equal access to and distribution of the benefits from the use of biodiversity; 2) respect for human rights, particularly of groups marginalized because of cultural or economic conditions; 3) sustainable use of biodiversity components to respect the development options of future generations; and 4) democracy as a guarantee of greater participation of all citizens in decision making. Accordingly, the Biodiversity Law was the result of extensive consultations including indigenous people, farmers, industry, scientists, and other relevant stakeholders. Consultations with indigenous people were conducted separately as a special and distinct group. After two failed drafts, the final Biodiversity Law passed in Costa Rica is hailed as an example of sustainability. Among other things, it requires consultations with indigenous communities before conducting any research on genetic resources, and benefits-sharing arrangements for any commercialization of those resources. In addition, the law was designed to allow refinements and adjustments in consultation with those affected, including indigenous people.[104]

Though outside the confines of state–indigenous peoples relations, the experience and practices of UN agencies in Nicaragua also demonstrate that including broad representation of indigenous peoples to participate in decision making can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the result. In 2009, Nicaragua's UN offices supported the creation of the Consultative Committee of Indigenous and Afro-Descendant Peoples (in Spanish, CCPIAN). The CCPIAN is made up of 12 members including indigenous representatives, Afro-descendant representatives from the Caribbean coast, and three eminent individuals known for their experience, knowledge, and commitment to indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples' rights. It offers advice to UN agencies working in Nicaragua to help them better incorporate the rights of indigenous peoples into UN programs and activities, with program objectives and activities discussed and agreed jointly. CCPIAN members also serve on the program's executive and advisory boards. Its contributions to the decision-making process of UN agencies in Nicaragua have led to improvements in the coherence and overall benefits of UN programs for indigenous peoples in the country.[105]

From these and other cases, it seems that, at minimum, striving for adequate FPIC implementation requires that the following aspects are considered:

Representation: Identified indigenous representatives should be vetted by the communities they purport to represent. Before engaging in the process of FPIC, there needs to be a clear understanding about who can represent and who can make a decision for an indigenous community (which are not necessarily identical). While local leaders tend to have the skills and experience needed to engage directly with development actors, it is important to ensure that their actions and viewpoints convey the interests of all individuals, especially of those members who lack voice or face greater vulnerability. Moreover, indigenous peoples' representation should be wide, meaning that—where possible—there is direct community participation in addition to elected representatives; or, alternatively, that the communities, through their own procedures and channels, express conformity with being represented and, where applicable, are bound by the word of their designated representative(s).

CONTINUE

104 Vivienne Solis Rivera and Patricia Madrigal Cordero, "Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law: Sharing the Process," Grain, July 9, 1999, http://www.grain.org/es/article/entries/1907-costa-rica-s-biodiverity-law-sharing-the-process; CISDL and World Future Council, "Crafting Visionary Biodiversity Laws: Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law 1998," November 2011, http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/WFC-CIDSL-Costa_Rica_BD_Paper-111114.pdf; Preston Hardison, "Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Prior Informed Approval (PIA) Part I," *Monthly Bulletin of the Canadian Indigenous Caucus on the Convention on Biological Diversity*, October 2000, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122179.pdf.

105 UNIPP, "UNIPP Success Stories: Cooperating to Promote & Protect Indigenous Peoples' Rights," May 1, 2014, http://www.ilo.org/newyork/issues-at-work/indigenous-peoples/WCMS_243275/lang--en/index.htm.

Indigenous institutions and procedures: During the implementation of FPIC, all actors must make sure that indigenous institutions, procedures, and decision-making instances are respected and taken into account. The involvement of indigenous authorities and institutions not only enables the broad participation of local stakeholders, but also reasserts their legal rights as culturally distinct societies. Indigenous institutions can also help avert the exclusion of women, elders, or individuals who live in geographically remote areas or under conditions of voluntary isolation. Likewise, indigenous institutions can also expand the degree of accessibility to critical information inasmuch as they can offer timely and culturally appropriate translations, especially concerning aspects such as land use, natural resources, environment, and social impacts.

Time: Sufficient time must be allotted for the correct implementation of FPIC. Procedural constraints and contractual conditions, particularly those that set rigid time limits, can exert significant pressure and set a pace for the decision-making process that can hardly be compatible with indigenous peoples' traditions and processes. Limited time frames usually lead to uninformed or non-consensual decisions about any future project. Furthermore, inappropriate time frames also impose unfair limits on the number and geographic reach of stakeholders that can participate in the process. Finally, operating under flexible and mutually agreed time frames can be another form of inclusion, insofar as it permits traditional institutions and leaders to function according to their own procedures and phases of deliberation and decision making.

Flexibility: Interested parties need to remain open and flexible during the entire process. Given the complexity and lengthiness of FPIC, it is important for actors to be willing to change along the way. Agreements that are made during the first stages of the process might be disputed further down the line, or might require more information or time for deliberation. Moreover, community structure, leadership positions, and collective priorities might change dramatically over time. Thus, it is important to view FPIC as an organic endeavor in which the rules, methodologies, and objectives can be subject to continuous revisions.

Indigenous participation can also take place in the form of hands-on management or co-management of shared assets. For example, under the Bolivian constitution, whenever protected areas overlap with indigenous territories, indigenous peoples must be included in their management. Bolivia's experience involving indigenous peoples, through their direct participation in the management of assets and areas of cultural and socioeconomic relevance, has produced positive results in terms of indigenous empowerment and progress toward self-development and overall growth.[106]

In sum, though the effective participation of indigenous peoples and the respect for their right to self-determination are far from complete, the learning curve in the region has been steep over the past two decades. Governments, indigenous peoples, and private stakeholders are contending with decades, even centuries, of an institutional culture that stressed assimilation as the ultimate goal of policies and practices involving indigenous peoples. Experience shows that change does not happen just by willing it into place through law or regulation. It is by taking the combined efforts of administrators, legislatures, the courts, indigenous peoples, industry, and even NGOs and outside stakeholders such as international financial institutions and international industry organizations that it is possible to slowly turn the ship around. Change, however, is happening.

106 Oscar Castillo, Bonifacio Barrientos, and José Avila, Wildlife Conservation Society, "The Kaa-Iya Experience: Trends toward Financial Sustainability" September 2003, http://conservationfinance.org/guide/WPC/WPC_documents/Apps_10_Castillo_v3.pdf.

Poverty and Vulnerability

Poverty is not a natural trait of indigenous peoples, but a by-product of a protracted history of external aggressions on their values and economies. Yet, as the need for a new epistemology of development becomes apparent and widely demanded, we also have to consider that the market economy and its concomitant forms of consumerism, labor organization, and monetary exchanges have been penetrating indigenous families, communities, and territories for decades, even centuries. The creation of fair conditions for market inclusion is therefore an increasingly important element to reduce the vulnerabilities of a large and growing number of indigenous households, in both rural and urban settings.

The 2000s were one of the most successful decades in Latin America in terms of economic development and poverty reduction. The consistent growth of the GDP per capita and the reduction of inequality (the Gini coefficient dropped from 0.57 in 2000 to 0.52 in 2012) led to a sharp decline in the number of individuals living in poverty.[107] The "golden decade" also left important economic and social gains for indigenous peoples. The percentage of indigenous people living in poverty dropped significantly in many countries—in Peru and Bolivia, about one-third and one-fourth of indigenous households escaped monetary poverty, while the wage gap in urban areas narrowed significantly.

There has also been unquestionable improvement in the overall access to basic services throughout the region. Indigenous households' access to electricity increased by nearly 50 percent in Panama and Peru, and access to sewerage increased by 60 percent or more in Peru, Bolivia, and Costa Rica. The level of participation in the labor force and earnings of indigenous peoples also grew—even though gaps with non-indigenous workers persist. In a similar vein, recent studies have shown that targeted taxes and transfers can alleviate ethnic and racial inequality, which suggests that the social programs that were implemented in Latin America have exerted a positive impact among ethnic minorities.[108]

Access to education is probably the most successful story of the decade, with indigenous children poised to catch up with non-indigenous children in school attendance at primary and—to a smaller degree—secondary levels. In Mexico, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, the gap in primary school attendance was virtually erased, while in El Salvador, Panama, and Peru, the gap is below 6 percent. Rural-urban gaps also narrowed considerably in some countries, with Mexico and Ecuador leading the region in equal access, at 96 percent for both rural and urban indigenous households. All these gains indicate that a favorable economic climate, together with the right policies, can yield highly positive results.[109]

Many challenges remain, however, as these gains have not been followed by an equally significant reduction of inequality. In fact, apart from education, the gaps separating indigenous households from non-indigenous households have either stagnated or increased over much of the past decade on most accounts.[110] Several studies show that the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) have failed ethnic minorities by most indicators.[111] In other words, the benefits of the last decade have been unevenly distributed, a trend aggravated by the enduring effects of economic globalization, rising demand for natural resources, and insufficient protection of indigenous peoples' rights.

Inequality, however, does not affect indigenous people alone. Despite important growth over the past decade, Latin America is still regarded as the most unequal region in the world.[112] The incidence of poverty was nearly halved from 2000 to 2012, and extreme poverty fell by almost two-thirds, but

107 Renos Vakis, Jamele Rigolini, and Leonardo Lucchetti, *Left Behind: Chronic Poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), 7.

108 Nora Lustig, "Fiscal Policy and Ethno-Racial Inequality in Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay" (working paper no. 22, Commitment to Equity, Tulane University, New Orleans, January 2015).

109 Hugo Ñopo, *New Century, Old Disparities: Gender and Ethnic Earnings Gaps in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, DC: World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, 2012).

110 See ECLAC, *Guaranteeing Indigenous People's Rights*; Hall and Patrinos, *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development;* Patrinos and Skoufias, *Economic Opportunities*; Skoufias, Lunde, and Patrinos, "Social Networks."

111 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, *Indigenous People and Poverty*; Hall and Patrinos, *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development*.

112 World Bank, *Inclusion Matters*.

progress varies considerably from one country to another and, even more so, within countries.[113] In Brazil, for example, the richest 1 percent absorbs 13 percent of the total income, compared with only 4 percent going to the poorest 21 percent.[114]

Moreover, a recent study by the World Bank found that, despite the favorable economic conditions of the 2000s, one in four Latin Americans still endures "chronic poverty." Chronic poverty affects individuals in rural and urban settings, and it is difficult to overcome even in a context of accelerated economic growth and healthy labor markets.[115] It is noteworthy that many countries with high chronic poverty identified in the report are also countries where indigenous poverty is the highest in the region.[116] Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, and Ecuador, for example, are above the regional average, while Mexico is just below the average. In Bolivia, where the report found important downward mobility in terms of chronic poverty, the poverty gap between indigenous and non-indigenous households increased by 32 percent during the same period.

To be sure, the regional trend in poverty reduction—in monetary terms—also significantly benefited indigenous peoples, but the growing gaps reflect an unbalanced distribution of wealth that ultimately reinforces their subaltern position. For example, from the early 2000s to the late 2000s, the proportion of indigenous people living in moderate poverty (US$4/day) fell by 45 percent in Peru, 32 percent in Bolivia, and 23 percent in Ecuador, but in Guatemala it increased by 14 percent. Extreme poverty (US$2.50/day) fell by approximately 38 percent in Bolivia, 31 percent in Ecuador, and 50 percent in Peru, but increased by nearly 21 percent in Guatemala. Clearly, with the exception of Guatemala, the trend shows significant progress. At the same time, however, the poverty gap between indigenous and non-indigenous people increased by 32 percent in Bolivia, 13 percent in Ecuador, and 99 percent in Brazil, while in Guatemala it decreased 0.36 percent.

As a result of these gaps, in the Latin American countries for which data are available, the proportion of indigenous households living in poverty today still doubles the proportion of non-indigenous households living in poverty, is 2.7 times as high for extreme poverty, and is three times as high for people living on less than US$1.25 a day (see figure 10).

Figure 10

Percentage of People Living on Less than US$1.25, US$2.50, and US$4 per Day
Late-2000s weighted average for Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru



Source: SEDLAC data (CEDLAS and World Bank).

In fact, the income gaps in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru either remained unchanged or widened throughout most of the decade, particularly after 2009 (see figure 11). Furthermore, World Bank analyses of Mexico show that indigenous people are more susceptible to economic downturns, so a widening gap in income inequality, even if

113 ECLAC, *Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges* (Santiago: UN, 2010), http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/5/39995/P39995.xml&xsl=/tpl-i/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl#.

114 LAC Equity Lab tabulations of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

115 Vakis, Rigolini, and Lucchetti, *Left Behind*, 7.

116 Ibid., 13.

Figure 11 Poverty Evolution in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

accompanied by other gains, might in effect increase their vulnerability.[117] Given the economic relevance of the indigenous population in these countries, and their disproportionate representation among the poor, closing these gaps is not only important in itself, as a way to build a more prosperous and just society, but it is also important because not doing so severely limits the chances of achieving sustainable development and eradicating poverty, and growth alone does not seem to deliver results.

Being born to indigenous parents in fact substantively increases the probability of being raised in a poor household, regardless of other conditions such as level of education of the parents and size or location of the household, contributing to a poverty trap that hampers the full development of indigenous children's potential. In Ecuador, for example, considering two similar households—where the household head has completed primary education, is married, and has two children—the probability of being poor increases by 13 percent and the probability of being extremely poor by 15.5 percent if the household head belongs to an indigenous group. In Bolivia and Mexico, the probability is 11 percent and 9 percent higher, respectively (see figure 12). This pattern might not be exclusive to ethnic minorities, as chronic poverty not only tends to be geographically focused, but also is frequently passed down from generation to generation.[118] Yet, what is particularly telling about these findings is that even under similar conditions, indigenous people experience worse outcomes compared with non-indigenous peers living in the same context and with similar life trajectories.

Additionally, despite important gains in education, indigenous people still have less probability of completing primary and secondary education than non-indigenous people, which reduces their chances of economic mobility within the market economy. In Mexico, for instance, indigenous youngsters are 2.6 percent less likely to complete primary education than other people, and 8 percent less likely to complete secondary education. In Guatemala, indigenous youngsters are 12 percent less likely to complete primary education, and

Figure 12 Increase in Probability of Being Poor for Similar Households if the Household Head Is Indigenous



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

Methodological note: marginal probabilities estimated using an OLS regression on household's poverty status (using alternative definitions of $1.25, $2.50, and $4 per day), controlling for ethnicity, area (urban/rural), household head's gender, marital status, educational attainment and age, number of kids (compared with the median number of children per household in the country), and local region size (defined by population). These probabilities are statistically significant (at least $p<0.01$).

117 World Bank, *Country Partnership Strategy for the United Mexican States* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013).

118 Vakis, Rigolini, and Lucchetti, *Left Behind*.

Figure 13 Decrease in Probability of Completing Primary and Secondary Education if a Person Belongs to an Indigenous Household



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

Methodological note: marginal probabilities estimated using OLS regressions on individual's educational attainment status (completed primary education or higher and completed secondary education or higher), controlling for ethnicity, gender, area of residence (urban/ rural), marital status, and size of the region (defined by population). Observations included only people from 15 to 25 years of age for primary and 20 to 35 for secondary education. These probabilities are statistically significant (at least p<0.01).

Figure 14 Increase in Probability of Being Poor if Indigenous Household Is Headed by a Woman



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

Methodological note: marginal probabilities (logit regression) of being poor (using alternative definitions of $1.25, $2.50, and $4, at USD2005), controlling for household location (urban/rural), ethnicity, gender and educational attainment of the household's head, and number of children under 15 years of age in the household. These probabilities are statistically significant (at least p<0.05).

13 percent less likely to complete secondary education (see figure 13). However, there has been significant improvement of about 36 percent in the probability of completing primary education in Guatemala from the beginning to the end of the decade, and of nearly 60 percent in the probability of completing secondary education in Bolivia.

The poverty trap is further exacerbated by other dimensions, such as gender and prevailing rural-urban gaps. In Ecuador, for instance, the same type of indigenous household is 6 percent more likely to be poor if it is headed by a woman, and 4 percent more likely in Bolivia (see figure 14). In Peru, the same type of indigenous household is 37 percent more likely to be poor if it is rural than if it is urban, a pattern that repeats in every country considered for this study (see figure 15).

As a result of these patterns of persistent exclusion, indigenous households are disproportionately represented among the chronically poor, the segment of Latin American societies that has not benefited equally from the past decade of economic growth. An illuminating example is the case of rural Guatemala, referred to in box 4.

Figure 15 Increase in Probability of Being Poor if Indigenous Household Is Rural



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

Methodological note: marginal probabilities estimated using an OLS regression on household's poverty status (using alternative definitions of $1.25, $2.50, and $4 per day), controlling for ethnicity, area (urban/rural), household head's gender, marital status, educational attainment and age, number of kids (compared with the median number of children per household in the country), and local region size (defined by population). These probabilities are statistically significant (at least $p<0.01$).

Indigenous people in Guatemala have historically faced economic and social exclusion. During the civil war (1960–96), many indigenous communities in the western highlands were affected by the internal armed conflict. The historic legacy of decades of violence and exclusion contributed to a morbid association between belonging to an indigenous household and chronic poverty. In 2011, for example, three out of four people living in persistently poor rural areas (chronically poor areas) belonged to an indigenous household (figure B4.1).

Indigenous Population by Municipality Type

Figure B4.1 | Share of Indigenous Population in Chronically Poor vs. Municipalities with Economic Growth (Improved)



Figure B4.2 | Chronically Poor and Improved Areas in Municipalities with a Majority of Indigenous Population



Source: Javier Baez, Kiyomi Cadena, Maria Eugenia Genoni, and Leonardo Lucchetti, "Chronic Poverty in Guatemala: Analysis Using Poverty Maps" (forthcoming).

Methodological note: data calculated using poverty maps for 2000 and 2011, for rural areas only. Chronically poor municipalities are those where rural poverty rates were above 75 percent at the beginning and end of the decade (2000 and 2011). Improved municipalities are areas where rural poverty was above 75 percent in 2000 but below 75 percent in 2011. "Majority indigenous" are municipalities where more than 50 percent of the population is indigenous.

Even though there is evidence of progress in some geographic areas with a high proportion of indigenous population—that is, the share of people in rural areas that improved was similar in indigenous and non-indigenous municipalities (see figure B4.2)—in general, indigenous people in chronically poor areas are persistently worse off than non-indigenous people. In chronically poor areas, adults living in municipalities with a majority of indigenous population had lower education levels and smaller improvements during the 2000–11 period. In addition, school attendance rates were lower for indigenous children in these areas (see table B4.1). Malnutrition rates were also high for indigenous people, regardless of whether they lived in chronically poor or improved municipalities. However, in areas that showed improvement, the share of indigenous population was lower than in chronically poor areas (that is, in both areas this share was higher than 50 percent).

Finally, chronically poor indigenous municipalities are more likely to be located in the northern and southwestern regions of the country. In contrast, the indigenous municipalities that improved were more likely to be in the northwestern and central regions (figure B4.3). This evidence suggests that low initial endowments and context matter in the dynamics of chronic poverty.

CONTINUE

Table B4.1 | Characteristics of Chronically Poor and Improved Municipalities with a Majority of Indigenous Population

	Chronically poor Majority indigenous		Improved municipality Majority indigenous	
	Circa 2000	Circa 2011	Circa 2000	Circa 2011
Moderate poverty rate	0.92	0.87	0.87	0.67
Moderate poverty gp	0.47	0.36	0.40	0.2
Share of population indigenous	0.94	0.94	0.85	0.82
Share of adults 18+ with primary complete or more	0.11	0.18	0.15	0.24
Share of households where at least a member with 5 or more years of education	0.46	0.49	0.47	0.57
Share of children 6–11 attending school[a]		0.88		0.9
Share of children 12–16 attending school[a]		0.65		0.66
Children in primary school with low height-for-weight	0.64	0.62	0.64	0.58
Number of municipalities	71		45	

Source: Baez et al., "Chronic Poverty in Guatemala."

Methodological note: data calculated using poverty maps for 2000 and 2011, the 2002 national census, and the 2008–11 census for the targeting of the program "Mi Familia Progresa"; for rural areas only. Chronically poor are municipalities where rural poverty rates were above 75 percent in both 2000 and 2011. Improved municipalities are areas where the rural poverty rate was above 75 percent in 2000 but below 75 percent in 2011. Majority indigenous are municipalities where more than 50 percent of the population is indigenous. Numbers are weighted by population.

a Data from the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 2011.

Figure B4.3 | Location of Municipalities with Majority of Indigenous Population by Type



Source: Baez et al., "Chronic Poverty in Guatemala."

Methodological note: data calculated using poverty maps for 2000 and 2011, for rural areas only. Chronically poor are municipalities where rural poverty rates were above 75 percent in 2000 and 2011. Improved municipalities are areas where the rural poverty rate was above 75 percent in 2000 but below 75 percent in 2011. Bars show percentage of people in 2011.

The growth in the poverty gap separating indigenous from non-indigenous households can be at least partially attributed to the way indigenous people are being incorporated into the market and mainstream society, where education plays a pivotal role.

While there seems to be no major difference in terms of unemployment, urban indigenous people work mostly in low-skill/low-paying jobs—a pattern that resonates with the finding of a recent World Bank report[119] (see figure 16). In countries with large urban indigenous populations, such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico, the percentage of indigenous persons occupying high-skill jobs is consistently smaller than the percentage of non-indigenous people. Indigenous people in Peru are half as likely to work in high-skill employment as non-indigenous persons, while in Ecuador they are about one-third as likely. In Mexico and Bolivia, the proportion is about two-thirds. Disaggregated along specific employment types, in Chile, the percentage of non-indigenous workers almost doubles the percentage of indigenous workers in areas such as "professional work" (10 percent vs. 5 percent) and "technician" (15 percent vs. 10 percent). In Mexico, 8 percent of indigenous workers are categorized as "unpaid workers," typically in family-owned businesses, according to the national censuses.

The prevalence of informal jobs exacerbates the precariousness of the labor force, as indigenous workers are less likely to receive benefits such as social security, health insurance, retirement funds, and other legal compensations. In Bolivia, a person with the same education, gender, and age is almost 7 percent more likely to work in the informal sector if he or she belongs to an indigenous household; and 14.5 percent in Guatemala. What is more, the

Figure 16 Employment Status and Type of Employment of Indigenous People in Urban Areas



119 Vakis, Rigolini, and Lucchetti, *Left Behind*, 7.



Source: national censuses.

a Skill-level variables have been calculated by grouping predefined occupation categories obtained directly from country censuses: high-skilled employment includes armed forces, clerks, legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians, and associate professionals; low-skilled employment includes crafts and related trades workers, elementary occupations, plant and machine operators and assemblers, service workers, and shop and market sales; and agriculture/rural includes agricultural and fishery workers.

probability of an indigenous household member to work in the informal sector has increased in both countries over the past decade, by about 1 percent for Bolivia and over 5 percent for Guatemala (see figure 17).

Even if an indigenous person completes tertiary education, he or she might earn considerably less than a non-indigenous individual with the same qualification. International comparative studies on remuneration and income have found that indigenous workers "are confronted with 'glass ceilings' or access barriers while trying to obtain high-paid positions."[120] Household data show that an indigenous person with the same level of education and household characteristics likely earns nearly 12 percent less than a non-indigenous person for the same type of work in urban Mexico, and 14

120 Juan Pablo Atal, Hugo Ñopo, and Natalia Winder, "New Century, Old Disparities: Gender and Ethnic Wage Gaps in Latin America" (working paper series no. IDB-WP-109, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 2009), 45.

Figure 17 Increase in Probability of Working in the Informal Sector if a Person Belongs to an Indigenous Household in Bolivia and Guatemala



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

Methodological note: marginal probability of working in the informal sector (logit regression), controlling for ethnicity, gender, age, square of age, and educational attainment. Observations include people older than 14 years of age, who were not working in the agricultural sector, and were living in urban areas. These probabilities are statistically significant (at least $p<0.1$).

percent less in rural areas. In Bolivia, an indigenous person likely earns 9 percent less in urban settings, and 13 percent less in rural areas; and in Peru and Guatemala, he or she makes about 6 percent less (see figure 18).

There have been improvements in urban Peru and Bolivia, where the wage gap narrowed by 60 percent and 25 percent, respectively (see figure 18). A disaggregated analysis of the data shows that improvements in access to education might be playing an important role in these positive developments, which are observed throughout the region. When wages are compared among people with similar characteristics and the same level of education, the urban wage gap decreases by 33 percent in Mexico (from 18 percent to 12 percent), 73 percent in Guatemala (from 23 to 6), and 30 percent in Peru (from 8 to 5.6).[121] A similar effect is found in rural areas. Similarly, the reduction in urban wage gaps observed in Peru (14 percent to 6 percent) and Bolivia (12 percent to 9 percent) throughout the decade (see figure 18) is consistent with the expansion of primary education to indigenous households in both countries. However, a slight increase in the rural wage gap in Bolivia suggests that the benefits of this expansion have not been equally distributed among rural and urban households, which is also consistent with a slight imbalance in the expansion of the education system. Nevertheless, both results highlight the impact that expansion of the education system can have on the lives of more and more indigenous households. The next section delves further into this aspect, as well as the need to invest more on its quality and adaptation, for the education system holds the key for the social inclusion of indigenous peoples with respect for their rights, cultures, and priorities.

Data are very limited on the discrimination of the disabled, the elderly, the underage employed, and other vulnerable groups within indigenous societies, but several studies have found that for indigenous women, the wage and education gaps are wider than those of indigenous men. A World Bank study estimated that indigenous Bolivian women earn about 60 percent less than non-indigenous women for the same types of jobs.[122] Comparing census data, Brazilian indigenous men earn on average 39 percent less than non-indigenous men, while indigenous women earn nearly 58 percent less than non-indigenous men. In Panama, indigenous men earn on average 57 percent less than non-indigenous men, while indigenous women earn about 70 percent less than non-indigenous women (see figure 19). Other studies, however, have found significant improvement in the gender divide in indigenous societies across the region, which suggests an association between improved access to education for women and a reduction in earning differentials.[123]

121 These marginal effects of education on wages were estimated using OLS regressions, based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

122 World Bank, *Gender in Bolivian Production: Reducing Differences in Formality and Productivity of Firms* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).

123 Ñopo, *New Century, Old Disparities*.

Figure 18 Decrease in Income in Five Countries if a Person Belongs to an Indigenous Household: Urban and Rural



Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank).

Methodological note: These marginal effects were estimated using OLS regressions on income per hour, controlling for ethnicity, gender, experience (defined as potential experience, which is equal to the difference between age and years of schooling minus six years), square of experience, marital status, educational attainment (complete primary, complete secondary and tertiary), age cohort (18–24, 25–44, 45–54, 55–65 years of age), number of children in the household (compared with country's median), type of work (wage workers, self-employed, and no-wage workers), informality status, and size of region of residence (defined by population). Observations included only people from 18 to 65 years of age, out of the agriculture sector and in urban areas for the urban estimate (the urban model, in addition, controls for sector of work including construction, commerce, manufacturing, transport, mining and utilities, and other services); and people from 18 to 65 years of age, in the agriculture sector and living in rural areas for the rural estimate. These probabilities are statistically significant (at least $p<0.01$).

Figure 19 Income by Indigenous Status and Gender in Panama and Brazil



Source: Panama and Brazil censuses.

Methodological note: income refers to all personal income from all sources received during a year, and includes labor income and income from sources such as retirement, pension, social programs, and returns on financial investments. Numbers collected on a monthly basis in US dollars in Panama and in reais in Brazil; 2010 exchange real/dollar exchange rate was used to convert amounts in reais to dollars.

There has also been significant improvement over the past decade regarding indigenous people's access to services (see figure 20). For instance, there was a 53 percent increase in electricity access for indigenous households in Peru, 49 percent in Panama, 32 percent increase in Costa Rica, 24 percent in Bolivia, and 16 percent in Ecuador. Access to sewerage increased by 65 percent in Peru, 60 percent in Bolivia, 58 percent in Costa Rica, 41 percent in Ecuador, and 35 percent in Panama, with only Brazil decreasing in coverage, by 26 percent. More modestly, indigenous households' access to piped water increased by 20 percent in Peru, 8 percent in Panama, and less than 4 percent in Bolivia, Brazil, and Costa Rica. The expansion of services is another positive sign that the region is trying to close the gap that divides indigenous and non-indigenous people.

However, despite these improvements, the proportion of indigenous people having access to sanitation still is considerably smaller than that of non-indigenous people. In Bolivia, Mexico, and Ecuador, all with large indigenous populations, non-indigenous have 1.3 to 1.8 times better access to sanitation than indigenous people. Something similar happens regarding electricity. In Panama, non-indigenous people have 2.3 times more access to electricity at home. In Colombia, non-indigenous people have 1.6 times more access to this service. The regional average in access to piped water shows a 19 percent gap between the two groups (71 percent access for indigenous peoples vs. 90 percent for non-indigenous people) (see figure 21).

Figure 20 Progress in Access to Public Services by Indigenous People



Source: national censuses. Note: for Peru first point of data corresponds to 1993.

Figure 21 Access to Public Services by Indigenous Status



Source: national censuses.

Has improved access to services contributed to the growth of rural-urban migrations? The available data suggest that the expansion has benefited both rural and urban indigenous people, without a clear pattern of preference. However, urban indigenous people clearly have benefited more from the expansion of sewerage in the three countries where data are available for the period of the early 2000s through the late 2000s (Ecuador, Peru, and Panama). Progress in access to sewerage was nearly four times higher for urban indigenous dwellers in Ecuador compared with indigenous people living in rural areas, and three and 2.7 times higher for urban indigenous people in Panama and Peru, respectively. Improvement in access to electricity has been more significant for rural indigenous dwellers in Panama and Peru compared with urban indigenous residents, and more balanced in Ecuador. On the other hand, piped water has shown nearly a nine-fold expansion in rural Peru and Panama compared with urban gains, while urban indigenous dwellers in Ecuador have doubled the improvement in access to piped water compared with their rural counterparts (see figure 22).

Limited market inclusion is also associated with poor technical skills and access to new technologies. Computers, cell phones, and the Internet offer new ways of connecting to markets, services, and the public sphere. Mobile communications "offer major opportunities to advance human development—from providing basic access to education or health information to making cash payments … to stimulating citizen involvement in democratic processes."[124] Latin America, in fact, has become the second-fastest-

Figure 22 Progress in Access to Basic Services for Indigenous Households from the Early 2000s to the Late 2000s: Rural vs. Urban Areas



Source: national censuses.

124 World Bank, *Information and Communications for Development 2012: Maximizing Mobile* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).

growing market for mobile technologies in the world, and mobile technologies constitute about 3.7 percent of the region's GDP.[125] Indigenous people, however, have not benefited equally from the exponential growth and democratization of these technologies in the last decade.

While in many Latin American countries the number of mobile phone subscribers outstrips the number of people, indigenous people in general have access to cell phones half as often as non-indigenous persons (see figure 23). Similarly, Internet access among indigenous people in Bolivia is four times smaller than among non-indigenous people, and six times smaller in Ecuador (see figure 24). Finally, indigenous people have access to computers half as often in Bolivia, a third as often in Brazil and Peru, and one-ninth as often in Colombia (see figure 25). The digital divide reinforces prior forms of exclusion, insofar as access to technologies is becoming a key aspect of social capital in increasingly globalized Latin American societies.

The Capacity to Change...

Several studies have shown that one consequence of persistent patterns of exclusion like those experienced by indigenous Latin Americans is reduced agency or the "capacity" to find ways out of poverty.[126] A recent World Bank report therefore calls for improvement in how individuals and groups take part in society, which involves "improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to

Figure 23 Access to Cell Phones



Source: national censuses.

125 GSMA, *Mobile Economy, Latin America 2013* (London: GSMA, 2014).

126 Appadurai, "The Capacity to Aspire."

Figure 24 Access to Computers



Source: national censuses.

Figure 25 Access to the Internet



Source: national censuses.

take part in society."[127] Indigenous Latin Americans experience discrimination more frequently than other groups in their respective countries. Data from the 2011 Latinobarómetro show that over half of the indigenous respondents feel discriminated against in countries with large indigenous populations, such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In general, these numbers double and even triple the number of people who did not identify as belonging to an ethnic minority but nevertheless felt discrimination. In other words, despite the general dissemination of ideas of multiculturalism, the broad acceptance of indigenous rights, and the subsequent emergence of plurinational constitutions, indigenous people still feel overwhelming discrimination.

This has several consequences for development. Data also from Latinobarómetro show that regarding their views on economic inclusion, for example, indigenous people see little hope for social mobility. Invited to consider a scale where 1 is poor and 10 is rich, indigenous people locate themselves in the bottom 50 percent, as a majority of Latin Americans do, but they consistently see themselves and their parents ranking below non-indigenous people, in the second-poorest quintile. More dramatically, indigenous people envisage a negative future for their children, reflecting their pessimism regarding future opportunities within the current socioeconomic system. Thus, while non-indigenous people imagine their children scaling up to the top 50 percent, indigenous people imagine their children improving, as one would expect, but still stuck in the bottom 50 percent, where they are and their parents were before them.

Ethnically based social exclusion can therefore lead to lower human capital achievements and instigate a sense of powerlessness that might discourage individuals from participating in public life. Economic growth alone does little to solve discrimination, insofar as it is embedded in attitudes and perceptions that shape how policies are implemented. Social exclusion not only reduces a group's ability to participate in the economic and political spheres, it also diminishes the group's dignity.

Figure 26

Perception of Social Mobility; Weighted Average for Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru

Considering a scale where 1 is poor and 10 is rich, where you think your parents were, you are, and your children will be…



Source: Latinobarómetro, 2011.

The political and legal advances of the last decade are important factors in turning this situation around, but change will not happen only by nominally expanding indigenous peoples' rights. Indigenous peoples have a fundamental role to play in the development agenda of the region, but one study after another shows that these groups do not respond to development efforts in conventional ways. Indigenous peoples have specific histories, cultural systems, forms of social organization, local economies, and governance structures that might conflict with top-down, market-oriented approaches. Though the use of standardized indicators such as the MDG to examine regional data provides important insights into the socioeconomic conditions of indigenous peoples in the region, an approach focused exclusively on standardized indicators such as the MDG leaves aside indigenous ideas on development, self-improvement, and poverty, and how these have changed over time. It

127 World Bank, *Inclusion Matters*, 4.

also leaves little room for assessing local, targeted initiatives that have successfully reduced poverty and empowered local communities.

In the last decade, numerous programs and policies have been implemented in the region with positive results, from the standpoint of poverty indicators but also in terms of ecological conservation, health care access, preservation of traditional knowledge, and local participation. Important lessons have been drawn about the potential socioeconomic impact of implementing programs that are in line with regional regulatory frameworks and promote indigenous peoples' participation. Self-targeting, for instance, has been advanced as a crucial element of several poverty-alleviation programs in indigenous areas, not only because it encompasses local and culturally specific notions of vulnerability and deprivation, but also because it gives stakeholders the ability and agency to decide how poverty-reduction efforts should be implemented.[128]

Likewise, self-determination can be more than an aspiration whenever indigenous peoples can act as the actual initiators and drivers of the process to design development programs. A good example can be seen in the case of the Pando region of Bolivia, inhabited by highly vulnerable indigenous communities. In this region, two organizations representing the communities—the Central Indígena de Pueblos Originarios de la Amazonía de Pando (CIPOAP) and the Central Indígena de Mujeres de la Amazonía de Pando (CIMAP)—have developed a comprehensive development plan for the indigenous peoples of Pando that takes indigenous views into account, using a participatory diagnostic methodology. By initiating the design and consent process from their end, and with support from several UN agencies and the European Union, they hope to prompt the government into negotiations that deliver key, culturally appropriate decisions concerning indigenous peoples' economic development, health, and education.[129]

Experiences of self-development in health, from the point of view of both government participation and the communities, have also borne important lessons (see box 5).

In sum, while many targeted policies and experiences of self-development might not be visible from a macro-perspective, these local initiatives do offer valuable, on-the-ground insights about why development projects succeed or fail, and what are the factors and conditions that determine a project's outcome. However, despite abundant debate in academic and non-academic circles, there remains insufficient comparative data regarding the challenges, limits, and "best practices" of targeted and self-driven development in the region. Education, which plays a fundamental role in the future possibilities of indigenous people to turn things around, is a good example of the challenges, gaps, and opportunities opened by the new legal realignments in favor of indigenous peoples.

128 See, for example, Norma Correa Aste and Terry Roopnaraine, *Pueblos indígenas & programas de transferencias condicionadas: Estudio etnográfico sobre la implementación y los efectos socioculturales del Programa Juntos en seis comunidades andinas y amazónicas de Perú* (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute and Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo; Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013).

129 UNIPP, *Indígenas quieren consulta previa para salud y educación*, June 9, 2013, http://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia/indigenas/06092013/indigenas_quieren_consulta_previa_para_salud_y_educacion#sthash.mmlUrD6S.dpuf; UNIPP, "UNIPP Success Stories."

Box 5 | Two Cases of Self-Driven Development in the Health Sector

In southern Chile, since the late 1980s, Mapuche organizations have been working toward improving biomedical health care access for rural Mapuche families. They promoted community-driven strategies of management and biomedical care, complemented with Mapuche medical practices and knowledge. Today, these Mapuche organizations co-manage (with the Health Service of Araucania Sur) the Mapuche Medicine Center at the Hospital de Nueva Imperial, the Makewe Hospital, and the Intercultural Health Center Boroa Filulawen.

These initiatives were conceptualized within a framework of "intercultural health," through which indigenous communities collectively assume and coordinate the provision of biomedical care in their territories, but according to their own views and needs, and in harmony with their traditional health practices and knowledge. After 15 years of work, these three experiences of self-development have not only improved health care inclusion in rural areas, but they also have spurred cultural and political empowerment, becoming a model for intercultural health care for the region.

From a different position, the Servicios de Atención y Orientación al Indígena (SAOI), envisioned and implemented by indigenous professionals working at the Venezuelan Ministry of Health, have provided assistance and orientation to indigenous patients in major hospitals of the country since 2005. The service began with two pilot experiences in Maracaibo, in the west of the country, that sought to improve access of indigenous patients who were often alienated from biomedical facilities by cultural and linguistic barriers. Through bilingual and intercultural attention, provided by specially trained indigenous professionals, indigenous families were guided through bureaucratic proceedings, received translation during medical visits, were followed up during treatments, and received culturally sensitive advice. The success of the first SAOI increased the demand of the service both from indigenous people and from health workers in other regions.

Over time, the SAOI have also become creative environments for intercultural exchanges between indigenous and biomedical healing practices and knowledge, allowing the introduction of culturally pertinent facilities and diets as well as indigenous health knowledge and specialists into the hospital environment. Despite the ups and downs of the Venezuelan economy over the past years, indigenous personnel, health workers, and indigenous patients themselves have not only kept the SAOI services alive, but have expanded their outreach to 32 hospitals in 12 states around the country. In nine years of service, the SAOI have assisted over 380,000 indigenous patients, constituting one of the most remarkable experiences of intercultural adaptation of public health care services in the region.

Education

In many respects, the new national and international legal frameworks have opened the path to other forms of education. Accordingly, in recent decades laws on education relevant to indigenous culture, language, and identity have been enacted in most of the region. However, as with other legal and policy reforms, a gap remains between theoretical advances and actual implementation.

School attendance, in general, has improved among indigenous children. Between the two rounds of censuses considered for this report, the percentage of indigenous children age 6 to 11 attending school increased from 73 percent to 83 percent in Brazil, from 87 percent to 96 percent in Ecuador, from 78 percent to 92 percent in Panama, and from 85 percent to 93 percent in Peru. However, a gap remains between indigenous and non-indigenous children. This gap is more pronounced in countries with small, diverse, and scattered indigenous populations, such as Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, probably because of difficulties intrinsic to the task of attending to hundreds of indigenous societies (at least 382 in only those four countries). In countries such as Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador, however, the percentage of indigenous children attending school is relatively similar to the percentage of non-indigenous children, particularly at the elementary school level.

Figure 27 Children's School Attendance: Indigenous vs. Non-Indigenous



Source: national censuses.

This picture can be misleading, however, as small populations such as the Shipibo-Conibo and the Ashaninka tend to be statistically overshadowed by larger indigenous societies such as the Quechua and Aymara. In Peru, where school attendance of indigenous children 6 to 11 years old is at about 93 percent, a more detailed review of rural indigenous schools carried out by the Ombudsman Office in 2013, based on a sample of 75 schools, found that about 46 percent of indigenous children and adolescents were not registered in any educational institution.[130] Also, according to a specialized census of Amazonian communities carried out in parallel to the national Peruvian census (2007), 19 percent of indigenous Amazonians did not know how to read or write (28 percent of women), and only 51 percent of the population younger than 24 were receiving formal education (only 47 percent of the above-15s had completed primary education).[131]

There is also a gap between urban and rural settings in the proportion of indigenous children attending school. Again, the largest gaps occur in countries with more diverse and scattered indigenous populations, namely Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (see figure 28).

Figure 28 Indigenous People of School Age Attending School in Rural and Urban Settings



Source: national censuses.

130 *Informe Defensorial: Avances y desafíos en la implementación de la Política de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe 2012–2013* (Lima: Defensoría del Pueblo, 2014).

131 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, *Censos Nacionales 2007: II Censo de Comunidades Indígenas* (Lima: INEI, 2009).

The intersection between gender and indigenous status has considerable negative impacts on educational outcomes. In general, indigenous and rural women have higher levels of illiteracy and school dropout rates, which hinder their ability to take advantage of economic opportunities, contributing to higher rates of unemployment and greater vulnerability. In terms of educational attainment, the combination of gender, ethnicity, age, and place of residence seems to have a higher deterrent effect than gender alone.[132] For example, in Ecuador and Peru, both indigenous men and women generally have fewer years of schooling than non-indigenous men and women. However, there is a larger gap between indigenous men and women compared with non-indigenous men and women, and indigenous women are particularly disadvantaged, as shown in figure 29.

The combination of gender and indigenous status is associated with considerably lower school completion rates, regardless of age and geographic area. In Bolivia, the primary school completion rate for indigenous women in rural areas is half the rate for non-indigenous men, and the disparity in the secondary school completion rate is also large, at 23 percent vs. 10 percent (see box 6 for a detailed example from Bolivia). The reasons for not attending school vary. Data from Colombia indicate that indigenous status might be more of a variable than gender, as both non-indigenous men and women report that the costs associated with school and distance from schools are larger deterrents than for indigenous men and women, while a larger share of indigenous men and women identify the need to work as a reason for not attending school (figure 30).

Figure 29 Share of Population with 1–6 Years of Schooling Compared with 7–12 Years of Schooling, by Gender and Indigenous Status, in Peru; Data for Population 24 Years Old and Above



Source: national census (2007).

132 World Bank, *Bolivia: Challenges and Constraints.*

Figure 30 Reasons for Not Attending School in Colombia by Gender and Indigenous Status



Source: World Bank calculations using 2005 census data.

Box 6 | Gender, Location, and School Completion among Indigenous Bolivians

Educational attainment in Bolivia is significantly lower among women, ethnic minorities, and rural residents, in spite of universal education policies that date to the 1930s and major education reforms during the 1990s. Educational attainment in rural areas is generally better for men than women, regardless of indigenous/non-indigenous status. For example, 7.6 percent of women have no schooling, while the corresponding figure for men is 4.9 percent. Also, about 86 percent of women and 92 percent of men are literate (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2011).

Women in rural areas and women who belong to indigenous groups have lower educational attainment than any other group. The primary school completion rate for indigenous women in rural areas is half the rate for non-indigenous men, at 25.6 percent vs. 52.5 percent. The disparity in the secondary school completion rate is also large, at 9.8 percent vs. 22.9 percent. The combination of gender and indigenous status is associated with considerably lower completion rates, regardless of age and geographic area. Compared with non-indigenous men, non-indigenous women and indigenous men are 9 percent and 10 percent less likely to complete primary school, respectively, while indigenous women are 29 percent less likely to do so. Indigenous women are also 23 percent less likely to complete secondary school than non-indigenous men (see figures B6.1 and B6.2).

CONTINUE

Figure B6.1 Completion Rates in Urban Bolivia



Source: Tas, 2014, based on 2012 census data.

Figure B6.2 Completion Rates in Rural Bolivia



Source: Tas, 2014, based on 2012 census data.

These persisting gaps between boys and girls could be associated with several factors: 1) pregnancy, for instance, is a common reason for dropping out of school; 2) many schools do not have separate sanitary facilities for girls, which is particularly problematic as girls get older and start to menstruate; 3) if schools are located too far away, traveling might be considered a "risk" for girls; etc. In more indirect terms, in households that have limited resources, boys are often privileged over girls when prioritizing between children to be sent to school; gendered curricula and schooling practices tend to also silently exclude girls. Also, the presence of younger siblings (in preschool) increases the probability of older sisters to be out of school, as they often help with domestic activities and take care of their younger siblings. It has therefore been argued that increasing the coverage of preschool programs could have a positive effect on school enrollment and attendance of older indigenous girls.[133]

Source: Adapted from World Bank, *Bolivia: Challenges and Constraints.*

133 Ernesto Yáñez, Ronald Rojas, and Diego Silva, "The Juancito Pinto Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Bolivia: Analyzing the Impact on Primary Education" (FOCAL policy brief, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, Ottawa, May 2011); Daniela Zapata, Dante Contreras, and Diana Kruger, "Child Labor and Schooling in Bolivia: Who's Falling Behind? The Roles of Domestic Work, Gender, and Ethnicity," *World Development* 39, no. 4 (April 2011): 588–99.

The data shown so far speak merely of a material expansion of the education systems to indigenous regions, but it would be a mistake to take those quantitative outputs as measures of quality, for enrollment ratios, gender distribution, and retention rates say little about the quality or the cultural pertinence of education that is being provided to indigenous children. Furthermore, standardized syllabi prioritize language and mathematics to the detriment of other, equally important learning dimensions for indigenous peoples, such as their traditional forms of thinking and knowing, the existence of other civilization patterns, and other ways of understanding the relationship between man and nature.

Accordingly, the data available on education do not necessarily represent a sociocultural order in which those 42 million indigenous people and hundreds of distinct societies and languages can fit. Educational attainment, for instance, is inversely related to the retention of an indigenous language. Despite widespread laws and regulations protecting indigenous languages and cultures (see box 7), and the general recognition of the importance to include intercultural bilingual education strategies at school, less than 31.9 percent of indigenous people in the countries analyzed spoke an indigenous language by the time they completed their primary education, and a mere 5.3 percent did so by the time they completed secondary education. More critical, the chances of turning things around via the participation of indigenous professionals in the design and implementation of new curricula are low, as less than 2 percent of indigenous people who completed university education spoke their native language (see figure 31).

Figure 31 Percentage of Indigenous People Who Speak Indigenous Language by Level of Educational Attainment (Age 24 and Above)



Source: national censuses.

The above is evidence that, despite decades of intercultural bilingual programs in the region, education systems continue working toward a model that at best helps indigenous children in their transit toward cultural and linguistic assimilation. In this context, aside from the symbolic and legal recognition of a good number of indigenous languages in the region, Spanish and Portuguese continue to enjoy the status of de facto official and education languages. This calls for obvious questions on the role of education systems to promote the multicultural and multilingual societies proclaimed in so many constitutions, education laws, and international agreements throughout the region (see box 7).

Box 7 | Indigenous Peoples' Rights to Education

Part VI of ILO No. 169 (Articles 26–31) grants indigenous peoples several educational rights, including the right to be educated in their own languages and cultures, with content based on their own history, knowledge, value systems, social practices, and technologies, as well as the right to maintain their own educational institutions under state funding. It also calls for equal access and opportunity to attain educational services at all levels and without discrimination. Article 30 moves a step further as it indirectly promotes interculturalism as a route for fostering a dignified image of indigenous peoples in contemporary society.

The 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ratifies and expands most of the above mentioned aspects, and although issues related to the education of indigenous people are to an extent a crosscutting topic through this declaration, Articles 11 to 15 relate to the educational rights to which indigenous peoples are entitled. Articles 11 and 12 state the right to practice and maintain their present and future cultural traditions and customs, including their religious and spiritual practices and ceremonies, as well as the responsibility of states to protect and provide access to their religious and cultural sites. Article 13 and 14 establish that indigenous peoples "…have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons" as well as to "…establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning." The declaration determines that "states…in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language" (Article 14, numeral 3). All of these considerations are linked to a higher-order right related to the dignity and aspirations of indigenous peoples and, as in the case of ILO No. 169, the states should take effective measures, in consultation with indigenous peoples, "…to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of society" (Article 15).

In 2009, the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples carried out a study on the rights to education. The study identified lessons learned and challenges related to the implementation of these rights. Among the main lessons learned, the study referred to the adoption of laws and policies on the education of indigenous people, as well as to the provision of the necessary financial resources. As to the challenges encountered, the study prioritized the following: lack of control over educational initiatives for indigenous children, lack of consultation on the development and implementation of educational services provided to indigenous people, limited consideration given to autonomy and participation of indigenous people in the delivery of educational services, and most generally the imposition of mainstream education on indigenous children.

Intercultural bilingual education is, in fact, not new to Latin America. It has been proposed as an alternative to monolingual Spanish/Portuguese education since at least the 1960s, and it is widely regarded as an important targeted policy to include indigenous peoples without threatening their languages, cultures, and social autonomy.[134] However, the origins of IBE were associated with assimilation strategies led by governments and missionaries during the first half of the twentieth century. They saw the use of modern linguistics and the implementation of bilingual education as an adequate solution to the problems of reaching out to and converting predominantly monolingual indigenous societies. Since then, however, IBE has become an important part of interethnic and intercultural dialogue.[135] Nonetheless, legal and educational rhetoric does not necessarily match public action.

The implementation of and access to IBE in Latin America are in fact highly irregular and unsystematic (see Appendix B). In Argentina, for example, where IBE was included in the education law in 2006, over 90 percent of indigenous children who attend school do not receive education in their languages.[136] In Peru, where IBE has been protected by the constitution since 1993 and different aspects have been implemented since 1961, only 38 percent of the indigenous children with access to primary education attend a school with IBE, and only about half the teachers in IBE schools speak the language in which they are supposed to teach.[137] In Bolivia, which included provisions for IBE in its 2009 constitution and has had different pilot experiences since 1977, IBE reached only 22 percent of the population that required it in 2005. In Brazil, over 90 percent of the teachers in IBE schools are indigenous, but only 65 percent of them have secondary level education, and 13 percent tertiary level qualifications.

The weaknesses of bilingual education include not only the lack of effective implementation, but also poor design and lack of proper targeting. There is evidence that bilingual education can be effective if done well.[138] The failures of implementing IBE in terms that effectively promote indigenous knowledge and values, while providing indigenous children with the intellectual tools they will need in their increasingly globalized societies, are also apparent in the strong association between literacy and the loss of native languages (see figure 32). Over 95 percent of all illiterate indigenous persons above 10 years of age in Bolivia speak their native language.

In spite of the limitations pointed out above, socioculturally relevant innovations that try to break away from the assimilationist patterns of educational design and delivery have been taking place in numerous indigenous settings and territories, and even in the metropolitan areas of a number of Latin American capital cities for the past two or three decades. Many of these transformations are the by-product of indigenous agency and self-determination, and most generally imply transformations that originate locally and at small scale, with the active involvement of civil society in decision making even when moving from the bottom up and achieving official recognition. Others are the result of sociopolitical and cultural awareness efforts, resulting from encouragement and support given by research centers and non-governmental organizations aligned with the indigenous agenda.

134 Delia María Fajardo Salinas, "Educación intercultural bilingüe en Latinoamérica: un breve estado de la cuestión," *Estudios Sociales y Humanísticos* IX, no. 2 (December 2011).

135 Luis Enrique López, "Top-Down and Bottom-Up: Counterpoised Visions of Bilingual Intercultural Education in Latin America," in *Can Schools Save Indigenous Languages? Policy and Practice on Four Continents*, ed. Nancy H. Hornberger (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 42–65; Lucy Trapnell, "Addressing Knowledge and Power Issues in Intercultural Education" (master's thesis, Department of Education, University of Bath, United Kingdom, 2008).

136 UNESCO, "World Data on Education, VII Ed. 2010/11," http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Argentina.pdf.

137 Martín Benavides, Magrith Mena, and Carmen Ponce, *Estado de la Niñez Indígena en el Perú* (Lima: INEI and UNICEF, 2010), 72.

138 Harry Anthony Patrinos and Eduardo Velez, "Costs and Benefits of Bilingual Education in Guatemala: A Partial Analysis," *International Journal of Educational Development* 29, no. 6 (November 2009): 594–98.

Figure 32 Illiteracy and Knowledge of Indigenous Languages (Indigenous Population 10+)



Source: national censuses.

However, the number of bilingual schools is limited, and so is the number of professionally trained bilingual teachers. Very recently, the Ministry of Education of Peru announced the need to train 21,000 bilingual teachers to look after the educational needs of the indigenous children attending bilingual schools in rural areas. However, considering the increased presence of indigenous persons in urban areas, this need is likely significantly higher. The country that has managed to reach the largest proportion of indigenous students at primary school level is Mexico, although educational quality is also an issue there, as it is in every other Latin American country.

Finally, the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador deserve special mention because in both cases the new and unprecedented format of a multi-nation state has been adopted. The national constitutions of these two countries were radically transformed in 2008 (Ecuador) and 2009 (Bolivia), and new national education laws were later enacted. In the Bolivian case, more advances have been made with the recent adoption of a new indigenous knowledge–based curriculum, implemented in 2013–14, which pursues a more equitable relationship between Western and indigenous knowledge. Nonetheless, it is perhaps too early to assess the impact of these changes on language retention and the promotion of truly inclusive and multicultural education patterns.

Toward a Post-2015 Agenda

December 2014 marked the end of the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples, a period when indigenous Latin Americans continued to strengthen their position as relevant actors in the political and social life of the region. The tenacity of their social movements and community organizations bore fruit in terms of legal recognition. Their activism also contributed to a growing consensus on the right of indigenous peoples to participate in and benefit from the prosperity of the region without having to renounce their identities and aspirations as culturally distinct societies. The fact that 15 of the 22 countries that have ratified ILO Convention No. 169 are in Latin America is an encouraging sign of the direction the region is headed regarding indigenous rights.

The decade also produced economic and social gains for indigenous peoples in Latin America. The wage gaps that have historically affected ethnic minorities, rural dwellers, and women declined, as well as the gaps in educational attainment, showing that a favorable economic climate together with the right policies can yield positive results.[139] The percentage of indigenous peoples living in poverty also dropped significantly in some countries, while in others there was unquestionable improvement in the overall access to basic services including electricity, sewerage, and piped water. As the economic climate in Latin America is changing, the challenge ahead is how to make these gains sustainable over time, even in a context of slow economic growth.

Despite important gains, the decade also was marked by the persistence of old and the creation of new forms of inequality. While in absolute terms there was progress in areas such as poverty reduction and inclusion in key services of the state, in relative terms the gaps separating indigenous people from other Latin Americans grew even larger on many accounts. Also, the expansion in coverage of many key services was not necessarily accompanied by an increase in the quality or adaptation of those services to the needs and viewpoints of the indigenous population. Although some studies have pointed to a lack of overwhelming evidence that programs targeted at indigenous people could substantially erase these gaps,[140] data analyzed in this report suggest that growth alone will not help reduce them either. Economic growth does little to solve discrimination, for example, insofar as the attitudes and perceptions that lead to discriminatory outcomes are often ingrained in the way public policies are implemented.

Indigenous peoples' limited market access, for example, is associated with low education levels, prior economic conditions, poor access to finance and services, low market skills, exclusion from new technologies, gender gaps, and distrust, in a long list of etceteras. Eliminating indigenous peoples' market exclusion will therefore require a strategic and comprehensive approach, as well as the combined efforts of local communities, civil society, development agencies, the private sector, and NGOs, all working under the notion that there is no single solution or "big idea" that will suit all situations and sort out all problems. Gains are more likely to be small and incremental. However, experience shows that if the right conditions are set and the critical actors involved, change is possible.

This study has presented an updated assessment of the situation of indigenous peoples in the region at the beginning of the new millennium, without delving into overtly academic explanations of causality or potential solutions. However, the region has accumulated extensive empirical experience over the past two decades to address many of the challenges described throughout this report. Further work on these experiences is needed to broaden our understanding of what works and what does not in critical areas of development such as education, health, environmental conservation, territoriality, and market inclusion. Despite the preeminently descriptive character of this report, in this final section we outline observations and lessons that can be drawn from the data analyzed and could inform discussions leading to a post-2015 agenda.

139 Ñopo, *New Century, Old Disparities*.

140 Hall and Patrinos, *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, and Development*.

Legal and participatory gains need to be translated into social and economic ones.

There is an inescapable tension between the policy and participatory gains of recent decades and the lack of unequivocal economic and social gains at the community and household levels. The readiness of the region to approve and adapt progressive international instruments and agreements aimed at protecting indigenous peoples' rights is commendable, as these address the systematic conditions that prevent indigenous peoples from pursuing their own chosen development paths. They are also important because they mark a substantial change from the attitude and policies of the region only two decades ago. The speed and flexibility exhibited in adopting these changes contrast, however, with growing gaps in many areas and the little traction that long-awaited programs and policies have experienced, such as the regularization of indigenous land rights.

In all fairness, these political and legal advances are still at a trial-and-error stage. Thus, though it is true that many countries have generated laws and regulations meant to guarantee the participation of indigenous peoples in governments and decision making, echoing the contents of international covenants, very few have put in place effective measures to enforce them and to ensure that their implementation delivers actual results in terms of achieving inclusion and development with identity. Where they have, moreover, these relatively recent adaptations have to struggle with the inertia of over five centuries of prejudices, intolerance, and outright annihilation.

At the other end, even though ideas such as development with identity, indigenous development, and ethno-development have gained momentum over the past decade, the challenge for indigenous peoples, NGOs, governments, and development agencies is in implementing development programs that are sustainable and effective in reducing social exclusion. One common setback of these approaches has to do with the assumption that indigenous development can be legitimate only if it is diametrically opposed to Western forms of development. If indigenous conceptions of development are misconstrued around stereotypes and preconceived assumptions about what being indigenous is, contemporary indigenous people who for different reasons have drifted away from these orthodox canons might be left behind, leading to new forms of discrimination. The return to traditional means of production and the traditional territories, for example, might no longer be feasible or relevant for many indigenous households today. They certainly seem of little use when addressing the needs and priorities of a growing number of indigenous families living in marginalized urban environments.

> More work on the practical implementation of progressive legal frameworks protecting indigenous peoples' rights needs to be done.

The post-2015 agenda must also take into account the multiple layers of exclusion that make some indigenous households and individuals more vulnerable than others. Throughout this report we have emphasized, for example, that indigenous women are often discriminated against as both indigenous and women, resulting in poorer access to education and lower salaries than indigenous men. In the same vein, the outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly gathered in New York on September

> Legal and practical solutions must also address the needs and views of vulnerable groups within indigenous societies, bearing in mind that there are gaps related to gender, people with disabilities, children, the elderly, and interethnic discrimination.

22, 2014, called the attention of its member states to the need to promote and protect the rights of indigenous persons with disabilities, support the empowerment and capacity building of indigenous youth and women, and prevent and eliminate all forms of violence and discrimination against indigenous peoples and individuals, in particular women, children, youth, older persons, and persons with disabilities. There remains plenty of room for improvement in the legal and policy frameworks of the region. Advances, however, need to go hand in hand with a stronger commitment to translate this "rights approach" into substantial gains for indigenous people in ways that respect their identities and dignity.

Education might hold the key to development with identity, but the quality of the education system must be improved. Indigenous children have the right to receive an education of quality, culturally appropriate and relevant to them.

Improving the quality of education might be the key to greater inclusion.

The expansion of primary education to most indigenous latitudes over recent decades is a remarkable achievement. Through schools, indigenous communities often gain access not only to institutionalized education, but also to an array of opportunities to change the terms of their relationship with non-indigenous society and increase their voice and agency within the states. Evidence presented in this report and elsewhere shows that improvements in educational attainment have a significant impact on the market inclusion of indigenous peoples, contributing to narrower wage gaps. Moreover, evidence from other studies suggests that women might benefit more from the increased access to education than men, which could help them break away from a long history of discrimination.

However, whether these opportunities are fully developed will largely depend on our joint efforts to improve the quality and cultural pertinence of these services. Intercultural bilingual education, one of the most widespread and long-lasting proposals to bridge indigenous and institutionalized education systems, is a good example of the gap separating advanced legal frameworks and policy guidelines from their practical implementation. Present in the region since the first half of the twentieth century, bilingual education has evolved from a clearly assimilationist paradigm, aimed at facilitating the Christian conversion and cultural integration of indigenous peoples, to a prolific space for interethnic and intercultural dialogue. Virtually all Latin American countries today have specialized programs and/or departments for IBE within their ministries of education, and their legislations recognize IBE as a vital tool for the inclusion of indigenous peoples in the national education system without threatening their languages, cultures, and social autonomy. Some countries have gone further, proposing multilingual and intercultural education for all.

Despite this long history and remarkable transition, IBE is still poorly designed, randomly targeted, and, ultimately, scarcely implemented. Specialized textbooks and teachers are scant, and indigenous children more often than not receive an education that does not serve them well, either as citizens of the state or as recipients of their own culture. This report has shown a clear association between formal education and native language loss, but similar associations have been proved between formal education and other aspects of indigenous cultures that are essential to their survival, such as ethnobotanical knowledge,[141] medical knowledge and practices,[142] and traditional social arrangements.[143] Indigenous parents and community leaders are therefore faced with the

141 Stanford Zent, "Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) and Biocultural Diversity: A Close-up Look at Linkages, Delearning Trends & Changing Patterns of Transmission," in *Learning and Knowing in Indigenous Societies Today*, eds. Peter Bates, Moe Chiba, Sabine Kube, and Douglas Nakashima (Paris: UNESCO, 2009).

142 Germán Freire and Aimé Tillett, *Salud Indígena en Venezuela* vols. 1–2, (Caracas: Ministerio de Salud, 2007).

143 Laura Rival, "Formal Schooling and the Production of Modern Citizens in the Ecuadorian Amazon," in *Schooling the Symbolic Animal: Social and Cultural Dimensions of Education*, eds. Bradley A. U. Levinson et al. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).

dilemma of having to choose between preparing the younger generations for the global world they will most likely have to live in as adults or educating them according to their traditions. There is evidence that IBE can help indigenous children navigate many of these challenges and paradoxes, but it needs to be implemented well. IBE should offer indigenous children the tools to benefit from the state without having to renounce their cultures and languages in the process. The morbid association between formal education and culture loss today should be seen as an alarm on the urgency of moving faster to implement culturally adequate and socially inclusive programs.

Addressing the new scenarios and social realities of indigenous peoples.

The post-2015 agenda must also take into account the changing scenarios that indigenous peoples are living in at present. We cannot ignore that the number of indigenous Latin Americans living in urban settings has nearly caught up with the number of rural indigenous people. Besides challenging our collective representation of what *indigeneity* means, this new scenario defies the models and analytic tools we use to understand and address their needs and priorities.

The transition to urban spaces has clearly improved the rate of access to basic services and market opportunities for many indigenous peoples. In cities, indigenous households tend to have better access to electricity, piped water, and sewerage. Cityscapes have also been catalysts of political participation and empowerment. In some distinctive locations, such as El Alto, Bolivia, urban dwellers have been able to broaden their citizenship rights and political participation. For women, the migration to cities can open new opportunities to break away from discriminatory roles and enjoy greater social, economic, and political opportunities and liberties than in their communities of origin. Children substantially improve their access to schooling. Despite these gains, a disproportionately large number of indigenous households moving to cities occupy unsanitary, insecure, and naturally risk-prone areas, indeed improving their access to basic services—or averting some immediate threats, such as households escaping armed conflict—but at the expense of increasing their vulnerabilities or exposing themselves to new forms of exclusion.

The region needs to improve its understanding of the situations of indigenous people living in urban settings, as well as the reasons they are leaving their traditional territories, and address both their needs and priorities in ways that respect their identities and dignity.

Though urbanization is not unique to indigenous people, this report has presented abundant evidence that they are being hit more pervasively by the rural-urban transition than other groups. Thirty-six percent of indigenous urban dwellers in the region are relegated to slums, nearly twice the proportion of non-indigenous urban dwellers. In many countries the percentage of indigenous slum dwellers is much higher. In cities, indigenous people have on average one-third of the access to piped water that other urban Latin Americans have, a sixth of their access to electricity, and a fifth of their access to proper housing.

In slums, with limited skills to compete in the job market, and deprived of many of the safety nets and assets they had in their communities of origin, indigenous urban households require a reassessment of their needs and strategies of inclusion, which should begin with rendering visible their situations, coping strategies, and specific views of the urban space.

There is, therefore, little question that improving indigenous peoples' conditions in urban settings needs a comprehensive and strategic approach, aimed at targeting the root causes of their disproportional marginalization. Nevertheless, the current regulatory framework and development agenda have little or no reference to their situations.

With the growth in urban indigenous dwellers, more research is needed to understand multiple aspects of their urban experience, ranging from the role of the informal economies in indigenous urban households and its impact on poverty and life indicators, to the opportunities cityscapes offer for political participation and the expansion of the intercultural agenda.

Expanding the voice and participation opportunities of indigenous peoples.

One way of addressing the needs and priorities of a changing indigenous population, without ascribing it to the prejudices and stereotypes that have dominated our understanding of their situations so far, is by increasing their own voice and agency in development and policy making. The need to involve local communities in development programs and policies is, in fact, one of the few areas of development where there seems to be a consensus nowadays. By de facto rule or by law, the question in Latin America no longer is whether indigenous peoples should be involved in decision making, but rather how and when.

Though there are limited data to assess indigenous peoples' involvement as voters in electoral processes, their increasing involvement in politics is evident in the rise of indigenous representatives at all levels of government, including the presidency of Bolivia. Electoral systems offer indigenous peoples an opportunity to bring their political agenda into mainstream debates, therefore increasing their voice within the state. However, only a handful of countries have enacted laws that broaden the political participation of indigenous people in democratic elections. For instance, only eight countries have created laws and procedures aimed at guaranteeing the participation of indigenous voters in electoral processes, six have reserved seats in local and national legislatures for indigenous representatives, and only four have changed the political-administrative division of the country in order to favor special electoral jurisdictions for indigenous peoples.

The region must make more efforts to eliminate the geographic, linguistic, and social barriers that prevent indigenous peoples from partaking in electoral processes. The division of the Mexican state of Oaxaca is one insightful example. Out of 570 municipalities, 418 are now managed according to indigenous peoples' traditions *(usos y costumbres)* and are recognized by the state's constitution.[144] Within these municipalities, indigenous people can exercise their own modalities of participation or conduct electoral processes that better represent their views and social arrangements. Reorganizing the electoral districts improves the representation of indigenous leaders in different sectors of governments and increases the participation of individuals who belong to small indigenous peoples.

The region must make more efforts to eliminate the geographic, linguistic, and social barriers that prevent indigenous peoples from partaking in decision making, including electoral processes.

The advance of the indigenous rights agenda in Latin America has also spurred the creation of high-level government bodies dedicated to overseeing the implementation of indigenous rights. Though their organization and effectiveness varies from case to case, the fact that they exist is a positive signal, which is already starting to shed valuable lessons. The creation of an international framework for the advancement of indigenous peoples' rights and aspirations within the UN system is indicative of the progress made on this front on a wider scale. Over the past two decades, the UN has established a

144 ECLAC, *Guaranteeing Indigenous People's Rights*, 19.

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, an Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Special Rapporteurship on the rights of indigenous peoples.

On the indigenous side, the creation of supra-national platforms for cooperation and mutual assistance has also improved considerably indigenous peoples' capacity to elevate their priorities onto the political agenda. The Foro Indígena Abya Yala, for example, which comprises over 40 organizations from Latin American and the Caribbean, has not only been involved in a dialogue with the World Bank, which has informed this report and the research on which it is based, but it has also been involved in other important spaces of decision making, such as the International Indian Treaty Council, International Indigenous Women's Forum, Consejo Continental de la Nación Guaraní, Rio+20, and the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples.[145] The region needs to support sub- and supra-national organizations of this sort not only because they reassert indigenous people's right to participate in high-level government meetings, but also because they enable indigenous organizations to share experiences on successful programs and policies with multiple actors, including governments, policy makers, and development agencies.

FPIC offers tools to guarantee the participation of indigenous peoples in decision making, but its regularization requires the consent of indigenous peoples, governments, and other stakeholders. Unilateral implementations have proved difficult and politically costly.

Free, prior and informed Consent (FPIC) is another important tool to guarantee the participation of indigenous peoples in aspects that can affect their lives, cultures, and assets. Experience of recent decades shows that, no matter how imperfect, the best way to advance development projects successfully in indigenous territories is through their involvement in the design, implementation, and monitoring of development programs. As a recent World Bank report asserts, "Consultations are the cornerstone of diagnosing problems and building support for interventions. …Building such consultations into projects and programs can help organizations frame key questions and identify the right channels for intervention."[146]

Though the way FPIC has been received and implemented in law and practice differs by country and even on a case-by-case basis, a few generalizations can be made:

- The region is still at the trial-and-error stage and, though numerous lessons are being learned, the learning curve is steep and requires commitment at all levels and branches of government. Attempts to regularize FPIC unilaterally and without the consent of all branches of government and other stakeholders that will have to partake in its implementation have proved difficult and politically costly.
- Whether it is entrenched in law and regulations or the result of de facto demands of the affected indigenous peoples, FPIC is a necessary feature of successful decision making. While numerous adjustments have yet to be made regarding how FPIC is implemented, lack of FPIC makes for unsustainable decisions and costly mistakes.
- Overall, the region is rich with experience in FPIC and could benefit from close collaboration between countries and among all relevant stakeholders.
- Access to quality, unbiased baseline information is key to its implementation, as is a clear understanding of decision-making dynamics within indigenous societies and the regulatory frameworks that assist them in every country.

145 Ibid., 31.

146 World Bank, *Inclusion Matters*, 237.

This report has provided comparative data on these and other aspects that should inform discussions leading to the implementation of FPIC.

Rethinking indigenous development goals and improving data collection strategies.

An area that requires further attention concerns the challenges involved in implementing targeted programs. Although the region has made tremendous progress in recognizing indigenous peoples' special needs, the implementation of concrete policies and programs to address them has been less significant. In the cases where such policies have been put in place, their benefits, impacts, and obstacles remain largely unexplored, despite abundant debate in academic and non-academic circles. A World Bank report recently asserted that it is important to "use impact evaluation tools to rigorously assess what policy tools and programs actually work—and which do not—in improving indigenous peoples' outcomes."[147] The participation of local communities in assessing development programs and policies is also vital, as statistical tools might fail to account for intangible outcomes that are central to the idea of development with identity, such as the empowerment of local organizational institutions or vulnerable subgroups.

Information on key areas of development, such as primary health care, access to justice, and political participation, remains scant and patchy, and therefore difficult to systematize and use for development planning. Positive and negative practices are found throughout the region, but, again, the region lacks a repository of knowledge that could allow learning from experiences and mistakes. Without public and accessible information of this sort, it is less likely that governments, NGOs, development agencies, and local communities will be able to take the necessary steps to address the causes that underpin poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion.

Positive and negative practices are found in every sector, but knowledge sharing is limited. The region needs to build repositories of knowledge to learn from experiences and mistakes.

Research and policy are increasingly needed to design statistical indicators that can facilitate data gathering on key areas of development. Policy makers should take into account that indigenous people's situations are often underreported or unknown because of the difficulties of accessing their territories (often isolated), civil conflict, and sociocultural inadequacies that remain in standardized data collection methods. Also, a number of indicators commonly used for assessing poverty and vulnerability do not adequately reflect indigenous people's views and situations. There are no development targets that describe the points of view and special needs of the indigenous population, for example, while global, cross-nationally comparative targets, such as the MDG, seem to be either failing to address ethnic minorities' special needs or simply not focusing on what is relevant to them; or most probably both.

Also, despite significant progress, important statistical gaps remain. A majority of Caribbean countries have not included statistical information concerning indigenous people or ethnic minorities in census data, and only nine countries in Latin America have included ethnic variables in household surveys. (Some household surveys that have included ethnic variables do not have representative samplings of indigenous households.) Likewise, few countries have included ethnic variables in other key statistical tools, such as their national epidemiological records, judicial records, birth and death records, and electoral statistics.

The region has made commendable progress to improve its methods of data gathering and

147 Hall and Patrinos, *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, and Development*, 387.

development planning aimed at ethnic minorities, as well as the quality of public statistics, but room for improvement remains. The data presented in this report were standardized precisely to help build a critical body of knowledge with accessible and comparable data and indicators on indigenous peoples. The region should also take further steps toward including indigenous peoples' views and priorities in the setting of development targets, as well as in assessing progress toward them. The participation of indigenous organizations in identifying culturally appropriate indicators, data collection methods, and analyses is critical, not only because they can contribute with locally and culturally specific notions of development and vulnerability, but also because it gives indigenous peoples the ability and agency to decide what development goals are relevant to them and how poverty reduction efforts should be implemented.

Indigenous peoples must be involved in the identification of culturally appropriate indicators, data collection methods, and policy analyses. This will give them the ability and agency to decide what development goals are relevant to them and how poverty reduction efforts should be implemented.

Finally, indigenous peoples should also be seen as key partners in the region's development agenda. Strengthening indigenous communities' rights to their lands and resources, for example, has proved an effective strategy to combat climate change. In Brazil, the legal recognition of and enforcement in indigenous territories proved an important strategy to prevent deforestation. From 2000 to 2012, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon was 0.6 percent within legally protected indigenous territories, but 7 percent outside them, leading to 27 times more carbon dioxide emissions.[148] The potential contributions of indigenous peoples to key areas of development such as food security, environmental management, biodiversity, farming, pharmacology, medicine, human rights, arts, low-cost/low-tech solutions, ethics, politics, community-driven development, and alternative knowledge have been proved and make indigenous peoples indispensable partners in the struggle to rid Latin America of poverty and lead it to a path of sustainable green growth and shared prosperity.

148 Caleb Stevens, Robert Winterbottom, Jenny Springer, and Katie Reytar, *Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change: How Strengthening Community Forest Rights Mitigates Climate Change* (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2014), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/securingrights_executive_summary.pdf.

Appendix A

Countries, Years, and Variables Available for Identifying Indigenous Peoples in Censuses and Household Surveys of the Region

Country	Household surveys				
	Years	Available variables for IP identification		No Data	Comments
		Self-Identification	Language		
Argentina				x	
Bolivia	2000, 2012	x	x		
Brazil	2001, 2012	x			
Chile	2003, 2011	x	x		IP identified starting 2003.
Colombia				x	
Costa Rica				x	
Ecuador	2004, 2012	x	x		
El Salvador				x	
Guatemala	2000, 2011	x	x		
Honduras				x	
Mexico	2010, 2012	x	x		IP identified starting 2008.
Nicaragua	2000	x	x		IP identified only for 2000. No data available for recent years.
Panama				x	
Paraguay			x		IP identified by language, though “Guaraní” speakers do not indicate affiliation to an indigenous group.
Peru	2004, 2012	x	x		
Uruguay	2006, 2012	x			Urban only.
Venezuela				x	

Country	Censuses			
	Years	Available variables for IP identification		Comments
		Self-Identification	Language	
Argentina	2004/2005	x	x	National census does not have any ethnicity variable. IP is identified by the *"Encuesta Complementaria de Pueblos Indígenas."*
Bolivia	2001, 2012	x	x	
Brazil	1991, 2000, 2010	x	x	
Chile	2002, 2012	x	x	
Colombia	2005	x	x	
Costa Rica	2000, 2011	x	x	
Ecuador	2001, 2010	x	x	
El Salvador	2007	x	x	
Guatemala	2002	x	x	
Honduras	2001, 2013	x		
Mexico	2010	x	x	Before 2010, the identification of IP was done based on language spoken.
Nicaragua	2005	x	x	
Panama	1990, 2000, 2010	x		
Paraguay	2002, 2012	x	x	
Peru	1993, 2007		x	
Uruguay				
Venezuela	2001, 2011	x	x	

Appendix B

State of Intercultural Bilingual Education in Seven Latin American Countries

Country	Bolivia	Guatemala	Mexico
Indigenous languages	36	24	65
Legal provisions	National constitution of 2009 National Education Law of 2010 General Law of Linguistic Rights and Language Policies of 2012	National constitution of 1985 National Education Law of 1991 Peace Accords of 1996 Law of National Languages of 2003	National constitution reformed in 1992 and 2001 Federal Education Law of 1973, reformed in 2010 and 2014 General Law of Linguistic Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2003
Dates of official bilingual education program initiation	1977 with the beginning of a Quechua/Spanish bilingual education project under USAID support and in 1980 of an Aymara/Spanish project under a World Bank loan. 1983 as a result of the creation by presidential decree of a national intercultural bilingual literacy program in Aymara, Guarani, and Quechua. 1990 beginning of an experimental project for Aymara, Guarani, and Quechua children, with active grassroots participation and UNICEF support. 1994 with the new educational reform law that institutionalizes intercultural bilingual education as a national policy.	1980 beginning of an experimental bilingual, bicultural education project with the four most common Mayan languages, under USAID support. 1985 with the creation of a national bilingual, bicultural program under USAID support, for the four largest Mayan populations. In 1992 PRONADE (Programa Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Educación) was a decentralized education program administered by indigenous communities reaching places where formal schooling had not. It was closed in 2009. In 1995 Guatemala adopted intercultural bilingual education with the creation of DIGEBI (Dirección General de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural).	1964 with the creation of the National Service of Cultural Promoters and Bilingual Teachers, and 1978 with the creation of the General Directorate of Indigenous Education, under the spirit of bilingual, bicultural education and as of 1997 intercultural bilingual education. In 1971 CONAFE (Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo), a national organization offering alternative educational services, was created to attend to smaller and vulnerable indigenous rural populations not covered by formal schooling. In 2000 as a result of the creation of the General Coordination of Intercultural Bilingual Education, with the mandate of promoting intercultural education for all.

Peru	Ecuador	Nicaragua	Colombia
43	12	6	65
National constitution of 1993 National Education Law of 2003 Law for the Protection of Indigenous Knowledge of 2009 Indigenous Languages Law of 2011	National constitution of 2008 National Law of Intercultural Education of 2012	National Autonomy Statute for the Atlantic Coast of 1987 Law of official use of the languages of the communities of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua of 1993 Law of Indigenous Languages of Nicaragua of 1998	National decree of 1976 regarding the educational rights and needs of indigenous populations National constitution of 1991 National Education Law of 1995 Law of Native Languages of 2010
1961 beginning of an academic experimental Quechua-Spanish program supported by a national university. 1972 within the framework of the first official National Bilingual Education Policy and within the framework of a new National Education Law. Two large IBE experimental programs began in 1975 in Cuzco (Quechua) and Puno (Aymara and Quechua) under USAID and GIZ technical support.	1979 beginning of a national Quechua literacy program supported by a local private university. Various indigenous organizations and NGO projects beginning in 1972 preceded the government program. In 1982 the intercultural bilingual education of children became official, and in 1988 it was incorporated in the national education law.	1980 beginning of a national literacy crusade that included literacy training in Miskito and English on the Atlantic coast, and in 1984 with a preschool and elementary intercultural bilingual education program to attend to Miskito, Sumu, and Creole children.	Since the late 1970s in different indigenous territories, but more prominently in the Cauca region, ethnic organizations started their own alternative education projects and programs. 1984 with the creation of the National Ethno-Education Program, in response to the indigenous struggle for more relevant education in indigenous territories.

Continue...

Country	Bolivia	Guatemala	Mexico
Involvement of civil society organizations	NGOs Indigenous organizations Universities	NGOs Mayan civil society organizations Universities	Some NGOs particularly in educational levels not yet attended to by the state Universities
Aid from international donors	USAID, GIZ, WB, IDB, DANIDA, ASDI, Finland, UNICEF, Netherlands, foreign NGOs	USAID, GIZ, WB, IDB, Finland, Norway, UNICEF, UNESCO, foreign NGOs	Indirectly through local NGOs WB loans
Government units responsible for IBE	Unidad de Políticas Intraculturales, Interculturales y plurilingües dependiente del Ministro de Educación	Viceministerio de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural Dirección General de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural	Dirección General de Educación Indígena Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo Coordinación General de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe
Estimated coverage of IBE	No disaggregated data available. In 2005 IBE reached 22% of the population that required it.	19% in pre-school and 15.6% in elementary education in 2012 (ICEFI 2013).	In 2012–13, 407,346 students were registered in preschool and 847,519 in elementary school (Sept. 2013).
Educational levels covered	No information available	Preschool and primary	Preschool, primary, and secondary
Tertiary education initiatives	Three public indigenous universities operate.	Two unrecognized indigenous universities offer services in two indigenous regions.	Twelve public intercultural universities in indigenous territories.
Availability of educational materials in indigenous languages	No information available since 2006. In 2005 materials were available for the first six grades in Aymara, Guaraní, and Quechua.	In 12 languages for the first three grades of elementary education.	In most languages for preschool and elementary education.

Peru	Ecuador	Nicaragua	Colombia
Universities Indigenous organizations of the Amazon basin NGOs	NGOs Indigenous organizations Universities	Indigenous organizations NGOs Universities	Indigenous organizations NGOs Universities
USAID, GIZ, WB, IDB, Finland, UNICEF, foreign NGOs	GIZ, WB, IDB, Finland, UNICEF, foreign NGOs	EU, Finland, foreign NGOs	IDB, indirectly through international NGOs
Dirección General de Educación Intercultural, Bilingüe y Rural, dependiente del Viceministerio de Gestión Pedagógica	Subsecretaría para el Diálogo Intercultural Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe	Programa Nacional de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural	Oficina Asesora de Atención Educativa a Grupos Étnicos del Viceministerio de Educación de Preescolar, Básica y Media.
38% in elementary school in 2012 (Defensoría del Pueblo).	No disaggregated data available. In 2005 IBE reached 52% of the population that required it.	Reaching all indigenous children in schools of the Atlantic coast.	No disaggregated data available.
Preschool and primary	Preschool and primary	Preschool and primary	Preschool and primary
Three public intercultural indigenous universities.	One private unrecognized indigenous university.	One public community indigenous intercultural university.	One unrecognized community indigenous intercultural university.
In 13 languages for preschool and elementary education.	In 2 languages (Kichwa and Shwar) for preschool and elementary education and primers in some others.	In 3 languages mostly for elementary education.	No information available.

Continue...

Country	Bolivia	Guatemala	Mexico
Quick policy and implementation appraisal	The education of indigenous students has historically been a matter of national concern involving practically the whole country. Abandonment of IBE after two decades of intensive implementation in primary schooling in rural areas. IBE counted on indigenous organization support and practically originated from the bottom up. Now in pursuit of multilingual education for all.	Long history of early-exit transitional IBE. The education of indigenous students became a matter of national concern involving vast areas of the country as a result of the Peace Accords (1996). Persistence of vast gaps between legal rhetoric and school practice. Official IBE seen mainly as compensatory. Some innovative programs carried out by NGOs and often with international aid.	The education of indigenous students has historically been a matter of national concern involving practically the whole country. Long history of continuous official compensatory indigenous education and compensatory IBE with persistence of vast gaps between rhetoric and practice. Innovations being tried out in perspective of intercultural education for all, with emphasis on the mainstream population. Connections and creative articulation among the three bodies responsible for IBE.
Main challenges	Quality improvement of education in indigenous regions. Implementation of new national intercultural and multilingual educational model and curriculum, which incorporates indigenous knowledge and practices. Pre-service and in-service teacher training for native language teaching. Cooperation between MoE and NGOs. Introducing IBE in secondary schooling and at tertiary level.	Quality improvement of IBE programs. Indigenous participation in IBE decision making. Incorporation of indigenous culture and knowledge in the curriculum. Improved coordination and cooperation among MoE, indigenous organizations, and NGOs. Pre-service and in-service teacher training. Introducing IBE in secondary schooling. Intercultural education for the mainstream population.	Quality improvement of indigenous education programs. Indigenous participation in IBE decision making. Coordination and cooperation among the three different government units responsible for the education of indigenous students, Pre-service and in-service teacher training. Reinforcing IBE in secondary schooling. Intercultural education for the mainstream population.

Source: prepared by Luis Enrique Lopez-Hurtado for this report.

Peru	Ecuador	Nicaragua	Colombia
The education of indigenous students has historically been a matter of national concern involving practically the whole country. Long history of IBE projects and national programs, persistence of vast gaps between legal rhetoric and practice. Recent renewed government interest on the issue with intensive activity in different regions. Innovations being tried mainly in rural areas.	Long history of IBE projects and national programs that originated from the bottom up and received indigenous organization support. For 20 years IBE was granted partial autonomy. The present situation of IBE is not clear. Recent legislation proclaims interculturalism for all, but for some indigenous leaders to the detriment of IBE.	The implementation of IBE is focused on the Atlantic coast. Two decades of IBE implementation at project level, in primary schooling. Legally recognized autonomous education system for the Atlantic coast, of which IBE forms part about to start implementation. IBE has become "the normal" mode of schooling, although vast gaps between rhetoric and practice remain.	IBE in Colombia is understood as part of ethno-education models.
Quality improvement of IBE programs. Increased coordination and cooperation among MoE, indigenous organizations, and NGOs. Pre-service and in-service teacher training. Introducing IBE in secondary schooling. Intercultural education for the mainstream population.	Quality improvement of IBE programs. Improved coordination and cooperation among MoE, indigenous organizations, and NGOs. Pre-service and in-service teacher training. Introducing IBE in secondary schooling. Intercultural education for the mainstream population.	Quality improvement of IBE programs. Improved coordination and cooperation between MoE and educational secretariats of the autonomous territories of the Atlantic coast. Pre-service and in-service teacher training. Introducing IBE in secondary schooling. Intercultural education for the mainstream population.	Quality improvement of IBE programs. Improved coordination and cooperation between MoE and indigenous organizations. Pre-service and in-service teacher training. Introducing IBE in secondary schooling. Intercultural education for the mainstream population.

Appendix C

Regional Comparative Data | **Demography**

Country	Year (Projection 2010)	Total Indigenous Population*	Proportion of IP	Average Age		Average Children Ever Born	
				Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous
Argentina	2010	955,032	2.4%	–	–	–	–
Bolivia	2012	4,115,226	41%	30.02	25.74	3.8	2.6
Brazil	2010	817,963	0.5%	26.17	31.61	2.5	1.9
Chile	2002 (2010)	788,935	4.6%	30.36	31.66	2.4	2.3
Colombia	2005 (2010)	1,532,678	3.3%	25.2	28.91	2.7	2.2
Costa Rica	2011	104,143	2.4%	31.96	31.1	2.8	2.2
Ecuador	2010	1,018,176	7%	25.72	28.52	2.9	2.3
El Salvador	2007 (2010)	14,865	0.2%	26.44	27.52	2.2	2.4
Guatemala	2002 (2010)	5,880,046	41%	21.77	24.36	–	–
Honduras	2001 (2010)	548,727	7.2%	–	–	–	–
Mexico	2010	16,836,877	15%	30.78	30.89	2.8	2.3
Nicaragua	2005 (2010)	349,333	6%	23.21	24.47	3.2	2.8
Panama	2010	417,559	12.2%	22.21	31.11	3.2	2.2
Paraguay	2012	112,848	1.7%	–	–	–	–
Peru	2007 (2010)	7,596,039	26%	27.9	28.5	2.9	2.3
Venezuela	2011	724,592	2.8%	–	–	–	–
Latin America		**41,813,039**	**7.8%**	**29.8**	**30.2**	**3.1**	**2.3**

* See criteria used for identification in page 25, table 2.

Country	Year	Population in Urban Areas (Percentage of Indigenous People)
Bolivia	2001	56%
	2012	48%
Brazil	2000	52%
	2010	29%
Chile	2002	65%
Colombia	2005	22%
Costa Rica	2001	23%
	2011	41%
Ecuador	2001	39%
	2010	21%
El Salvador	2007	51%
Honduras	2001	15%
Latin America		49%
Mexico	2010	54%
Nicaragua	2005	38%
Panama	2000	18%
	2010	24%
Peru	1993	51%
	2007	53%
Venezuela	2001	86%
	2011	63%

Country	Year	Illiteracy (Indigenous population)		Percentage of Indigenous population that speaks indigenous language by level of education, population 24+				
		Percentage of illiterate population 10+ that doesn't speak indigenous language	Percentage of illiterate population 10+ that speaks indigenous language	Less than primary completed	Primary completed	Secondary completed	Tertiary completed	
Bolivia	2001	4.8%	95.1%	55%	29%	14%	2%	
Brazil	2000	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Chile		–	–	–	–	–	–	
Colombia	2005	33.9%	66%	76%	17%	6%	1%	
Costa Rica	2000	8.8%	91.1%	76%	23%	1%	0%	
Ecuador	2010	20.5%	79.4%	55%	34%	9%	2%	
El Salvador	2007	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Guatemala	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Honduras	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Mexico	2010	25.7%	74.2%	60%	33%	5%	2%	
Nicaragua	2005	3.2%	96.7%	59%	28%	10%	2%	
Panama	2010	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Peru	2007	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Venezuela	2001	13.3%	86.6%	67%	25%	8%	0%	

Country	Year	Education Attainment (Indigenous Population)							
		Percentage with less than primary completed		Percentage with primary completed		Percentage with secondary completed		Percentage with tertiary completed	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Bolivia	2001	25%	59%	75%	41%	34%	8%	4%	0%
Brazil	2010	44%	73%	56%	27%	25%	6%	5%	1%
Chile	2002	29%	52%	71%	48%	25%	7%	2%	0%
Colombia	2005	42%	72%	58%	28%	22%	5%	4%	0%
Costa Rica	2000	40%	70%	60%	30%	18%	3%	6%	0%
Ecuador	2010	40%	56%	60%	44%	17%	7%	2%	1%
El Salvador	2007	49%	81%	51%	19%	18%	2%	3%	0%

	School Attendance							
	6 to 11 years old				12 to 18 years old			
	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous		Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	
			Urban	Rural			Urban	Rural
	–	–	–	–	59%	66%	66%	49%
	–	–	–	–	74%	84%	83%	70%
	83%	97%	97%	78%				
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	74%	92%	91%	70%	55%	74%	73%	50%
	75%	95%	92%	71%	51%	69%	65%	47%
	96%	97%	96%	96%	73%	79%	73%	73%
	81%	84%	86%	77%	63%	70%	70%	57%
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	96%	97%	96%	96%	69%	75%	72%	67%
	83%	82%	89%	80%	67%	65%	78%	60%
	92%	98%	96%	91%	72%	85%	78%	71%
	93%	96%	96%	91%	81%	79%	85%	77%
	78%	95%	79%	71%	56%	75%	57%	47%

Country	Year	Education Attainment (Indigenous Population)							
		Percentage with less than primary completed		Percentage with primary completed		Percentage with secondary completed		Percentage with tertiary completed	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Guatemala	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Honduras	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mexico	2010	40%	57%	60%	44%	17%	5%	5%	1%
Nicaragua	2005	45%	77%	55%	23%	18%	3%	5%	0%
Panama	2010	38%	66%	62%	34%	18%	4%	3%	1%
Peru	2007	40%	66%	60%	34%	36%	11%	5%	1%
Venezuela	2001	64%	76%	36%	24%	9%	3%	0%	0%

Country	Year	Access to Electricity		Access to Piped Water		Access to Sewerage	
		IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP
Bolivia	2012	76%	95%	69%	87%	55%	76%
Brazil	2010	78%	99%	65%	93%	36%	67%
Chile	2002	90%	98%	86%	97%	77%	92%
Colombia	2005	58%	94%	41%	84%	–	–
Costa Rica	2011	81%	99%	75%	97%	70%	96%
Ecuador	2010	84%	96%	77%	84%	43%	79%
El Salvador	2007	62%	88%	61%	76%	34%	43%
Guatemala	2002	–	–	69%	77%	–	–
Mexico	2010	95%	99%	82%	93%	69%	92%
Nicaragua	2005	50%	70%	39%	65%	10%	26%
Panama	2010	40%	92%	60%	94%	20%	65%
Peru	2007	61%	80%	53%	74%	40%	67%
Venezuela	2001	92%	97%	61%	87%	44%	86%

Country	Variation in Access to Electricity (Early-Late 2000s)	Variation in Access to Sewerage (Early-Late 2000s)	Variation in Access to Piped Water (Early-Late 2000s)
Bolivia	+14%	+20%	+2%
Brazil	+7%	-12%	+1%
Costa Rica	+20%	+16%	0%
Ecuador	+12%	+12%	+6%
Panama	+13%	+5%	+10%
Peru	+21%	+16%	+10%

Access to Cell Phones		Access to Computer		Access to Internet	
IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP
–	–	15%	36%	4%	16%
46%	85%	12%	39%	–	–
39%	55%	10%	23%	4%	11%
–	–	2%	16%	–	–
64%	91%	17%	36%	16%	35%
54%	81%	8%	29%	2%	14%
48%	67%	8%	11%	3%	4%
–	–	–	–	–	–
44%	70%	13%	34%	8%	25%
13%	24%	2%	4%	0%	1%
53%	89%	5%	32%	52%	72%
24%	50%	6%	18%	2%	9%
–	–	3%	13%	1%	4%

Country	Year	Employment Status (Working-Age Population)									
		Percentage of Employment		Employed							
				Type of Occupation							
				High-skill Employment		Low-skill Employment		Agriculture/Rural		Unspecified	
		Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous
Argentina		–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bolivia	2011	60%	57%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	2012	–	–	10%	27%	47%	58%	38%	9%	4%	5%
Brazil	2010	–	–	18%	28%	47%	56%	30%	8%	6%	8%
Chile	2002	–	–	22%	39%	65%	56%	13%	5%	0%	0%
Colombia	2005	47%	56%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Costa Rica	2000	61%	60%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	2011	–	–	20%	34%	65%	62%	15%	4%	0%	0%
Ecuador	2010	74%	65%	6%	25%	51%	65%	43%	10%	0%	0%
El Salvador	2007	–	–	15%	22%	69%	67%	16%	11%	0%	0%
Guatemala	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Honduras	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mexico	2010	63%	63%	12%	24%	63%	68%	25%	8%	0%	0%
Nicaragua	2005	57%	59%	12%	17%	48%	60%	40%	23%	0%	0%
Panama	2010	17% Female 65 % Male	45% Female 77% Male	27%	47%	70%	45%	2%	8%	0%	1%
Peru	2007	–	–	11%	26%	65%	64%	25%	10%	0%	0%
Venezuela	2001	48%	55%	18%	36%	65%	51%	8%	7%	8%	7%

Employment Status (Working-Age Population)

Employed								Inactive		Unemployed	
Education Level											
Primary		Secondary		Tertiary		Unspecified					
Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous	Indigenous	Non-Indigenous
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	36%	39%	4%	4%
40%	10%	18%	21%	36%	61%	5%	8%	–	–	–	–
44%	15%	16%	22%	40%	63%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
20%	11%	24%	23%	55%	66%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
68%	27%	6%	14%	25%	58%	0%	0%	49%	39%	4%	4%
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	35%	38%	4%	2%
34%	13%	14%	20%	51%	67%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
55%	21%	17%	20%	29%	59%	0%	0%	22%	31%	4%	5%
29%	18%	21%	23%	50%	59%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
10%	19%	20%	22%	70%	59%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
30%	11%	23%	25%	47%	64%	0%	0%	35%	34%	2%	3%
51%	34%	16%	19%	33%	48%	0%	0%	41%	39%	2%	2%
49%	10%	12%	20%	39%	70%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
43%	19%	15%	17%	42%	64%	0%	0%	–	–	–	–
19%	10%	22%	21%	59%	69%	0%	0%	46%	40%	7%	6%

Country	Year	Indigenous Population		Non-Indigenous Population		Percentage Living in Slums		Percentage of Indigenous Population Living without Electricity		Percentage of Indigenous Population Living without Piped Water	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	IP	Non- IP	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Bolivia	2001	48%	52%	87%	13%	47%	39%	9%	74%	12%	60%
Brazil	2010	29%	71%	85%	15%	40%	27%	2%	35%	7%	52%
Chile	2002	65%	35%	88%	12%	5%	4%	2%	25%	1%	39%
Colombia	2005	22%	78%	78%	22%	32%	9%	7%	52%	18%	70%
Costa Rica	2000	41%	59%	74%	26%	16%	5%	0%	51%	1%	32%
Ecuador	2010	21%	79%	66%	34%	21%	17%	3%	20%	9%	27%
El Salvador	2007	51%	49%	63%	37%	40%	40%	12%	66%	20%	59%
Guatemala	2002	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Honduras	2001	15%	85%	48%	52%	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mexico	2010	54%	46%	81%	19%	23%	8%	2%	9%	8%	29%
Nicaragua	2005	38%	62%	54%	46%	80%	60%	16%	72%	37%	76%
Panama	2010	24%	76%	71%	29%	47%	31%	7%	76%	5%	50%
Paraguay	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Peru	2007	53%	47%	82%	18%	57%	37%	15%	67%	22%	75%
Venezuela	2001	63%	37%	89%	11%	65%	17%	6%	23%	35%	63%
Latin America	–	49%	51%	81%	19%	36%	–	–	–	–	–

Percentage Living in Urban Areas without Piped Water		Percentage Living in Urban Areas with Unfinished Floor (Earth)		Percentage Living in Urban Areas without Electricity		Percentage Living in Urban Areas without Sewerage		Percentage of Indigenous Population that Owns Dwelling	
IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP	IP	Non- IP	Urban	Rural
12%	8%	15%	11%	9%	8%	41%	34%	61%	90%
7%	2%	–	–	2%	0%	39%	26%	71%	92%
1%	0%	1%	0%	2%	1%	4%	3%	74%	84%
18%	8%	22%	7%	7%	2%	–	–	65%	84%
1%	0%	6%	1%	0%	0%	14%	4%	53%	65%
9%	9%	6%	4%	3%	2%	10%	9%	52%	86%
20%	11%	24%	13%	12%	5%	37%	37%	76%	80%
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
8%	4%	8%	3%	2%	1%	14%	3%	79%	94%
37%	10%	21%	28%	16%	5%	74%	55%	89%	92%
5%	2%	9%	3%	7%	2%	40%	31%	69%	89%
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
22%	16%	45%	25%	15%	8%	32%	20%	76%	82%
35%	9%	22%	3%	6%	1%	54%	9%	84%	71%
13%	4%	17%	3%	6%	1%	23%	16%	–	–

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